Writer: Colonel Ashfaq Hussain, retired

Nur ul Hassan belongs to a small village Chinji near Talagang. His father, Darab Khan was a retired havildar from Pakistan Artillery. He was educated up to middle class from his village, and did his matriculation from Talagang. He then joined Army Apprentices School (AAS) Rawalpindi, which was then located where Army Medical College is these days. This school prepared technicians for the military technical services like EME, Signals and Engineers. At the time of joining, Nur ul Hassan also thought that he would get some modest job in the Army. He never knew what was destined for him, and what feats he was to perform in the next war with India. During his training at AAS, he appeared in intermediate examination. After passing intermediate he joined 16th War Course, passed out from PMA on 30th November 1968, and joined 46 Field Regiment Artillery, which was then located at Garhi Dopatta in Azad Kashmir. The unit moved to Sialkot in July 1969 as part of 8 Division. He was promoted lieutenant in 1969 and captain in 1970.

46 Field Regiment was placed with 24 Brigade which was responsible to defend Zafarwal. Due to the then prevailing situation in the country, the division moved to its operational area on 25th September 1971 from Sialkot. It was located at Qila Sobha Singh and comprised 24 Brigade, 14 Para Brigade which was responsible for defending Shakargarh, and 115 Brigade to defend Narowal. At the outbreak of war, the enemy committed three infantry divisions and two independent armoured brigades. 24 Brigade defending Zafarwal, had 24 Punjab, 40 Punjab and 11 Baluch (now Baloch) under its command. 46 Field Regiment, in direct support of 24 Brigade, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Saeed Janjua. Besides direct support regiment, two batteries each from 12 Medium and 33 Heavy Regiments respectively, were available in reinforcing role. The tasks assigned to 24 Brigade were: (see map-1)

• Take up defensive positions from Degh Nadi to Basantar Nullah, with a view to defending area Sakror Bund, Azizpur and Zafarwal.
• Occupy advance position with a company in area village Lagwal.
• Be prepared to operate with armoured brigade group to counter attack within brigade area, if needed.

Full-fledged war on the western front broke out on 3rd December. In Sialkot sector, 115 Brigade of 8 Division took the initiative and ousted Indian troops from Dharam Enclave, which was north of River Ravi, and which could pose a serious threat to Narowal. On 6th December, at about 1630 hours, Captain Nur ul Hassan was asked to go ahead with a platoon of 11 Baluch and engage the enemy as far forward as possible. Exact position of the enemy was not known. He contacted Commanding Officer 11 Baluch, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Herbert, who expressed his inability to spare a platoon due to paucity of troops. Instead, he spared an intelligence havildar to accompany him. According to the CO, he was well familiar with the ground and knew the area well, particularly the layout of minefields and the gaps in between. They were four persons from 46 Field Regiment, forward observation officer (FOO), Captain Nur, driver, wireless operator, a technical assistant, and an NCO from 11 Baluch. (see map-2)

Driving on a muddy track in broad daylight, they drove towards the enemy, kicking up a lot of dust, exposing themselves to enemy snipers and artillery observers. It was a risk, but Nur, energetic in the prime of youth, and infused with the spirit of Jihad, didn’t care, and kept on moving with speed. They reached Darman, crossed Basantar Nullah and arrived at a vintage point at Nikki Brahmna. Nur scanned the area through binoculars and found that an enemy armoured regiment was concentrating in area Narayanpur Dinga. Many vehicles were unloading fuel barrels. It was obvious that those barrels were meant to fill up the tanks before proceeding further.

This area was already surveyed and had been registered. Captain Nur immediately called for the fire of all batteries. They promptly responded and the area was bombarded with heavy shells. The vehicles caught fire and in turn set the fuel barrels ablaze, as well. Many tanks were damaged. Indian officers were heard talking on the wireless in panic, that their tanks were damaged, they were short of fuel and they were not in a position to go for attack. Their conversation was intercepted at 24 Brigade Headquarters. Nur was asked to fall back to brigade headquarters. He returned at about 7 pm. At brigade headquarters he was debriefed and it was revealed that Nur went without a platoon. Commander 24 Brigade asked CO 11 Baluch about the platoon, he had ordered to accompany Captain Nur. For this act of bravery, Captain Nur was recommended for Sitara-e Juraat.

It did not end here for Nur. The same night, it was decided to send a strong fighting patrol ahead with 30 soldiers. Nur was selected as patrol leader. Normally such tasks are assigned to some infantry officer, but Nur was selected because he was familiar with the area. In fact, he knew the area like the lines of his palms. The troops who were to accompany him came from 11 Baluch, SSG and Rangers, 10 each. Second Lieutenant Waseem Ashraf (later Lieutenant General) of 11 Baluch, was nominated as second in command of the patrol. While advancing between Darman and Ghamrola, Nur engaged the suspected positions of the enemy with artillery fire. As they were proceeding to Village Ghamrola, Captain Nur heard one of their FOOs Captain Saleem, deployed at the right edge of Sakror Bund, asking for fire in an area where they were moving. This is what happens in the fog of war. It was night time and there were no night vision devices available to Pakistan Army at that time. Captain Saleem spotted some movement in the area and thought that they were enemy troops. With a lot of difficulty Nur succeeded in contacting Saleem and got the fire stopped. Nur scanned the area thoroughly, and reported to brigade headquarters, whatever he observed. He was asked to fall back late at night. (see map-3)

On 8 December, commanding officer of 46 Field Regiment and Commander 24 Brigade came to the gun positions in the evening, and said that it has been decided to send Nur to the advance position at Lagwal, where Alpha Company of 11 Baluch was deployed. It was being, commanded by Major Iftikhar Ali Khan (later Lieutenant General). The enemy was moving from Darman- Ghamrola towards the south. They launched seven to eight attacks, but Alpha Company fought bravely and repulsed those attacks. Nur also performed his role bravely and brought effective fire on the advancing enemy. By 11 December, the enemy succeeded in reaching the south, bypassing Lagwal village. Thus, Alpha Company was isolated. Realising the precarious situation, the brigade major asked Major Iftikhar Ali to fall back. He insisted to stay, but was finally persuaded to withdraw. The company withdrew on 12 December at 7 am. It was a very difficult situation. The enemy could observe their move from three directions, and impede their withdrawal. Nur played a vital role. He brought f ire, smoke mixed with high explosive, around the company, and kept calling shots on the enemy. This facilitated Alpha Company to withdraw safely. Captain Nur was the last man to leave Lagwal.

On the night of 15/16 December, the enemy launched a full-fledged attack on 24 Brigade. One infantry battalion, 16 Madras, attacked Lalial RF (reserve forest) and Saraj Chak, another, 3rd Grenadiers, attacked village Jarpal.

They had the support of 17 Poona Horse (tank regiment). They succeeded in creating a dent in the Pakistani defensive positions. There was a great shemozzle. In short, the enemy succeeded in occupying Lalial RF, Saraj Chak and village Jarpal. It was decided to quickly launch a brigade counter attack. Alpha Company of 11 Baluch was tasked to attack Lalial RF, while a company of 40 Punjab was tasked to take back village Saraj Chak. Alpha Company Commander, Major Iftikhar, requested that Nur should go with him in the counter attack. The request was granted. Captain Saleem went with the company of 40 Punjab. 0105 was fixed as H hour (the time to start action). Since some troops could not reach the start line within the stipulated time, H hour was changed and the two companies reached the FUP (forming up place) at 0115 hours. The counter attack force bravely charged the objective, and in a hand-to-hand fight, the enemy suffered heavy casualties. A number of soldiers of 16 Madras were captured, but there were no arrangements to secure them. Taking advantage of darkness, they managed to slip away.

However, the counter attack did not meet success due to mounting pressure of enemy armour, and on the morning of 16 December, Pakistani troops withdrew to area Sakror Bund and village Ghazipur. Troops of 11 Baluch holding Sakror Bund were further extended towards their right, up to Ghazipur. Besides, troops of the company of Major Iftikhar returning after the counter attack, also occupied defences in Ghazipur, and covered the gap between Ghazipur and Sakror Bund.

Counter Attack by 8 Armoured Brigade

On the early morning of 16 December, 8 Armoured Brigade was ordered to take back positions occupied by the enemy. Keeping in view the information passed by Commander 24 Brigade, 8 Armoured Brigade took four actions:

• Alpha Squadron of 13 Lancers under Major Jehangir Karamat (later General and Chief of Army Staff) crossed Road Zafarwal Shakargarh and started advancing towards village Jarpal. While they were moving in that direction, information was passed that some enemy tanks were moving towards Zafarwal. They were asked to turn left. After crossing village Marara/Wazirpur and village Sikandarpur, a number of tanks were knocked down by enemy fire from Lalial RF, village Saraj Chak and sand dunes between Saraj Chak and Jarpal.
• In response to the information that seven enemy tanks and an infantry battalion had broken through Basantar Nullah, and were heading for road Zafarwal-Shakargarh, Charlie Squadron under command of Major K.M. Nasir and Bravo Squadron under Command of Major Asmat Beg, started advancing in the direction of village Jarpal. During the advance, a number of tanks were hit by enemy fire, from Saraj Chak and Jarpal.
• 31 Cavalry was ordered to attack from the direction of Marara/Wazirpur between Alpha Squadron and Charlie Squadron. Its leading squadron was commanded by Major Aley Ahmed. Two tanks of the leading squadron were hit. Major Aley Ahmed and Lieutenant Zahid Rashid embraced shahadat. Finally, the squadron went into a counter penetration position in Marara/Wazirpur.
• Alpha Company ex 29 FF (then an armoured infantry battalion) commanded by Major Rizvi, under command 13 Lancers, was deployed ahead of village Barapind on a mound, to cover the right f lank, along with a troop of Charlie Squadron.

13 Lancers lost five officers and 20 JCOs and other ranks. Major K.M. Nasir was awarded Sitara-e-Juraat while, Lieutenant Derek Joseph was granted Tamgha-e-Juraat. Craftsman Faqir Muhammed earned Tamgha-e-Juraat. 31 Cavalry lost 2 officers, 3 other ranks, 2 missing and 6 wounded. 13 Lancers also lost 28 tanks due to enemy fire, while 31 Cavalry lost 13 tanks. Both regiments had lost some tanks earlier in the Shakargarh battle, and also due to mechanical problems.

The whole operation helped the enemy earn laurels. Major Hoshiar Singh Dahiya, reportedly hailing from Daska, who claimed to have hit 10 tanks of 13 Lancers, was awarded the highest gallantry award of India, Param Vir Chakra. An Indian tank was hit by 13 Lancers, which was being commanded by Lieutenant Arun Khaterpal from 17 Poona Horse. He was killed. Later he was awarded Param Vir Chakra posthumously.

Counter Attack by 35 FF

Once 8 Armoured Brigade fell short of its objectives, 35 FF was ordered to go for a counter attack and retake Jarpal. The unit was only a few months old, and had been traversing long distances. After being raised at Abbottabad on 19 April 1971, it was moved to Chaman by rail, some 1027 miles away. The founding, and first commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja conducted intensive training and operational preparedness exercises till September. The unit was then ordered to move to Quetta for the onward journey. The battalion covered the distance of 77 miles on foot in two days. Thereafter the unit moved to Mahesar, Rahim Yar Khan, Pakpattan, Hakra Canal, Sharaqpur and finally reached Sialkot sector on 13 December.

Based on information available from troops in contact with the enemy, the enemy picture as seen at Headquarters 8 Division and 24 Brigade, at about 4 pm, 16 December was as follows:

• The enemy having crossed the minefield in area Lagwal, established a bridgehead with approximately two infantry battalions and a tank regiment, in area Saraj Chak and Jarpal.
• Lalial RF and Ghazipur were still being held by Pakistani troops, and the bridgehead was being contained by a company of 11 Baluch and other troops.

At about 8 pm, the commanding officer of 35 FF was summoned to brigade headquarters, but since no guidance was provided, he could not locate the brigade headquarters till quite late at night. The orders were passed on night 16/17 December. Salient points were: (see map-4)

• 35 FF was to capture Jarpal as soon as possible, on 17 December.
• FUP was in a clump of trees along Basantar Nullah, east of the objective, which was to be shown by brigade major 24 Brigade.
• The H hour was fixed for 0500 hours on 17 December.

The commanding officer requested that since he was unfamiliar with the area, as were his company commanders, at least a day might be given for reconnaissance, but his request was overruled. Charlie and Delta Companies were to go first, Alpha and Bravo Companies were to follow with a gap of fifteen minutes. Due to intense enemy artillery fire and miscalculation of time and space, the troops of 35 FF reached FUP at about 0515 hours, 15 minutes later than the stipulated time. The irony of fate was, that due to confusion, own troops around, especially a company in Barapind, opened fire on the advancing troops of 35 FF. Artillery had opened up according to schedule, thus giving away the element of surprise. The enemy was fully alert. Within half an hour of the attack, three officers, the commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja, and two company commanders of Charlie and Delta Companies met shahadat. In total four officers, one JCO and 55 other ranks met shahadat. Captain Nur was FOO with Delta Company, and Lieutenant Shabbir Haider with Charlie Company. Nur’s wireless operator Lance Naik Siddiq met shahadat during the attack, and his wireless set was also damaged. It could have been understandable for Captain Nur to mark time and look for some shelter, but he didn’t. He came back to the FUP where Alpha and Bravo Companies had assembled to go into attack. He borrowed the reserve wireless set of Alpha Company Commander, Major Imtiaz ul Haque (later Colonel), changed its frequency, and did his best to bring own artillery fire on the enemy. He was recommended for Sitara-e-Juraat, for his bold action during this attack. The other FOO with Charlie Company, Lieutenant Shabbir, was seriously injured. Part of his belly was blown away by artillery fire. He was evacuated to CMH. Apparently, there was no hope of his survival, but he did survive. (Much later while riding a motorbike, he met a road accident in which he died).

About midday on 17 December, the attack of 35 FF was halted due to heavy casualties and heavy firing of enemy artillery, tanks and infantry weapons. As for CO 35 FF was concerned, his bravery was acknowledged by the enemy commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Venon Prashad Airy (later Lieutenant General), commanding 3rd Grenadier Guards. He wrote a citation and sent it with the dead body of Colonel Akram Raja, shaheed. He wrote that Colonel Akram had displayed the highest level of determination and personal bravery. Colonel Akram Raja was posthumously awarded Hilal-e-Juraat.

Prominent Features of the Battle of Barapind

We call the battle that took place in the area, ‘Battle of Barapind’, which never fell to Indians despite their vigorous efforts. Indians call it ‘the Battle of Basantar’ after the nullah mentioned earlier. The officers who took part in the battle in this area, rose to distinction in their respective armies. The enemy suffered heavy casualties in its efforts to capture Lalial RF. 16 Madras which came for Lalial RF and Saraj Chak, suffered heavy casualties, and reportedly was disbanded after the war.

Brigadier Arun Shridhar Vaidya, commanding the Indian armoured brigade operating against 24 Infantry Brigade of Pakistan, was awarded Vir Chakra for his part in the battle. In the 1965 War, he was commanding an armoured regiment in Khem Karan Sector, and was also awarded Vir Chakra for his bravery in that battle. He rose to the rank of general and became Indian Chief of Army Staff. He commanded the Indian Army from 1983 to 1986.

Major Hoshiar Singh of 3rd Granadiers, as mentioned earlier, was awarded the Param Vir Chakra. He retired as colonel, and died at the age of 61.

Major Jehangir Karamat who led a squadron in that battle rose to the rank of general and became Army Chief of Pakistan.

Major Iftikhar Ali who commanded a company of 11 Baluch became a lieutenant general, commanded the corps at Bahawalpur and later served as Defence Secretary.

Second Lieutenant Waseem Ashraf of 11 Baluch, who accompanied Captain Nur on the night of 6/7 December, rose to the rank of lieutenant general, commanded a corps and later served as Adjutant General.

Notes

• Babar, Barapind Jarpal Battles, 31-34.
• Colonel (R) Imtiaz ul Haque. The Charge of the Bulls. (Lahore: Asim Welfare Society), 77.