Writer: Colonel Ashfaq Hussain, retired

The author met Lieutenant Colonel Abdur Rauf, retired (Commanding Officer 23 Baluch Regiment during 1971 Indo-Pak war) at his residence Chhamb House in Islamabad, and interviewed him, to pen down this anecdote, which reflect the views of the veteran.

Abdur Rauf was born in 1933 at Kohat, and belonged to a Yousafzai family settled at Kohat. After receiving his early education from Kohat, he moved to Rawalpindi and did his FSc from Gordon College. In 1953 he applied for the Army and joined 12th PMA Long Course. After commission, he decided to join Special Services Group (SSG) which was headed then by Colonel (later Major General) Abu Bakar Osman Mitha, and served there from 1958 to 1964. He then proceeded to East Pakistan and was posted near Sundarbans, a thick and beautiful forest, known for its tigers and other wild animals. Recalling his memories, Colonel Rauf stated that East Pakistanis were good friends and very cheerful people. General Azam Khan, the Governor East Pakistan, looked after them enthusiastically and was respected. After six months he was posted to School of Infantry and Tactics, Quetta, but before he could join the school, 1965 War brokeout, and he was ordered to join 9 Baluch (now Baloch).

During1965 War, he was in Sialkot Sector, commanding Charlie Company of 9 Baluch, located at Soragpure Band.

1971 War

During the 1971 War, Lieutenant Colonel Rauf was commanding 23 Baluch at Kharian. The enemy`s intentions to launch an offensive from Chhamb became obvious when large scale convoy movement from Akhnur to Jaurian and Chhamb, was reported. In one night alone, the Indians moved 800 vehicles from Jammu to Jaurian.1 At least one squadron of tanks was spotted in Chhamb Sakrana area. 23 Baluch was therefore ordered to move to Daulat Nagar in the first week of October, where it became part of 66 Brigade. Before proceeding further, he explained the strategic importance of Chhamb.

Chhamb is bounded by Ikhni Nullah in the north, Ceasefire Line (now Line of Control) in the west, Kashmir/Gujrat border in the south, and River Tawi in the east. Though only 128 square kilometres in size, it was strategically important for both India and Pakistan. Gujrat, the soft underbelly of Pakistan, and GT Road connecting Rawalpindi to Lahore, was only 35 kilometres from the border. The distance between the border and Lala Musa and Kharian was only 64 and 61 kilometres. Marala Headworks, providing irrigation water to the adjoining area, was only 16 kilometers away. Capture of Marala Headworks by India would have threatened our forces in the Sialkot Sector, and rendering the vital canal system waterless right up to Sulemanki in the South. Keeping in view this importance, 23 Division was tasked to capture Chhamb, clear the area up to River Tawi, and destroy the enemy`s offensive capability.2

Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) RK Jasbir Singh, who was commanding 191 Indian Brigade in 1971 War, opposite Pakistani 66 Brigade, writes that the Pakistanis, on the other hand, by attacking Chhamb, not only (could) remove the threat, but also in turn threaten Akhnur, the capture of which would threaten Rajauri-Punch line of communication, and Jammu-Pathankot from the west.3

23 Division consisted of two Azad Kashmir brigades, 4, 7, and three other infantry brigades, 111 Brigade, 20 Brigade and 66 Brigade. There were two armoured regiments, 11 Cavalry and 26 Cavalry with World War II vintage Sherman tanks mounted with outdated 76 mm guns. There was an independent armoured squadron also, which was raised only a week before the war. The personnel of the squadron were mostly reservists who were called back on duty a week earlier. 28 Cavalry was also placed under command of 23 Division at the last hour, with many restrictions on its use.

On the Indian side, 10 Infantry Division headed by Major General Jaswant Singh was our principle foe4, was supported by part of another division.

Operational Plan

66 Brigade was to attack and secure a lodgment in enemy territory between Pir Manguwali and south of Pir Jamal. Operational orders were issued by Commander 66 Brigade, Brigadier Qamar us Salam Khan, on 3 December 1971. Units under command of 66 Brigade were 4 Punjab, 23 Baluch and 33 FF. No detailed information about the enemy`s positions was available. 23 Baluch was tasked to capture Phagla. On D day, the unit moved swiftly, and despite enemy`s heavy artillery fire, kept moving, taking cover in an adjacent nullah and other natural features. The unit reached its objective three hours before the stipulated time. When the success signal was fired, everybody was surprised. Colonel Rauf then contacted 33 FF and informed them that the enemy was on the run, and they should reach soon. Immediately thereafter, Lieutenant Saleem and Major Rauf of 33 FF joined him. They went into a defence and started digging.

Next afternoon, the enemy reacted by playing tape recordings of tank movements from Sakrana village. They meant to intimidate 23 Baluch, but it had no effect on the soldiers who stood their ground. The enemy kept firing on 23 Baluch the whole day and night, which caused a few casualties including Second Lieutenant Mashhadi.

Regrouping

Next day, on 5th December, 23 Baluch was placed under command 2 Armoured Brigade at Gura. 23 Baluch was tasked to capture Bogan. Colonel Rauf ordered his two companies to have early dinner at Kot Jaimal. It was past midnight when Colonel Rauf ordered his Charlie and Delta Companies to attack Bogan before first light the same day. The enemy bolted and 23 Baluch entered Bogan without resistance. From Bogan the troops moved further east to find suitable positions for defence. By the evening of 6 December, village Gotre was cleared. The enemy had placed dummy soldiers in the trees to frighten the advancing troops. The withdrawing enemy set fire to haystacks and brought concentrated artillery fire on the advancing troops. Colonel Rauf and Captain Asad Durrani, a company commander, extricated jawans to a safer area to avoid presenting silhouetted targets to the enemy. A request was sent to brigade headquarters for tank support, which could not materialise. Instead they were asked to fall back to Panjgran.

6th December was a fateful day for 23 Baluch. They moved eastward from Bor at 1500 hours, and passing through Panjgaran reached Gotre at 1730 hours. 28 Cavalry started from Bor at 1600 hours and stopped at Panjgran at 1715 hours. 28 Baluch was recalled to Panjgaran from Gotre, they arrived at 2200 hours.

On 7th December, 23 Baluch was asked to comb Chhamb after 28 Cavalry had blasted the village with gun fire. As soon as the combing started, Captain Asif Jamshed of a R& S (reconnaissance and support) company came to Colonel Rauf with a bundle of letters, bearing the address of Malke Camp. After studying the map it, was revealed that what they thought was Chhamb, was in fact Malke Camp, and Chhamb was still 3 kilometers to the north. Colonel Rauf ordered his troops to rush to the north, with the promise that they would be rested at Chhamb. He requested the brigade headquarters for tank support to speed up the combing. Major Nisar Ghumman of 28 Cavalry dashed forward and joined 23 Baluch, which was a morale boosting factor. Troops reached Chhamb after the sunrise and thus was completed the capture of Chhamb. But the task of 23 Baluch was not yet complete.

General Officer Commanding (GOC) Major General Eftikhar Khan visited the captured area of Chhamb, patted the commanding officer and asked him to attack Palanwala immediately. Colonel Rauf tried to explain that his troops were tired, they had covered an area 15 kilometers. Moreover time was needed for gathering information about the next objective and for ground reconnaissance before attack. After hearing him patiently, the authoritative tone of the general changed. He placed his hand on the shoulder of Colonel Rauf and said, “The enemy is fleeing. Time is in our favour, we must not allow them time to recover. Rauf, I cannot trust anybody else, I want you to lead this operation. I am confident that SSG-led storm troopers will rip through Palanwala defences”. The encouraging words of the general were so powerful, and expressed with such passion and emphasis, that there was no option left but to do or die. Colonel Rauf promised him that the troops would be ready to attack Palanwala after sunset the same day, on 7th December.

Commanding Officer gets injured

After passing warning orders to his unit to prepare for the attack, Colonel Rauf along with Brigadier Sardar, commander 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Group (2IABG), moved to a vantage point to study the terrain and get more information about the enemy. They were moving in a jeep when they saw two enemy aircraft approaching. They stopped the jeep and took cover. Colonel Rauf states, “When I found one of the aircraft approaching us, I recited Kalima e Shahadat. I heard the aircraft firing. After it passed I looked around to see the damage. Apparently there was no damage but right in front of me, at about 25 yards, I saw a line of ash spots indicating that impact burst ammunition was used. Then I saw the second aircraft lining up for attack. I heard it firing and immediately I felt a burning sensation in my legs. I felt a forceful impact on my helmet which disturbed my balance temporarily. I looked at my legs. They were in proper shape but bleeding profusely. I bandaged my legs with a field dressing and informed the brigade commander that I was injured, and not in a position to lead the attack. The brigade Commander asked about his driver. I pointed towards the tree, he had taken cover. The brigadier went there and found that the driver had embraced shahadat. I did not hear any sigh, indicating the instant death of the driver.”

Colonel Rauf was evacuated to hospital. As per apprehensions of General Eftikhar, Palanwala remained unconquered (The attack did go across the Tawi River, but was called off on the orders of GHQ due to intelligence reports of heavy move towards Tawi from the Indian side). Chhamb remains part of Azad Kashmir.

After discharge from the hospital, Colonel Rauf was posted to 19 Baluch. In 1973, he was posted as Battalion Commander PMA, from where he was seconded to the civil Administration. After serving at various posts, he retired in 1993. He still carries a bullet in his calf, which could not be extracted. He lives in Chhamb House in Islamabad.

Notes

1. Lt Col (Retd) Saeed Ahmad, Battle of Chhamb (1971) (Rawalpindi: Army Education Press, 2001), 4.
2. Ahmad, Battle of Chhamb (1971), 6.
3. Lt Gen (retd) RK Jasbir Singh, “Battle of Chhamb: Indo-Pak War 1971,” United Service Institute of India Journal CLI, no. 626 (October-December 2021): 510, https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/battle-of-chhamb indo-pak-war-1971.html.
4. Ahmad, Battle of Chhamb (1971), 12.