Writer: Brigadier Imran Haider Jaffri, Retired

India and China remain locked in a border dispute since April 2020. This border dispute was almost resolved after conclusion of an agreement to de-escalate the situation, on 5 June 2020. The mutual agreement to withdraw troops from Galwan Valley of Ladakh region went horribly wrong on June 15, 2020, when deadly clashes broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers.

It was a unique clash in the modern age, when no automatic weapons were fired. Instead, wire-wrapped batons, clubs and stones were used at will. At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed and scores seriously injured. Although China did not release any details of her casualties, the Indian media claimed that Chinese casualties might have been double.

Since the Galwan incident, thousands of soldiers have been deployed by both sides in the Ladakh region, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Experts have been fearing that tension between the two nuclear armed rivals might lead to unintentional war, which is not only a threat to regional peace, but could endanger global peace as well.

Both the Indian and the international media covered the incident in detail, and kept the world updated. In-depth analyses of the Indo-China border dispute were carried out. Indian media houses portrayed China as the aggressor, while many international news channels followed suit. However, the status of the dispute remains somewhat confused, even today. One wonders as to what is the factual position behind the long border dispute between the two nations. To understand the facts, one may have to turn the pages of border history between British India, independent India and China, to understand the correct perspective of the Sino-India border dispute.

Historical Perspective of the Dispute

J.M. Addis, a British diplomat, dedicated his period of leave in 1962/63 to unearth the truth about the India-China border question, while at Harvard. During his research, Addis discovered that two of the copies of the 1929 edition of London’s officially published record of Treaties and other Diplomatic Engagements involving its Indian government, known as Aitchison’s Treaties (named after the original editor), were contradictory about the outcome of a conference convened by the Government of India in 1914 at Simla. The British covertly induced Tibet and/or China to cede to India a major chunk of territory to India’s north-east. One edition claimed success of the attempt while the other reflected failure. Addis found out that the British forgery of the 1914 Simla conference was, in fact, the basis of independent India’s false claims to a border that was named McMahon Line. The details of the forgery and the identity of the man responsible, Olaf Caroe, were revealed later by Alastair Lamb and an Indian scholar, Karunakar Gupta.

Further study of the diplomatic correspondence between India and China, in the late 50s and early 60s, including letters exchanged between the two prime ministers, suggests that the Indians not only insisted on the validity of McMahon Line, but also claimed that all the borders with China were indisputable and non-negotiable international borders.

Neville Maxwell, while writing about Addis papers, says, “Unfortunately Addis’ research papers for the Harvard Institute for International Affairs did not come into public knowledge at the time it was written, when its impact would have been explosive. The Indian Government obtained a copy, however, and hotly complained to London about the ‘anti-Indian activities’ of its diplomat: Addis was sternly rebuked by his superiors, and kept his silence”.

To understand the geography of the Indo-China border, Addis divided it into western, middle and eastern sectors.

Middle Sector. The frontiers in the middle sector generally run along the crest of the Himalayas, having least border issues except for four small areas. Nehru had confessed on 17 November 1959 that Barahoti was a minor border issue and could be settled with the Chinese during negotiations.

However, the Chinese regard the area as part of China, and they bring forward two quotations from the reports of Lieutenant Strachey who surveyed this area in 1848, and admitted that he had declared Barahoti as a British area, though it was then part of Tibet.

Western Sector. Both India and China agree that this part of the frontier generally runs along the crest of the Karakorams, and that Karakoram Pass is their common frontier. However, their claims run tangent eastwards of this point. China maintains that the frontier runs more or less straight from the Karakoram Range east along the crest of Karakoram Range to Kongka Pass. The Indians claim that from Karakoram Pass, the frontier executes a deep salient up to a point on the crest of Kunlun Range, and descends again to the Karakoram Range at a point east of Kongka Pass.

As per Addis, geographically the frontier should run along the crest of the Karakoram range the whole way up to Kongka Pass, rather than running along the crest for 200 miles, and then making an incursion to Kunlun Range, and back again, before descending to the Himalayas. Although the Indians refer to the 1684 Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, this treaty does not define the frontiers of Ladakh at all.

The disputed area of Aksai Chin, in this sector, is the major dispute. In the old days authorities in Ladakh and Khotan districts did not consider it important to define the limits. This was, however, not good enough for British India, who took over Ladakh in 1846. They twice offered defining the disputed border to China, but China, busy in the Opium War, declined the offers.

Eastern Sector. The disputed area consists of the southern slopes of the Himalayas, from Bhutan in the west, to Burma (now Myanmar) in the east. Indians claim that the frontier from Bhutan eastwards should continue to run along the crest of the Himalayas, contrary to the Chinese claim that it descends from the watershed to where the foothills join the plains (see map). During the 1913 1914 tripartite conference, involving a Tibetan delegate, a representative of the Chinese central government, and Sir Henry McMahon, (a foreign secretary of the British Indian government), a secret bilateral agreement was signed with the Tibetan representative, on a new border line, later known as the McMahon Line. The Chinese central government rejected the accord and their plenipotentiary and the Tibetan government, later disputed the legality of the McMahon Line. However, the British began using the McMahon Line on the Survey of India maps in 1937.

McMahon Line and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)

McMahon Line has never been recognised by the Chinese, notes John Addis in his papers. The same was conveyed to the British representative by the Chinese on 21 April 1914. The convention of 1914, known as Simla convention, was published years later in 1929, but the Chinese refused to ratify it. The first edition of Aitchison’s Treaties did not have the text of the convention. The 1929 edition was expanded to include the text of the convention, for the first time. The Survey of India published the maps in 1917, showing only the inner line in the northeast, and followed the practice of earlier published maps in 1856, 1859 and 1903. The same was followed until 1936, when Indian maps started showing the frontier as un-demarcated. Independent India followed the 1936 practice until 1954, when India published a map giving the northeastern frontier according to McMahon Line, without qualification.

The Chinese advance into Tibet dates from 25 October 1950. According to Addis, the Indian government, concerned at the implications of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, decided to extend their hold on the border areas. In 1951 they gave priority to NEFA over the western sector. In 1954, the Indians moved even closer to the borders and occupied the whole of NEFA. The Chinese advance into this region had been up to McMahon Line. When the Indians were busy advancing their frontiers in NEFA, the Chinese moved towards the western sector, which the Indians learnt in 1958 through patrols.

Between 1954 and 1958, there were several incidents when troops of both sides came face to face, but no serious clash occurred. Both sides protested and demanded the withdrawal of troops from the middle sector, especially Barahoti area. The Indians, apprehensive of the trouble to come, began establishing check posts in the frontier zone, particularly in the eastern sector, but not close to McMahon Line, whereas the Chinese were everywhere north of the line. In the western sector, the Chinese had built the Aksai Chin road, also known as the Sky Road in Chinese, by autumn of 1957. The period between 1958-59 brought all the issue in the open – the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin, and their claim to NEFA, their offers of negotiations, and the Indian refusal to discuss the border question. The Tibetan revolt precipitated a further advance by both into the frontier areas, that led to the first exchanges of fire.

The Negotiations

The ensuing correspondence between the two prime ministers suggests that perhaps the Chinese premier wanted to settle the frontier questions through negotiations and maintaining the status quo, while the Indian premier kept refusing any such offers. In March 1959, the Tibetan insurrection came to a head. The Dalai Lama was given asylum in India and the Indians showed all sympathy to the Tibetan revolt. For the Chinese the revolt was a public humiliation, since they believed that the revolt had been supported, if not by the Indian Government, at least by the Americans and Chinese nationalists using Indian soil. After the Longju incident, the Indian Prime Minister revealed on 16 November 1959, that the entire frontier of India was being handed over to the Indian Army. Another major armed clash occurred on 20-21 October 1959 near Kongka Pass, at the junction of Sinkiang with Tibet. Fire was exchanged, killing seventeen Indian soldiers. Both sides accused each other’s patrols of being on their side, and opening fire first.

Diplomatic exchanges of letters between the premiers went on during 1959. The Chinese Prime Minister offered a meeting to Mr. Nehru, either in China or Delhi, and proposed withdrawal of troops 40 miles from the frontiers, which Mr. Nehru refused. Nehru offered separate proposals for withdrawal from the eastern and western sectors, and again refused to accept the status quo proposed by the Chinese premier. After repeated attempts by the Chinese to settle issues at the ministerial level, finally the two leaders met in Delhi from 19-25 April 1960. However, due to the stubborn stance of the Indian Prime Minister, the meeting proved to be a failure in addressing any of the border questions. Even the Report of Officials, who met in June 1960, could not prove helpful.

Indo-China War of 1962

Subsequent correspondence and exchanges between the two sides show continuous attempts by the Chinese to reach to some sort of agreement, but the Indian side remained glued to its Forward Policy, and kept demanding the unilateral withdrawal of Chinese troops from all three sectors. Events before 20 October 1962, the day the Sino-India war commenced, suggest that the clash between the troops reached its climax due to an Indian push forward, as reported by the Times correspondent in New Delhi on 12 October 1962. The same day, Addis notes, “Mr. Nehru confirmed to journalists that Indian Army had been ordered to clear the Chinese from Indian territory”.

War broke out in the eastern and western sectors on 20 October 1962, and lasted for 5 days. The Chinese decisively defeated and evicted the Indian Army. Mr. Chou En-lai again offered resumption of talks on all border issues, suggesting the frontiers’ status quo as of 7 November 1959. The Indian Government modified their earlier stance, and suggested that the Chinese should return to status quo ante (8 September 1962 line), which would leave the Chinese in possession of Aksai Chin. The Indians this time, were also in agreement to discuss the whole frontier, not merely the western sector.

After hectic and fruitless diplomatic exchanges, the Chinese resumed their advance after a three week lull period, pushing the Indians back in the eastern and middle sectors, while positions in the western sector remained unchanged. On 21 November, the Chinese Government declared a unilateral ceasefire, and withdrew 20 kms behind the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which existed on 7 November 1959. The Chinese also warned India to keep America out of mutual negotiations, after India had abandoned her policy of non-alignment, by accepting US aid.

The border question between the two Asian giants still remains a matter of acute tension, that will continue to stay as such, until Delhi and Beijing find a more flexible stance. But this remains most unlikely. The relations will remain marred and the border question will trigger small skirmishes now and then, and in the worst scenario, an all-out war – unintended though. Both sides, of course, would not like that to happen. India needs to review its hawkish policies, as to declaring certain areas of frontiers as integral to India, to avoid jeopardising regional peace.

Notes

The entire article is based on J. M. Addis Papers (available online at https://chinaindiaborderdispute.files.wordpress. com/2010/07/india-china-border2.pdf), hence no bibliography or footnotes have been given.