Writer: Brigadier Masood Ahmed Khan, Retired

(A memoir of Captain Sherjan Tajik was penned down by the author during special sittings arranged at Captain Sherjan's residence a few months ago)

Though we lost 1971 War, there are numerous stories of the indomitable courage of our men, who fought and died facing heavy odds. They make us proud and need to be remembered. Here's one such story. This is the story of a child who barely crossed his teens, and went into battle with predictable consequences of death and destruction, for which he was trained. What he was not trained for, was the harrowing experience of frequently coming across the sights of mass killings of the innocent people who were brutally murdered, and the perpetrators were nowhere to be found. Captain (then Lieutenant) Sherjan Tajik's war action, has probably not been made public for half a century. However, it is never too late to make an effort and start putting the historical record in its correct perspective. Our heroes need to be remembered, and lauded for their valiant actions.

Sherjan is ethnically a Tajik pathan whose grandfather migrated from Tajikistan to Peshawar. After his education at the prestigious Lawrence College Ghora Gali, he joined 42 PMA Long Course and passed out as an under-officer in April 1970. He was posted to a signals unit in Multan, but was inspired and facilitated by General Fazle Haq, then commander 3 Armoured Brigade, to join the Armoured Corps. He joined the newly raised 29 Cavalry (C) in erstwhile East Pakistan in March 1971, a few weeks before the crackdown (OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT) and was immediately sent to School of Armour Nowshera, for his basic course. He reported back to the unit in September 1971.

In the months leading to war, Sherjan was a witness to the civil unrest, uprising and armed insurrection in the country, aided and abetted by Mukti Bahini which was armed, trained and funded by India. 29 Cavalry was in peacetime location at Rangpur (see map-1) when the skirmishes with Mukhti Bahini started in October 1971. When the orders for deployment were given, 29 Cavalry, the only cavalry regiment in East Pakistan was scattered all along the borders of the country. 30 November/1st December 1971, Lt Sherjan was ordered to take over a troop of M24 Chaffee light tanks deployed in Hilli area, covering the main approach defended by Delta Company ·, (D coy) 4 FF and ' commanded by Maj Julian Peter (later Major General). The troop was independent and was about 30-40 kms away from its squadron. Since last week November 1971, Indians were attacking Hilli strongpoint relentlessly, but with no success. Consequently, they moved their point of attack further north to the extreme right company of 4 FF, to bypass Hilli (see map-2).

The railway track which was on a 9-10 feet high embankment, was the dividing line between the attacking forces and D Company. Every morning around first light, a few enemy tanks would climb the berm, fire HE (high explosive) rounds on D Coy positions and then pull back into safety. The enemy air would become active as the sun rose, and strafe ground positions. It had become a routine. Getting impatient with continual attrition by those tanks, Capt Mian Muzaffar Gul, Adjutant (Adjt) 4 FF, urged Lt Sherjan to do something about them, in the choicest expletives common to military grunts.

Lt Sherjan's plan was bold yet simple: move up his tanks at night into the no man's land, get into good firing positions having an effective kill range, ambush the enemy tanks and pull back to safety as soon as possible. D Company main battle positions were about 1000 metres away from the railway embankment, with the forward screens about 500 metres ahead of main positions, in the no man's land. On night 4/5 December 1971, when Major Raja Muhammad Akram shaheed, posthumously awarded Nishan-e-Haider (NH), was fighting a ferocious battle with his Charlie Company (C Coy) against a brigade size enveloping attack, supported by armour in the north (see map-4), Lt Sherjan moved with two of his tanks into position ahead of screens, hardly 400 metres from the embankment. Noise of tank movement was subdued by the fire of a few rounds of a lone artillery battery in support. Soon after first light, three enemy tanks appeared, climbing up the berm into firing positions. The moment their bellies got exposed, Lt Sherjan ordered both his tanks to fire. Two enemy tanks stopped dead in their tracks and one of them exploded in a ball of fire. No bailing out was observed from both the tanks. The third enemy tank which had climbed up the berm by then, tried to traverse on one side instead of reversing, and got a hit on the tracks from Lt Sherjan's tank. Lt Sherjan saw the crew bailing out but didn't engage them with tank machine guns (MGs). When asked why he didn't engage a legitimate target, his simple answer was he didn't feel like engaging an enemy in distress, attempting to save its life. A good enough answer to generate a healthy debate on morality vs legitimacy.

The sharp and swift engagement resulting in destruction of three enemy tanks, was over in a few minutes, and his position was becoming increasingly untenable. As the daylight conditions improved, his two tanks were dangerously exposed to any anti-tank weapons deployed on the berm. Lt Sherjan ordered a quick pull back. While they were pulling back, enemy anti-tank weapons started engaging them. He could observe rounds exploding in the near vicinity. In the din and dust, he saw his other tank get a hit and burst into flames. As he was himself under fire, he couldn't do anything but to get away and go for a cover quickly. In a fleeting glimpse at the burning tank, he didn't see any bail out but did hear secondary explosions, possibly the ammunition inside the tank was "cooking off"(exploding). The triumph and euphoric feeling of killing three enemy tanks just minutes ago, evaporated quickly after losing one of his own. Late at night, he took a jeep in the no man's land and visited his burnt out tank which was still smoldering. The turret was uprooted from the hull but it was still lying on the tank in an inclined position. Lt Sherjan climbed up the tank and peeped inside. What he saw inside is too graphic and disturbing to mention. The crew was charred beyond recognition on their seats. With raw courage and steely nerves, he and his driver collected whatever remains there were inside, wrapped them in a tarpaulin, and brought them back for a quick burial in D Company's depth positions. When asked why he risked his life and that of his driver by revisiting those who were confirmed dead, his answer was, he didn't want to leave his shuhada at anyone else's mercy.

When the enemy couldn't dislodge D Company from its positions at Hilli after under two weeks of repetitive attacks, they chose to bypass it from the north, which they succeeded in, ultimately. Commander 205 Brigade Brigadier (later Major General) Tajammal Hussain Malik ordered the withdrawal to Bogra (see map-3), leaving some elements of 4 FF with Sherjan's two tanks, to cover the withdrawal and delay the enemy for 24 hours. On 10 December 1971, this force occupied a position on an embankment at a place called Parbatipur (see map-3), about 30 kms north of Hilli. On 12 December, Lt Sherjan saw a column of tanks making a bypassing maneuvre in a non-tactical fashion not very far away from his position. His two tanks started engaging them. Two were confirmed killed as they were stopped dead in their tracks, and the rest dispersed. Following the tanks, there were about a dozen trucks which were engaged at will. One of the trucks blew up into a huge ball of fire. It was possibly an ammunition lorry. The remaining trucks stood immobilised or went into cover. No Indian counter attack came on the delaying force; however Mukhti Bahini kept attacking them by fire at night from all directions. After delaying the enemy for about 48 hours, the delaying force started withdrawing towards Bogra, which was 120 kilometres away, with very little fuel and almost no ammunition on tanks. Lt Sherjan's other tank got bogged down in a paddy field, which had to be abandoned and he destroyed it by pumping a round in it from his own tank. On his way to Bogra, with his sole tank, he picked up twenty - odd fatigued and wounded stragglers enroute, without any incident, and reached the destination on 14 December, after 2 days of movement in a hostile environment. (The defensive battle of 4 FF and attached troops in Hilli is being taught in Bangladesh Army, as confirmed to me by a retired Bangladeshi general officer).

The surrender took place on 17th Dec 1971 at Bogra. The surrendering troops were interned in a hastily prepared transit camp before they were moved to Ranchi, India and imprisoned in Camp 98. When asked what was the feeling at the time of surrender, he replied nonchalantly, it was depressing and disheartening. The motivation and fighting spirit didn't wane but the battle fatigue of continuous fighting for about two weeks against an overwhelming enemy, with no relief and lack of ammunition/fuel, the outcome was pretty evident, he added further. Lt Sherjan stayed in Ranchi Camp for about 2 years or more and was finally repatriated to Pakistan in April 197 4. His conduct during captivity was dignified, as told to me by fellow POW s. In the camp the POW s were generally treated as per Geneva Convention, barring a few who were given special treatment. There was one untoward ugly incident in the camp when a jittery and trigger happy guard from the security tower opened fire on unarmed POW s in the compound during day time, and killed 16 of them. If anyone says the prisoners were attempting to escape or were charging at the guards is pure poppycock. The Red Cross did visit for an inquiry but the outcome is unknown. On repatriation to Pakistan in April 197 4, Lt Sherjan's belongings comprising his father's Rolex watch and a couple of hundred rupees were returned to him.

Lt Sherjan was awarded Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ), the third highest gallantry award for his intrepidity and courage, for fighting independently with a tiny force against overwhelming odds for about 2 weeks. He was promoted captain (Capt) in 197 4 after repatriation. Capt Sherjan asked for release which was accepted in September 1975. On leaving the Army at a young age, he joined a shipping company and served in many countries around the world for 25 years.

For this story, I had a few long sittings with capt Sherjan to comprehend as much as I could, the dynamics of war and its aftermath in erstwhile East Pakistan. Even after almost 50 years, capt Sherjan appeared tense and anxious while narrating the heart wrenching events which he had experienced. Despite being a tough soldier, the humane angle of his personality was clearly visible. I left his house with a feeling of emotional satisfaction that there is no dearth of brave soldiers in Pakistan Army which makes everyone proud.

Capt Sherjan Tajik is about 70 years old, fit as a fiddle and despite his grey hair is svelte, suave and appealing. He is leading a retired life in Karachi, plays golf and is socially active.

Notes

The story is reconstructed after almost half a century and is based purely on the memory of the narrator. Some support is also sought from the old emails exchanged between him and officers of 4 FF. Brig AsifHaroon's 4 FF memoirs on Battle of Hilli assisted in understanding the overall operational situation and 4 FF's courageous battle.