



Historical Monograph Series  
Army Institute of Military History  
Pakistan


## Hybrid Warfare: A Fifth Generation Perspective

An Analysis of Shifting Paradigm in Conflict

And it's Relevance to Pakistan

By

Brigadier Sohail Nasir Khan, SI(M), retired



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**On the Cover:** Hybrid warfare vs conventional warfare  
(Source: Author)

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## ***PREFACE***

War today has acquired a systemic character that tends to weaponise every aspect of life, whether politics, economy, society, information or even infrastructure. *Hybrid warfare* is the latest postmodern buzzword which explains conflict in its widest connotation. Prefixing *hybrid* to existing complexities of *warfare* seems to have resulted in a bewildering concept of conflict that demands a precise definition at best, or an explanation at least, to understand and prepare for it. After terrorism, that blurred boundaries between civil and military affairs, hybrid war is knocking down the barriers separating peace and war. The query is, *how the war of the future may look for Pakistan*.

The monograph begins with conceptual parameters of hybrid war in light of its modern understanding in US, the west, Russia and India. It is followed by highlighting the conundrum of defining hybrid war from a Pakistani perspective, by evaluating its likely impact on thirteen different domains that include ideology, politics, society, information, cyber war, artificial intelligence (AI), psychology, economy, military, infrastructure, lawfare, nationalism and civil-military relations. A probable hybrid threat scenario is then constructed, to define *hybrid threat* and *hybrid war* for Pakistan. Some recommendations are proffered for the evaluated domains, and the paper culminates with a possible way forward.

The phenomenon of hybrid war is multifaceted, very dynamic in manifestation, and hence warrants a hybrid mindset to understand it. This calls for gradually building a commensurate, holistic national strategic thinking culture, that ensures superior strategic orientation against all manifestations of hybrid threats and war in future.

***Brigadier Sohail Nasir Khan***  
*(retired)*





# Hybrid Warfare: A Fifth Generation Perspective

## An Analysis of Shifting Paradigm in Conflict and its Relevance to Pakistan


The state of conflicts in 20<sup>th</sup> century are being replaced by hybrid war and asymmetric contests in which there is no distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organized violence, terror, crime and war. **Alan DuPont**<sup>1</sup>

Military institutions and the manner in which they employ violence depended on the economic, social and political conditions of their respective states. **Clausewitz**<sup>2</sup>


Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. **Sun Tzu**<sup>3</sup>

### Introduction

History strongly endorses the contention that war has always been, and is most likely to remain, the *beau ideal* arbiter for resolution of conflicts<sup>4</sup>, despite the contemporary debates about its violent role in the realm of reason and logic of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>5</sup> Beginning with *survival* and *self-help*, the *Peace of Westphalia*<sup>6</sup>




added the *state* to complete the trinity of *realism* that drive the majority of our world affairs with the assertive tool of conflict, that has evolved in various *forms*<sup>7</sup>, *epochs*<sup>8</sup>, *waves*<sup>9</sup> and *generations*.<sup>10</sup> The dominance of the *western way of war*<sup>11</sup> during last five centuries reached its nadir with the *war to end all wars*<sup>12</sup>, and ushered in an era of proxy wars amidst fears of a *MAD*<sup>13</sup> nuclear holocaust. The phenomenon of *cold war*<sup>14</sup> thereafter, was a systemic aberration that drew down the dividing *iron curtain*<sup>15</sup> throughout the world, by initiating simmering proxy conflicts which subordinated the ethical and legal



Map: Cold War 1949-1991  
(Source: wikipedia.org)


dimensions of war to ideology alone.<sup>16</sup> Thus, here was born a complex concept of war that sanctioned the use of every resource<sup>17</sup> to achieve victory, and that must persist until the enemy is comprehensively defeated or annihilated.<sup>18</sup> States, steered by the prime instinct of preserving individual and group interests, kept on developing new ways of perpetrating or resolving conflicts through unconventional, unrestricted, irregular, asymmetric, digital, net-centric, cyber, subversive and remote warfare, by premising them on the concept of *revolution in military affairs*<sup>19</sup> and turning *battlefields to battlespace*<sup>20</sup>, till the fateful day of 9/11.<sup>21</sup> Subsequent global war on terrorism<sup>22</sup> blurred the line separating combatants from non-combatants, and made the distinction between civil and military affairs quite fuzzy.

With rapid progress in precision, accuracy and devastation of modern weapon systems, supplemented by ever-intrusive technology in human affairs, an



Chronology of Generations of War (Source: Author)

all-encompassing concept of non-contact post-modern conflict started emerging in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This all-amalgamating concept sanctioned the use of every national resource (military as well as non-military) in war, on the pretext of safeguarding national interests and security. This amalgamation effectively bridged the grey zone between the opposing concepts of war and peace, with some additional or new categories of war,




Hybrid paradigm of conflict (Source: Author)

and replaced the notion of the *positive peace with negative peace*.<sup>23</sup>

Hence, gradually developing from individual fights, tribal contests, empire clashes and right up to modern state conflicts, the war of today has acquired a systemic character that tends to weaponise every aspect of life, whether it is military, political, economic, social, informational or infrastructural (MPESII).<sup>24</sup> This conglomerate of options is now expediently termed *hybrid warfare* (first use of this term dates back to

1998, in Robert Walkers Paper<sup>25</sup>), and sanctioned under a more semantically satisfying construct of *grey-zone conflicts*<sup>26</sup>, endorsing Lyly's euphemism that *all is fair in love and war*.<sup>27</sup> Oscillating on a wide spectrum of varying worldviews (e.g. Locke<sup>28</sup>, Rousseau<sup>29</sup>, Hobbes<sup>30</sup>), the inquisitive



Hybrid Warfare Vs Conventional Warfare (Source: Author)

query necessitating analytical inquiry remains, **how war of the future may look like?** To answer this question, the paper has been organized by

initially looking at hybrid war from the lens of prominent concepts about the phenomenon in US and the West, Russia and India. After a brief analysis in the conceptual domain,

the conundrum of defining hybrid war from a Pakistani perspective is articulated, by evaluating its likely impact on 13 domains that include ideology, politics, society, information, cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), psychological, economic, military, infrastructure, lawfare, nationalism and civil-military relations. A probable hybrid threat scenario is furnished to define hybrid war from a Pakistani perspective. The paper wraps up the discussion with some suggestions and recommendations.

## The Nature of Modern Hybrid Conflict

The evolutionary transformation of war (through paradigms of forms, waves, epochs and generations) highlights the variations in conduct, but brought no change in the specific purpose of war i.e. *an act of force to compel our*

Humans	1G					
Comm / Info	1G	2G				
Politics	PMP	2G	3G			
Industry	1IR	1GP	3G	4G		
AI	Internet AI	2IR	2GP	4G	5G	
		Business AI	3IR	3GP	5G	
			Perception AI	4IR	4GP	
				Autonomous AI	5IR	


And then... there are Generations of Warfare

Relevance of different generational modes to warfare (Source: Author)

*enemy to do our will.*<sup>31</sup> The concept of generational shifts in evolution of warfare remains in sync with such a model of generational shifts in other aspects of life, like attitudes, communication, information, industry, AI and even politics. Hybrid war is the post-modernist<sup>32</sup> buzzword (without any precise or agreed definition) for elucidation of an illimitable conflict that now permeates every aspect of contemporary human life. Hybrid war created an entirely new understanding of what an ‘area’ is (virtual and not purely physical), what ‘control’ means (the social network – not to control information itself, but to rule and manipulate its nature), and who the ‘adversary’<sup>33</sup> is. In case of adversary, Aleksander Dugin analysis<sup>34</sup> points out that, as the nature of a network is very dynamic, and today’s ally can be tomorrow’s adversary (and vice versa), so *the separation between friend and foe in this new type of war is very provisional and [hybrid] war is waged consistently against everybody*

*i.e. shaping the behavioural model of friends, neutral parties and enemies in situations of peace, crisis and war.*


Without delving into morality and ethics, *hybrid and grey zone conflicts*<sup>35</sup> advocate Machiavellian<sup>36</sup> utilization of the full spectrum of means, to target the adversary, that includes political, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PESII) means, besides



Intersection of domains in hybrid warfare (Source: mpcoe.org)

the military. The relative novelty of hybrid warfare lies in the ability of an actor to *synchronize* multiple instruments of power *simultaneously and intentionally* to exploit *creativity, ambiguity, non-linearity and cognitive elements of war.*<sup>37</sup> The irony of success can be likened to *the perfect heist*<sup>38</sup> where the bank does not even know that it has been robbed. The strong and fluid element of ambiguity within *hybrid warfare* adds a new dimension to how *coercion, aggression, conflict and war are to be understood.*<sup>39</sup> **Hybrid war is not the next step in the generational progress of warfare (like Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) or even Slipchenko’s 6GW<sup>40</sup>), but rather a**

novel and distinctive process to choose and mix the best ingredients from all the present and previous generations of war, to furnish an appropriate mix of resources and processes (resembling Liang and Xiangsui's concept of *Unrestricted warfare*<sup>41</sup>).



Chronological and aspectual relevance of generational warfare  
(Source: Book – The Handbook of 5GW)

This process of combining capabilities and resources is specifically tailored in consonance with the peculiarity of a selected target and the decided strategy. All available sensitivities and vulnerabilities of a target are exploited to juxtapose strengths against weaknesses, so as to maximize the effect for ensuring a desired outcome or a premeditated consequence. The method and type of combination of the capabilities and resources keeps varying vis-a-vis different targets and adversaries in accordance with the dictates of the prevailing environment. This way, the evaluation of capabilities can be conveniently concealed behind a wide set of variations and combinations of MPESII, and that is how the concept of hybrid war differs from all preceding concepts of war, including 5GW.<sup>42</sup>


The core emphasis of hybrid warfare across the entire spectrum

is to blur the line distinguishing war from peace, and spread doubts and uncertainty, in order to exploit the cognizance of the target adversary. Such hybrid wars are tailored to remain below obvious *detection and response thresholds* that characterize the recent post-modern information age.<sup>43</sup> Time factor of such wars is quite long, with slow but persistent application over a period of time, to create synergy among various components for concentrated impact. *Hybrid war is yet an evolving concept where almost four-fifths of activity tends to be non-kinetic.*<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the prevailing concepts of hybrid war in US and the West, Russia and India need to be evaluated for the sake of conceptual clarity, and the comprehension of important elements that constitute the phenomenon of hybrid warfare. With aforementioned in context, it seems appropriate to take stock of the situation in case of Pakistan, so as to analyze prevailing perceptions regarding contemporary and future hybrid war, and how it will manifest itself on our national security perspective in the future.

## Conceptual Domain of Hybrid Warfare

- **US and the West Concept of Hybrid Warfare**

US and the West concept of hybrid war<sup>45</sup> owes its inception to Frank Hoffman<sup>46</sup> who created *intellectual synergy*<sup>47</sup> between elements drawn from different strategic ideas and theories conceptualized between late 1990s and early 2000s. The four prominent ones were *fourth generation warfare*<sup>48</sup>, *compound*



CONCEPT IN US / WEST


*Intellectual synergy for US and the West  
concept of hybrid warfare*

(Source: Author)

warfare<sup>49</sup>, *unrestricted warfare*<sup>50</sup> and the US National Defense Strategy-2005.<sup>51</sup> Hoffman analyzed the Irish insurgency (1919-1920), Mujahedin in Afghanistan (1980s), Balkan War (post Yugoslavia era) and Chechen rebels (1990s). However, as per his analysis, the true and most comprehensive war was the second Lebanon War (2006) and specifically *Hezbollah*, which describes the closest example of a modern hybrid challenge. *Hezbollah* displayed four distinct characteristics<sup>52</sup> i.e. *fusion of regular and irregular forces, had modern weapons and sophisticated technology for signal intelligence, simultaneous use and combination of these capabilities and successful use of information operations at operational as well as strategic levels*. Hoffman's conceptual synergy<sup>53</sup> utilized concepts like *blurring nature of conflict* and *loss of state monopoly on violence* from the fourth generation warfare (4GW), from the Chinese concept of *unrestricted warfare* he utilized the concept of *omni-directionality and combination of battlefield factors*, from *compound warfare* he took the concept of *mixing conventional and unconventional capabilities* (but at lower or operational levels), from Hammes<sup>54</sup> and Arquilla<sup>55</sup> he took the concept of *power of networks*, from Australian experts he borrowed the concept of *growing*

*complexity of operation environment and opportunistic nature of future adversary*, and from US National Defense Strategy (NDS)-2005 he borrowed the concept of *disruptive challenges*, and rephrased it as *criminal disorder*<sup>56</sup>, by drawing inspiration from the concept of social disruptive behaviours. This intellectual synergy<sup>57</sup> allowed Hoffman to articulate two definitive and conceptually interconnected terms, *hybrid war and hybrid threats*. He states that **"hybrid warfare incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion and criminal disorder"**. The concept was practical and initially limited to a distinctive battlespace where such capabilities and resources were to be synergized. It had amassed all the advantages of constituting concepts, bypassed their limitations, and remained policy-relevant as per the US military cultural mindset.<sup>58</sup> It therefore, became popular in the US military for force planning, doctrine, organization, training and education. However, the US Department of Defense *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* does not list any definition of *hybrid warfare and hybrid threat*. The concept has also been criticized<sup>59</sup> by many thinkers and experts for missing the alleged claim of *novelty* (as it was considered to be an old concept), being *ambiguous* in application and having an *'a-strategic'* nature.

NATO later expanded the concept further in 2012, by arriving at an understanding that *admittedly*,



NATO's Comprehensive approach to counter hybrid threats

(Source: nato.int)

hybrid threat is an umbrella term encompassing operations across wide variety of systems/subsystems, simultaneously including economic, financial, legal, political informational, social and military.<sup>60</sup> Despite productive NATO debates, NATO members were unwilling to contribute to a collective investment in development of capabilities for defense against hybrid threats.<sup>61</sup> However, this endeavor for collective defense got the needed stimulus for NATO and its members after the Ukrainian crisis, that led to the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. Since then, the concept of hybrid war has remained the main discourse in the west's military thought.<sup>62</sup> The extended vision for hybrid war by the US and the West states, that *in effect hybrid war bridges the divide between hard and soft power applications that result from technological and informational revolutions of last three decades in a way maximizing asymmetric advantages.....as well as minimize risks and costs.*<sup>63</sup> So the initial definition of hybrid war by Hoffman was limited to military means, and it was subsequently expanded by NATO to include the non-military means as well for achieving political goals.<sup>64</sup>

The most comprehensive analysis of the US and the West hybrid war is contained in a book from 2013 by two junior officers, Major Timothy McCulloh (who generalizes the conduct of hybrid war to seven principles after historical analysis of many wars<sup>65</sup>) and Major Richard Johnson (who spelled out three imperatives for the operational art in hybrid war<sup>66</sup>), entitled *Hybrid Warfare*.<sup>67</sup> It was the main conceptual context behind rise of the concept of *Russian hybrid war* in the western discourse, that essentially meant to tell audiences that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is a manifestation of hybrid warfare<sup>68</sup>, *to weaken and split EU*<sup>69</sup> and *to undermine US-led liberal democratic order.*<sup>70</sup> It needed a proactive response by NATO.<sup>71</sup> Russia had a different view about it.

- **Russian Concepts of the Gibridnaya Voyna (literal translation: hybrid war) and The New Generation War**

Since the mid-1990s, the Russian conceptualization of war as a socio-political phenomenon, had been shaped by the USSR defeat in the *Cold War* because of the persistent

and successful erosion of its culture, values and self-esteem by *the west*, in a span of time spread over forty years of *cold war*.<sup>72</sup> Russian interest in *Gibridnaya Voyna* began with observation of US debates on hybrid warfare in 2009. Hoffman's article on hybrid war was printed in the 2013 issue of *Geopoliticka*<sup>73</sup> (Journal of the University of Moscow). This



resulted in many conferences and seminars on *Gibridnaya Voyna*. But the Russians *did not adopt the concept blindly*, and *re-conceptualized it with the Russian politico-military experience and their understanding of the phenomenon of war*.<sup>74</sup> Consequently inspired by writings of Evgeny Messner<sup>75</sup> (in retrospect later, because he was an anti-communist during and after the *Second World War*), Aleksander Dugin<sup>76</sup> and Igor Panarin<sup>77</sup>, the discourse on *net-centric war*<sup>78</sup> (NCW) and *information war*<sup>79</sup> (IW) flourished in the 2000s. The term *Gibridnaya Voyna* gained widespread popularity among Russian scholars and political analysts. It was conceptualized as ***corrupting and undermining the adversary internally to achieve political goals (i.e. global domination) without escalating a given conflict to direct military confrontation***.<sup>80</sup> The concept was quite abstract as compared to the West,

and involved all spheres of public life i.e. political, economic, social development and even culture.<sup>81</sup>

*Gibridnaya Voyna* is different from hybrid war as it emphasized the link between military and non-military means for political struggle, where the military plays a supporting role. *It aims at destroying the political and social cohesion of the adversary from inside, by amplifying polarizations existing in political, economic, social and informational arenas for implosion and internal collapse of the target state*<sup>82</sup> (e.g. a *colour revolution*).<sup>83</sup> The concept was brewing in Russia since the 1990s and hybrid warfare was *Russified* (*Gibridnaya Voyna*) for political reasons to blame the West for conceptualizing it, and then using it against Russia.<sup>84</sup> It is a method of geopolitical confrontation by the weaker side in conflict, that cannot afford or does not want to engage in an open war.<sup>85</sup> Like USA, it has also not been adopted by the Russian military as they were already accustomed to taking war as a broader socio-cultural and political confrontation. Two other Russian thinkers, Sergey Chekinov (a retired colonel doing as the director of influential 'Center for Military and Strategic Studies' under the Russian General Staff) and Sergey Bognadov (a retired lieutenant general and the lead researcher of the institute), jointly worked on a similar concept of *new generation war* since late 2000s, and their joint publications concentrated on the changing nature of contemporary conflicts.<sup>86</sup>

Their work influenced the Russian military establishment in general, and views of Chief of

General Staff (CGS), General Valery Gerasimov<sup>87</sup> in particular, and whose view on nature of hybrid war are popular in the west as *Gerasimov Doctrine*.<sup>88</sup> Chekinov and Bognadov



Russia - Ukraine war (Source: twitter.com)

have also discussed the nature of Gibriddnaya Voyna. Their views on transformation of war as a socio-political and military phenomenon are quite interesting, as they differentiate between war (the violent conflict) and political confrontation (non-kinetic conflict) due to globalization, economic and financial interdependence and technological revolution in communications. In their concept of *new generation war*, the military and non-military means combine in a way that non-military means precede in application, to soften the target for launching subsequent final violent conflict, whereas in case of Gibriddnaya Voyna (which is a non-violent political confrontation), the military plays a supporting role only. So *new generation war* is the preserve of the military leadership, whereas Gibriddnaya Voyna is planned and executed by the civilian leadership. They object to calling non-violent confrontation as war, because it is not so, and consider it a substitute for military deployments. This distinction is important for maintaining and funding military establishments,

because both ways of conflict are different in scope and purpose. Hence, Gibriddnaya Voyna is not the direct responsibility of the armed forces, though they may be utilized as a tool to support political, economic, social and informational domains, by their potential presence and deterrence. Chekinov and Bogdanov appreciate the contributions of Gibriddnaya Voyna because in the present geopolitical environment, direct military threat from NATO and the West in the near future is unlikely. They reached a familiar conclusion that *an employment of asymmetric action frequently allows a weak adversary to achieve political victory*.

- **Indian Concept of Hybrid Warfare**

Chanakya Kautilya<sup>89</sup> in *Arthshastra*<sup>90</sup> said that *to achieve the political goals, the ruler must have all elements of power whether they are economic, social or military*, and for achieving these he suggested that *there are three types of warfare, “open warfare [conventional warfare], concealed*




Indian hybrid warfare (Source: linkedin.com)

*warfare [this resembles guerilla warfare], and silent warfare [this resembles the Russian concept of Gibriddnaya Voyna or hybrid war]*<sup>91</sup>. With these ideological foundations about war, Ajit Doval<sup>92</sup> suggested that *India needs to prepare for fourth generation warfare, including fighting invisible enemies*.<sup>93</sup> They also took



notice of *unrestricted warfare* which outlined that traditional battlespace of land, seas, air and outer space is overlapping with non-battlespace like technological space (cyber and



Likely conceptual synergy for Indian hybrid warfare  
(Source: Author)

electromagnetic space), social spaces (politics, economics and culture) and cognitive space of the human mind.<sup>94</sup> Chaos and complexities added by non-state actors are affecting civil and military equally, and the opportunity to use non-lethal means, asymmetric measures and non-contact response options, has pushed the world to endless war.<sup>95</sup>

The Indian concept of hybrid war can be elaborated through a similar and popular concept of *non-contact war*<sup>96</sup> in India, that looks at targeting enemy sensitivities rather than its vulnerabilities, thereby forcing the enemy to react, and can broadly be defined as “*the form of warfare which seeks to employ all elements of national power across multiple domains to target enemy’s population, sovereignty, governance structures and economy through non-kinetic and kinetic means with a view to intimidate, paralyse or denude its politico-military response capabilities and enable winning without fighting*”<sup>97</sup>. The then Indian Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat, reiterated that non-contact warfare is “*important*” and is a “*major consideration*” in the planned



Indian army chief on hybrid warfare  
(Source: news18.com)

restructuring of the Indian Army.<sup>98</sup> A task force headed by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat was to track the implementation of a set of directives by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, including *drafting a doctrine for non-contact warfare*<sup>99</sup>, reforming public sector units in defence, handholding the domestic defence industry, and ensuring greater use of indigenous languages in the military.<sup>100</sup> Virtually every space is being contested with battlefield significance.<sup>101</sup> “Its always good to remember that India’s neighbourhood has two nations who have attempted to weaponise information and communication like nobody else before. *Coming straight to the crux of the issue, it’s not for anything else but simply because the nature of war has changed; so has the concept of national security and emerging technologies are enabling and simplifying communication of narratives, ideas, beliefs, ideologies and thoughts. The nation does not have to only safeguard its borders, its territories and its physical assets but also its people who are the prime objects of psychological targeting*”.<sup>102</sup> Indian Army Chief General MM Naravane also emphasized the need to enhance non-contact warfare as well as contact warfare capabilities<sup>103</sup>, for two front war.<sup>104</sup>

- **The Conundrum–Defining Hybrid Warfare for Pakistan**

Pakistan nurtures the sixth largest military of the world whose professionalism is globally acknowledged. Backed by a credible



Pakistan day parade (Source: darivoo.com)

nuclear deterrent and supported by an effective strategic force component, the domain of conventional military conflicts is being safeguarded effectively against regional as well as global kinetic threats. Based on the prevailing view that mass violence, destruction of forces and loss of territory will pose an existential threat, such a capability development formed our dominant world view, and is still being pursued, despite criticism on the quantum of defense expenditure. This is rationally justified for Pakistan, due to peculiar regional dynamics, despite the relevant decline in contemporary effectiveness of mass military applications for eventual conflict resolution. Besides this, the omnipresence of Pakistan's military role is exhibited by its signature in many spheres of national importance, ranging from correcting irrigation system, census, unearthing ghost schools, managing WAPDA, disaster management, flood relief, elections, internal security, counter terrorism, CPEC infrastructure and beyond. Add to it, the management and supervision of corporate ventures for the welfare of soldiers and their families. Because

of strong professional, organizational, ethical and managerial acumen, the military is termed, under an elusive



Independence day celebrations  
(Source: pinterest.com)

construct, as the *center of gravity* of Pakistan, and around this is woven the concept of national security. This has served its purpose quite well till 9/11, despite our preceding political, social and economic woes.

The term *wars* still conjures up the image of violence and desolation in our minds, that is followed by an outcome precipitating *peace*, thus endorsing Berman's assertion that *every war has produced its own backwards looking tendency disguised as institutional prudence*.<sup>105</sup> Finding solace in physical security due




India-Pakistan armed conflict  
(Source: star.com.tr)

to a strong and omnipresent military, is only a fraction of complete security that a nation needs in today's era of hybrid warfare, and its wide spectrum that encompasses almost everything as *the aspects of war*. Self-centered fissiparous political discourse, dismal economic performance and indicators, social disharmony, informational naivety and infrastructural

discrepancies expose Pakistan to a variety of vulnerabilities. India's persistent endeavors to brand Pakistan internationally as a *state sponsoring terrorism*, incessant efforts to put Pakistan on *FATF blacklist again*, disputing construction of *Bhasha dam* in GB, criticism of *CPEC*, masking *Kashmir issue*, diplomatic isolation worldwide by virtue of influence, flaming indigenous hatred and exporting it through proxies, *water disputes*, cultivating dissent in society, espionage, exploiting disharmony in Balochistan and Karachi through surrogates, are but a few strands in a synchronized effort to use political, social, economic and informational institutions of national power simultaneously and intentionally, to exploit creativity, ambiguity, non-linearity and cognitive elements of war. Add to it aggression along the borders, especially LOC, and it completes the entire spectrum of *hybrid war and grey zone conflicts*.

Considering its perpetuity during the last seven decades, with increasing prominence during last two decades, it is obvious that Pakistan is in a state of perpetual war, that extends far beyond the realm of military. The usual counter argument that *everything has always been fair in war*, holds little validity in the prevailing concept of hybrid war, that does away with the primary



India's information warfare against Pakistan  
(Source: EU Disinfo Lab Report)

ethical precept of declaring or ending wars, and keeping it below detection and response thresholds. The accompanying argument that *all that can be done with existing resources is being done*, can only be considered learned helplessness or complacency, because of the overwhelming variety of ways professed by the concept of hybrid warfare.

We have examined the major conceptual domains of hybrid warfare from the lens of US and the West and Russian points of view, and also supplemented it with the Indian perspective. The Chinese perspective on hybrid warfare is quite unique, that blends views of Marx and Mao Zedong teachings, by aligning it to the 21<sup>st</sup> century manifestations of means and technology. Overall, the MPESII ingredients are to be combined in an endeavor to have an operationalized concept of policy. ***Except for the military, Pakistan seems to be far behind in conceiving a functional perspective of either facing a hybrid***


**threat, or executing a hybrid war.**

Fortunately, Pakistan nurtures no offensive plans of power projection, either regionally or globally, and hence can concentrate on detecting and countering hybrid attacks. But what good is a pure defense, without an ability to attack? So, at the policy level, the existing policy of *proactive defense* make sense. In this context the conundrum lies in operationalizing this policy into an actionable strategy. For this understanding, there is a need to analyze how hybrid war effects different realms like military, political, economic, social, informational and infrastructural domains.

**Effects of Hybrid War on Different Domains–MPESII and Beyond**

- **Ideological Domain.**

Ideology is a multi-layered phenomenon that lacks precise definition because of being a *contestable concept*<sup>106</sup> (along with the *emotional context* surrounding



*Purpose and constituents of ideology*  
(Source: Author)

it) and has three distinguishable discourses<sup>107</sup> in society, i.e. first, it serves to *legitimize the social system*; second, it serves to *socialize young into the common values* to which society adheres; and third, it serves to *mobilize the members of a society* toward selected goals that are exigent. Manipulating the four cardinal

elements of *threat, protection, values and knowledge*, the phenomenon of *hybrid war* influences the process of *identity formulation* through *narrative warfare*<sup>108</sup> in the ideological domain. Narrative warfare is about influencing people and forming a psychology-based theory of identity formation, the history of which goes back to Plato's fear of poets' and the artists' ability to evoke passion in an audience, as he was afraid of passion overrunning reason, and representational forces.<sup>109</sup> In international relations and security studies, *narrative warfare* explores how issues are communicated and made to be believed, and what political consequences those stories will bring.

Hybrid war exploits psychology and the overwhelmingly intrusive nature of modern media, for placing weaponized narratives to invade the ideological domain of a state, for either eradicating it or changing it. It is woven around media propaganda, fake news and manipulated narratives, as the human mind largely processes information on *first-come-first-served* basis e.g. incessant breaking news and a lot of these, day and night. Abundance of repeated messages creates schemas to stereotype perspectives, and to accept a popular perspective without much need of referring to facts and figures. The present post-modern and post-truth society is diligently built on this use of weaponized narratives. Dr Farah Naz has identified some pertinent contemporary issues about the ongoing narrative war against Pakistan, and our feeble response to these narratives<sup>110</sup> e.g. US and the West exit from Afghanistan let India

and the West to put out a narrative of Pakistan's role in Taliban victory, for which no evidence ever came up. This is how narratives are placed in a globalized world, to manipulate politics.

We gave a lukewarm response on Goswami leaks<sup>111</sup> (only a routine foreign ministry response), that exposed Indian involvement in Pulwama incident, besides having advance knowledge of Indian *Balakot air strikes*. We faltered in projecting *Kulbushan Jadhav* case and narrative




globally.<sup>112</sup> We could not contest India when she unilaterally revoked article 370 and 35A in Kashmir (a core issue for Pakistan), to create citizenship problems for Kashmir, and other Muslims in India.<sup>113</sup> We failed to adequately cover and highlight the *Dismantling Hindutva Conference* held in September 2021 by over 40 elite universities, to consider how Hindutva has become a nuisance for the minorities.<sup>114</sup> We failed to pursue and highlight the Euro-Lab exposure of the 15 year-long smear campaign against Pakistani interests in the international community.<sup>115</sup>

We even failed to timely address fake news and serious propaganda, when India highlighted the false involvement of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in drone strikes in the Panjshir incident<sup>116</sup> in Afghanistan, to support

the Taliban. Even BBC and the West media denied PAF involvement in the incident. In September 2021, the New Zealand cricket team returned from the stadium before the scheduled cricket match, on the plea of security concerns, when it got threats from Indian accounts via Virtual Private Network (VPN) in Singapore.<sup>117</sup> In the same month, Goswami claimed the Pakistan military has made headquarters on the fifth floor of Serena Hotel in Kabul - fortunately it had only two floors. We never challenged it properly in the media, probably considering it trivia from a foul-mouthed journalist, without realizing that he has considerable influence and following on the media, in India and elsewhere.

Pakistan emerged as the largest Muslim country in 1947 on the basis of an ideology, founded on a distinct *two nation theory*, and embedded in *Islamic identity*. 75 years later, the nation is broken (creation of Bangladesh in 1971), disillusioned (sectarian, ethnic, sub-national, religious differences), and searching for identity (Islamic, conservative, modernist, secular). Post-modernism seems hell-bent to convince people that there is no place for national ideology in 21<sup>st</sup> century materialism, except for capital-driven philanthropic



Ingredients for national narrative (Source: Author)

humanity. They seem to succeed in it, as much of our youth generally endorse the view that *religion is a private or personal affair, humanity is the best religion, everyone must have unbridled liberty in choosing personal relationships, and the state should have no right to interfere in it.*<sup>118</sup>

Pakistan does not have a central narrative or official stories<sup>119</sup>, which is further exacerbated by a political tilt in favour of strong provincialism. Paigham-e-Pakistan<sup>120</sup> remains a tapered academic endeavor, a state policy that lacks commensurate strategy to operationalize it. We do not need education for understanding cultural narratives, because we live it, and it works on assumptive and unconscious levels<sup>121</sup>, thus creates a deceitful sense of security vis-à-vis psychological manipulation designed




Unity of religious identities  
(Source: dailypioneer.com)

to discredit or disproportionately magnify its role in national identity.<sup>122</sup> The famed dictum on identity that, *I am a ..... (ethnic identity) from last 5000 years, a Muslim (religious title) from last 1400 years and a Pakistani (nationalist title) from last 40 years*<sup>123</sup>, aptly encapsulates the imbroglio being faced by Pakistan. In context of the *nation-state*, there is a need to reverse

the sequence of priorities. Unless we become a strong nation-state, we may not be able to achieve the other identity claims. Hybrid war in the ideological domain emphasizes this aspect of wrong sequence of priorities, to confuse the masses of Pakistan. On our part, we unfortunately help this widening cleavage with petty politics and fragmentary or individualized discourses, further amplified through an amendment in the constitution, aimed at devolving power from federation to provinces.

### • Political Domain

When the natural diversity of people is restricted due to artificially created state boundaries since Peace of Westphalia in 1648, it is bound to generate a difference of opinion and perspectives, on a variety of national




Bifurcation of Pakistani politics (Source: Author)

issues. Politics is the art of ensuring harmonious decision making by people living in groups, which in the context of modern nation-states, means shared governance i.e. finding the best possible way of achieving self-rule and collective will. Any modern nation-state which can harmonize it, has a better chance of progress and prosperity. One of the biggest examples of political narratives and its impact, is the *war on terror*, that changed the global perception about Muslims, non-state actors (NSAs), state's actions

against NSAs, redesigned security strategies, immigration laws and even foreign policies.<sup>124</sup> The political domain can be used positively in the context of a *political solution*, which is compromising and nonviolent<sup>125</sup>, or descriptively as *the art or science of government*, but it also sometimes carries a negative connotation.<sup>126</sup> Politics is the primary source of strength, from which all other elements of national power (MESII) draw inspiration and guidance.

Unfortunately, in case of Pakistan, the political domain remains weak, and has acquired many self-serving and dissipating political discourses. There is no harmony between the public and the elite sitting on political seats and driving policies. This is evident from different



Issues affecting Pakistani politics (Source: Author)

narratives framed by the political elite for popular public consumption, and realpolitik in Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's confusion<sup>127</sup> in regional context, somewhat describes the political imbroglio in Pakistan. In the political domain, hybrid warfare turns a legitimate non-violent struggle for power into a violent one for seizing power through coercive and illegal means<sup>128</sup> and has been successfully done in Balochistan, KPK (erstwhile FATA) and Karachi. Alternatively, the opposing parties are pitted against each other, and that

endlessly postpones the process of political consensus, ensuring chaos through a *Hobbesian war*<sup>129</sup> of all against all, that is perpetuated by means of emasculating the political and constitutional institutions that exist to mitigate socio-political conflicts.<sup>130</sup> Foreign players (especially India) attempt recruit from within different segments of society, ethnic and sectarian actors from urban centers, separatists and sub-nationalists from Balochistan and erstwhile FATA, and religious exploiters from different religious schools, to pitch them against each other, and create chaos throughout the country.<sup>131</sup> This becomes possible because our system of creating well trained politicians from the lowest level (i.e. local bodies) is ineffective, or has been made ineffective. No present political setup seems to be in favour of devolution of power, to give real power to the vote of public. This paves the way for nepotism and exploitation.

Political bickering drags the entire country in a downward spiral, that predicts a devastating outcome in future, in almost all MPESII domains. The echoes of incompetent governance, manipulation of legislature and administrative rules for self-protection, and hateful popular public slogans, are either an engineered outcome, or present a fragmented society ripe for perpetrating a well-designed hybrid war. Agitation-based politics since the 70s has continued, rather worsened. The political practice lacks a sense of *politesse*, and is largely based on publicly slandering opponents to extract short term political mileage for

elections. Politically, *we have failed* to comprehend Balochistan imbroglia in last 75 years, undergoing a fifth




*Internationalising the Balochistan issue*  
(Source: zeenews.india.com)

spate of insurgency since the last two decades. We have turned Karachi into a *feral city*<sup>132</sup>, failed to streamline FATA into mainstream politics, to limit state institutions to within their respective domains, to diminish corruption in our political system, and marred our electoral history with violence, rigging and gerrymandering. No one can ask for a better brew than this in a country, for imposing a hybrid war.

In terms of policy formulation, our disappointment is reflected by low levels of growth and development, despite having all the resources. We seem to be in a vicious cycle of bad policy facilitating hybrid attacks, that keeps reinforcing bad policy making.<sup>133</sup> Recent rumors of the country's default, despite seven decades of continuous policy formulations, expose Pakistan to all sorts of pressures to compromise on principles and cardinal national interests. In a regional context, the creation of Pakistan was a shocking anti-thesis to Hindutva's *Akhand Bharat*, which India wants to undo, at all costs. We tend to facilitate the West in general, and India in particular, with our inept political decision

making, both domestically as well as internationally. Our political image suffers internationally, as we deny recognition to certain countries. We are the only (Islamic) nuclear state, with a weak political system and fragile economy, that stokes global fears of extremist take over, and subsequent *Armageddon*. Certain laws are considered to be in contravention to basic human rights. Internally, our under-developed social and governmental structure remains a point of concern around the globe. Overall, Pakistan seems to have suffered more due to mismanagement and vulnerabilities, than purely outside interference. Mistakes have been turned into blunders, and blunders into national tragedies<sup>134</sup> e.g. nationalization of industries, provincial politics on national water reservoirs, dependence on IMF loans, employing *international financial*



*Continuous accumulation of IMF debt on Pakistan*  
(Source: tribune.com.pk)

*institution's* economic hitmen in the country's economic system, leadership deficit, and politicization of civil services. Established political entities resist efforts of devolution of power to the lowest levels of administration,



thereby creating a dilemma of micro-managing macro-economics.

Domestic politics dominate the creation of public policies, including defense and foreign policies. These policies are based on overriding self-interest, which are very diverse, personalized and overtly dynastic in culture.<sup>135</sup> Politics and corruption have been seamlessly intertwined in a vicious cycle of power, which provides



*Dangerous mix : religion and politics for legislation*  
(Source: courtingthelaw.com)

substantial space to adversaries for imposing hybrid war. Resultantly, it has polarized society with deep-seated hatred, and made them a suitable target for hybrid war. Low levels of political participation lead to incompetent and unstable mechanisms of power sharing, thus facilitating the rule of an astute minority, privileged by inheritance and manipulation. Such ossification of socio-cultural identities are exploited through sustained political and informational campaigns, to turn them into violent movements.<sup>136</sup> Present fissures are based on commonly used narratives<sup>137</sup>, like *religion has proved more divisive than bonding the nation, undivided India would have proved better for progress and opportunities, the military is greedy, power hungry and attacks its own people, and it is a conspiracy theory that Muslims are being targeted by some powers.*

Disregard for social movement across class, creed and ethnicity leads to fissures which are widened by hybrid attacks.<sup>138</sup> Perceived and actual differences between social groups are exploited to promote physical and psychological polarization based on identity, values and beliefs. The focus of such exploitation is on the weak and uneducated segment of society, and minds, to create desired effects. In order to assess whether we are victims of a planned hybrid war<sup>139</sup>, we need to consider the intensity of political rivalry, unequal development leaving some areas backward, criticism




*CPEC: The game changer*  
(Source: pakdefense.com)

of CPEC, sectarian clashes, ethnic rivalries, civil-military tensions highlighted in media, and deteriorating relations with neighbors. Last but not the least, are bad foreign policy decisions, showing our inability to distinguish between short term gains and long term interests.<sup>140</sup>

#### • Social Domain


In the social domain, the effects of social and economic inequality can be intensified through prolonged neglect in remedial measures, on the part of socio-political leadership. The *intersection of political differences, economic crises and physical dislocation* can fuel protest movements that are perceived to be more representative of popular forces, and more reflective of popular grievances, than constitutionally mandated institutions.<sup>141</sup> The present



Social issues –target for hybrid warfare  
(Source: Author)

social unrest seems to be the outcome of these factors. Hybrid war has a larger swathe in cognitive space, as compared to the physical domain.<sup>142</sup> These protest movements then can be engineered to do the damage, while staying within constitutionally prescribed limits, ultimately making them anti-government, or even manipulated for political disruption.<sup>143</sup> The ultimate objective is usually *the will and resistive mindset of a nation*, so its center of gravity and the place where it resides must be identified, for Pakistan.<sup>144</sup> Since inception, the majority believes that national unity lies in *faith, our religion and a culture under its influence*. This strong faith has been eroded slowly over the last 75 years, and we have not taken note of it, as we should have. The foremost requirement is to find out how and where it is done<sup>145</sup> e.g. *is there an already existing vulnerability that the adversary can exploit? Is social media being employed to aggravate perceptions? Are inadvertent agents leading the think tanks or are they being paid? Are economic hitmen being employed to aggravate existing disparities? Are political humans creating polarization? Is there civil unrest that can morph into civil war?* We need to gain control of the situation, and to end conflicts that are dividing society.

Pakistani society has experienced a low level of political participation, is based on an unstable mechanism of power sharing, and ruled by a minor class of elites through inheritance, with disregard for social movement across class, creed and ethnicity. Hence, hybrid attacks can widen existing fissure between leaders and the governed.<sup>146</sup> We need to assess whether we are the victim of a planned hybrid war in social sphere. From a social perspective we are politically very polarised, social institutions always seem to be on a collision course, our socio-economic priorities



Public perception of the role of major psycho-social issues in Pakistan  
(Source: researchgate.net)

are subdued to ethnicity, sects and sub-national inclinations. CPEC also remains in limbo due to these. This has also impacted civil–military relations negatively. Last but not the least, this has led to bad foreign policy decisions.<sup>147</sup> Unfortunately we present a ripe situation for imposing hybrid war in the social domain.

In the socio-cultural domain, perceived and actual differences

between different social groups are exploited to promote physical and psychological polarization based on identity, values and beliefs, through a sustained political and informational campaign designed to emphasize a violent response to social stratification.<sup>148</sup> Bad handling of such a ripe environment can lead to *Kazakhstan's bloody January*<sup>149</sup>-like situation last year, where bad decision-making escalated it to a national tragedy, that created the need of foreign help in controlling it. All wars impact society, and therefore hybrid war must be defined first, and then a policy be made for it, because it is important to understand not only *ways* and *means*, but also the desired possible *ends*, of hybrid war.<sup>150</sup>


#### • Informational Domain

Hybrid attacks keep unleashing a barrage of conflicting information that confuses the target population in distinguishing between true and false narratives. Social media platforms (like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Snap-Chat etc.) add to this confusion. The objectivity of the mind is subjected to deep-fakes, engineered audio



India's disinformation campaign against Pakistan  
(Source: twitter.com)

clips, false claims and other such products, so as to induce loss of faith in the national media, because the relativity of truth is heightened to perfectly align with confirmation-bias of the target segment of population.<sup>151</sup> Weaponized narratives are used to distort history and cohesion of the nation. US exit from Afghanistan and Taliban victory are attributed to interference or manipulation by Pakistan, without presenting any supporting evidence. This is how narratives are placed in a globalized world, to manipulate politics. We remained quiet on *Goswami leaks* that exposed the Indian involvement in the Pulwama incident, as well as advance knowledge of Balakot strikes. We have not been effective in projecting the case of Kulbushan Jhadav globally, despite enough evidence. We could



Timeline of international support of the Taliban (Source: War on the Rocks, Associated Press)

not contest India when she unilaterally revoked the status of Kashmir (articles 370 & 35 A), creating problems of citizenship for Muslims in general, and Kashmiris in particular. We have been unable to highlight EuroLab exposures of India's 15 year-long smear campaign and misinformation against Pakistani interests. We never fully challenged India's false claims of Pakistani involvement in Panjshir incident (even BBC and the West refuted PAF's involvement) or even false claims of Pakistan's military headquarters on fifth floor of Serena Hotel in Kabul.




Indian perception of Pakistan's support to terrorism through US monetary aid  
(Source: timesofindia.indiatimes.com)

It is important to realize that the information domain remains the mainstay of hybrid war, tends to be potentially endless in time, and calls for a proactive strategy to counter it. If it remains unchallenged beyond a certain point, it becomes self-perpetuating and self-generating, as it takes root in people's consciousness e.g. blaming *Afghan Jihad* (and General Ziaul Haq) for all the ills in Pakistani society, and *Afghan refugees* as a source of all troubles. Weaponized narratives are used

to distort and reverse the chain of causation (history), besides targeting the narrative of national cohesion, and intensifying an existing historical bias of exclusion and marginalization, for non-linear effects of hybrid warfare.<sup>152</sup>

### • Cyber Domain

Cyber space is unregulated and open to all types of users. Rather the access to internet now-a-days is considered by some as a *basic human right*, because it has become a *key means* to exercising freedom of expression and opinion.<sup>153</sup> Resultantly, cyber space surveillance (disregarding the distinction of friend or foe) has become a norm in modern day espionage, as was exposed by Snowden<sup>154</sup> in 2013. The internet has also provided immense power and outreach to the media, and former US president Trump has even used it for publicizing major policy decisions. Trump also used his Twitter account for spreading misinformation, to create a massive public hype about election fraud in US Presidential elections (he lost these elections). The hype went down by 73% after Twitter suspended his account. Similarly, the Australian government had to revoke state legislation to monetize Facebook's *breaking news*, due to the pressure of over 17 million users, after Facebook had banned such breaking news in a reaction to this new law. Cybersecurity Ventures expects global cybercrime costs to grow by 15 percent per year over the next five years, reaching \$10.5 trillion USD annually by 2025 (or even higher), up from \$3 trillion USD in 2015.<sup>155</sup> Such influential clout has given rise to a



Cybercrime Expected to skyrocket in the coming years

(Source: wordstream.com)

massive *cyber security* market as well, that amounted to 112 billion USD in 2019, and is expected to reach 280 billion USD by 2027.<sup>156</sup>

The hardware used in data centers (routers, firewalls, storage systems, servers and application-delivering controllers) also make it prone to hacking. Pakistan has over 193 million internet users, and NADRA database is considered to be one of the largest databases in the world, with over 200 million individual records. However, NADRA was hacked in March 2021 in one of the largest scandals in the world.<sup>157</sup> Revenue, land record, FBR and HEC are being digitized. HEC site and railway online booking site have also been hacked recently. Unfortunately, cyber security is usually ignored, and not given the priority it deserves. Additionally, cyber security has not been able to keep pace with exponential growth in communication technology. Cyber laws and cyber policy are mistaken for each other. A 13 page cyber policy issued in 2021 implements the concept of computer emergency response teams (CERT) and computer security incident response team (CSIRT), in addition to two laboratories of cyber-crime forensics (CCF) and smart devices

& network security (SDNS). This policy was made without any national debate, and does not address the shortfall of trained cyber security personnel and resources. Overall, responsibility for the defense of cyber space is ambiguous, ill-defined and suffers from turf wars and overlapping jurisdictions.<sup>158</sup> *Right man for the right job* is either ignored, or they do not get the job. FIA runs the national




FIA's response to cyber crime  
(Source: tier3.pk)

response center for cyber-crime (NR3C) with 144 persons, that has only 17 forensic experts, which seems to clearly lack the capacity to monitor a large

social media spreading malicious propaganda against the state.<sup>159</sup>

• **Artificial Intelligence (AI) Domain**

AI is the most widespread and advanced concept of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that lacks any precise or universally agreed definition, as the concept is operationalized differently by different entities. The upsurge of AI can be attributed to four factors,



Role of artificial intelligence in planning and output  
(Source: arxiv.org)

i.e. growth in computer performance, larger data sets, advance use of algorithms, and global commercial interests for funding AI research, like quantum computing, robotics, machine learning etc.<sup>160</sup> AI creates vulnerabilities because presently it is integrated almost in every aspect of modern life, even homes where we now have AI-driven Siri, Alexa and Google pods. AI becomes the prime choice for hybrid war once we consider the synergistic aspect of hybrid warfare (like using ambiguity, narrative control, cyber-attacks, politics, diplomacy etc. simultaneously), coupled with the overriding element of avoiding detection and counter-measures. The functional framework comprises of three components i.e. targeting the key vulnerability or weakness of the adversary, synchronizing hybrid warfare tools (MPESII), and creating linear as well as non-linear effects. AI is presently central to all sectors, including defense and security, because AI can be used for hacking and disturbing military systems, for information manipulation and propaganda, and even for physical harm (hacking missile launch systems, atomic reactors<sup>161</sup> or even AI-based public mass transport systems and cars).<sup>162</sup> AI has now become a pre-requisite for launching successful hybrid attacks, as well as defending against such hybrid warfare attacks. This ability can help create anonymity, ambiguity and creativity of attacks, for avoiding detection and attribution. *Experts believe that the military use of AI has the capacity of re-ordering the balance of power in the world.*<sup>163</sup>

Hence, it assumes cardinal significance for Pakistan, at least in regional milieu, where Indian progress in this field can be termed as remarkable, if not phenomenal.

- **Psychological Domain**

Human behaviour and its motivation is a subject of psychology, and is often used for behaviour modifications. Psychological domain has therefore, always remained part of conventional warfare, and has been used extensively to weaken the spirit of opponents and their public. In modern times, psychological warfare does it with *greater precision and adept deceptive tools*<sup>164</sup>, to strike and



*Military's development as cyber warriors*  
(Source: prebujanjezavesti.si)

weaken the spirit, ideology and beliefs of a nation. It is a slow but persistent process, and is more effective in peacetime for achieving long term objectives. Everyone has a unique process of formulating a worldview in the background of his circumstances (e.g. is he poor, running after bread, or affluent, enjoying life etc. because both can have a differing opinion of the same incident). Perception management, as one of the strongest tools of hybrid warfare, is more effective where social conflicts are rife, and creating fissures in society. With sectarian, religious, ethnic,




The human need for conformity and compliance is usually forced in a society where perception and belief are intertwined, and often reinforce each other. Beliefs are seldom put to test, and social compliance in group societies is visible e.g. Milligram experiments about German people's compliance to Hitler's orders, and Abu-Ghraib incident in Iraq.



Cultural violence (Source: nytimes.com)

This is induced helplessness through weapons of mass deception and demoralization (as done by Goebbels in Germany, and social media now-a-days). Helplessness leads to despair and extreme reactions. For example, when people repeatedly listen to Pakistan being labelled as a *failed state, most corrupt state, intolerant state, and extremist state*, it weakens and ultimately takes away the most potent element of human spirit i.e. hope. This can prove very dangerous to national unity. The battlefield has shifted to media dominance, for perception manipulation and management. Media's quest for breaking and sensational news through talk shows, has blurred the



Drivers of false beliefs (Source: skepticscience.com)

line between responsible and yellow journalism. Gullible audiences are either charged or disappointed, to start questioning patriotism and identity. Kinetic measures to counter these will not prove fruitful. Pakistan must come to the realization that the history of political instability, ethnic disturbances, sub-national struggles, terror attacks and economic hardship, despite having the resources to achieve financial stability, are the outcomes of non-conventional warfare strategies of opponents.

### • Economic Domain


In the economic and financial domains, hybrid warfare can monopolize, and thus weaponise the production, distribution and consumptions of goods and services, on the basis of ethnic and geographic differentiation.<sup>166</sup> This can be seen in the shape of elite monopoly, as sugar mafia, wheat mafia etc. in Pakistan. It can exaggerate social as well as economic inequality, besides




Economic warfare (Source: mronline.org)



manipulating normal distributive asymmetry in a society, which is quite evident in Pakistani society. The divide between *haves and have not* is quite pronounced, and continuously increasing. In the financial domain, hybrid aggression can create dissonance and disjuncture between fiscal policy



Institution wise distribution of Pakistan's debt in 2021  
(Source: sekhobial.com)



Worldwide economic cost of conflict and violence  
(Source: english.cw.com.tw)

(policy on taxation and spending), and monetary policies (for ensuring quantity of money and credit in an economy), by getting the former out of government's hand and bringing the latter under the sway of a political process, that itself is corrupt.<sup>167</sup> Our economic woes are too obvious and well defined, yet no long term remedy has been put in place. Dependence on loans and international restructuring of the economy under tutelage of IFIs, has brought the country to the brink of default. Dr Ashfaq H. Khan has appropriately indicated four major factors that have played a cardinal role in ruining the economy<sup>168</sup>; 34 years

of dependence on IMF structural adjustments programs, exploitation through FATE, disruption of CPEC, and disturbances in Karachi, which is the biggest hub of economic activity in Pakistan.

- **Military Domain**

In the military domain, hybrid warfare can have a demoralizing effect tailored to create disorientation, based on the inability to identify adversaries properly.<sup>169</sup> Hybrid war can lead to the proverbial fog of war—even denser—resulting in Liddell Hart's positive and negative principles of strategy<sup>170</sup>, so that;

### The Largest Militaries in the World



Pakistan has the 6<sup>th</sup> largest military in the world  
(Source: statista.com)

- *Means cannot be adjusted to ends* (our comfort with what we have,

on the pretext of it being utilized in the best possible manner).

- *The object cannot be kept in sight* (urgency to gear ourselves up for future hybrid war).
- *The line of least expectation is not chosen* (countering hybrid war, efficiently while remaining below response and detection thresholds).
- *The line of least resistance is not exploited* (launching cyber and information war).
- *The line of operation offering alternative objectives is not taken* (developing hybrid capabilities based on PAF and Army Air Defence (AAD) instead of investing in conventional land-based hardware).
- *The plans and dispositions are neither flexible nor adapted to circumstances* (sticking to old thinking and repeating mistakes).
- *The attack is launched before the enemy is dislocated or paralyzed, and the attack is renewed along the same line or in the same form after it has once failed* (preparing ourselves for the last type of war).
- It creates the risk of reckless use of power in a situation of unconventional war, and can lead to wrongful prioritization of use of force in situations demanding dialogue and negotiation, and vice versa.<sup>171</sup> This has been seen and done in FATA, Balochistan and Karachi.

## • **Infrastructural Domain**

Hybrid attacks will aim to choke and paralyze the normal functioning of different social and physical infrastructures. This can have devastating effects in national or regional situations of deficient and degraded infrastructure like Pakistan, for initiating hybrid aggression in different national contexts. CPEC, with the potential of being a game changer in our history, is being subjected to obstacles internally, and through sabotage externally. There is an inherent linkage between hybrid warfare, and cities, which must be understood thoroughly. Cities are not only sanctuaries of human civilization, but also hubs of governance and policy making, nodes of a global system of wealth creation, nurseries of talent, incubators of technology and archives of human memory.<sup>172</sup> Hybrid warfare will find conducive conditions in badly governed cities, simply because cities, as *the places where people live, are getting increasingly crowded,*




*Clogging roads in Islamabad*  
(Source: propakistani.pk)

*urban, coastal and networked,* the wars people fight will take on the same characteristics.<sup>173</sup> The confluence of these trends with weakness in political, economic, cultural and infrastructural domains, will result in creation of a *feral city*<sup>174</sup> that would be

an end goal, and a perfect haven for nesting hybrid war actors, activities and aggression. It is difficult to find a better example of a feral city than Karachi, that acts as a major hub of economic activities in Pakistan.

**Who pays for Pakistan?**

Karachi, the business capital of the country, generates more revenue than all of Punjab  
TAKEN FROM FBR YEARBOOK 2017-18 (FIGURES IN BILLION RUPEES)



Importance of Karachi in Pakistan's economy  
 (Source: twitter.com)

• **Lawfare<sup>175</sup> Domain**

Laws are traditionally considered the pinnacle of collective human intellect, and as such have presently acquired the role of final authority for recourse to violence. Lethality and precision of modern weapons, launched from remote locations and much farther distances, has increased the importance of the *just* rationale before resorting to violence, as the final option for conflict resolution. Owing to this importance, the US has included *lawfare*<sup>176</sup> (*legitimacy*) as one of the principles of war in 2011.<sup>177</sup> *Pakistan has been subjected extensively to lawfare*<sup>178</sup> through FATF, US sanctions, EU legislation and Indian manipulation (revoking article 370 and 35A in Jammu and Kashmir dispute<sup>179</sup>, Basmati Rice Geographical Indication Tag Patent in EU<sup>180</sup>, Atlantique incident<sup>181</sup> and objections on CPEC<sup>182</sup>). Pakistan's sports industry



Importance of law in warfare (Source: ifri.org)

in Sialkot, and carpet industry elsewhere in Punjab, suffered due to Pakistan's inability to understand and interpret International Labour Organization's statutes.<sup>183</sup> Reko-diq case<sup>184</sup>, and litigation against nuclear proliferation<sup>185</sup> by a tiny country, Marshall Islands, reflect Pakistan's lack of expertise in lawfare. In most of the cases, it was due to lack of understanding of international law. We erred again in case of responding to ICC on Kulbushan Jhadav case. We have also been criticized internationally for some of our internal laws violating basic human rights. A smart move of lawfare by Pakistan, was the acquisition of an additional 50,000 square kilometers of the continental shelf in 2015, under UNCLOS<sup>186</sup>, after negotiating with Oman for a couple of years.

• **Nationalism Domain**

During the 1990s, the proponents of 4GW argued that the character of war was changing. Evgeny Messner had arrived at much the same conclusion more than half a century before Lind, Hammes and other advocates of 4GW, and as early as 1931 he wrote that 'in our days, humanity experiences a period of social cataclysm' (i.e. the world revolution).<sup>187</sup> According to Messner, one of the main outcomes of the world revolution is that people, as nations, have become



Unity is the real national power  
(Source: reddit.com)

politically active; or in other words, the politics of states have become *'nationalized'*. Nationalism is an ideology based on the premise that the individual's loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual or group interests.<sup>188</sup> Academics define nationalism as a political principle, that holds that the *nation and state should be congruent*.<sup>189</sup> Modernization theory, currently the most commonly accepted theory of nationalism<sup>190</sup>, adopts a constructivist approach and proposes that nationalism emerged due to processes of modernization, such as industrialization, urbanization and mass education, which made national consciousness possible.<sup>191</sup>



Unity in diversity (Source: aurora.dawn.com)

Proponents of this theory describe nations as imagined *communities*<sup>192</sup>, and nationalism as an *invented tradition*<sup>193</sup> in which shared sentiment provides a form of collective identity, and binds individuals together in

political solidarity. Surprisingly, Pakistan seems to lack all these attributes of developing a sense of nationalism. It must be realized that the western concept of nationalism is based on shared race, territory and language. We only have shared territory, and replaced the other two ingredients with religion. Islamic nationalism in a heterogeneous country like Pakistan, seems a difficult proposition, with wide open cleavages for exploitation through hybrid war. Hatred and emotion seem to bind us together against the possibility of external aggression, especially from



Logo-Youth Parliament  
Pakistan

(Source: youthparliament.pk)

India. We nurtured two generations of Afghans, but could never integrate them with us. Unfortunately, this short

term stimulus has driven our sense of reactive nationalism in the last few decades, and religious premise has often been used to ignite it.

### • Civil–Military Relations

Samuel Huntington defines institutionalization as a *process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability*, and contends that four distinct features (adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence), working in sync, measure the institutionalization of a political system, *to create civil supremacy*.<sup>194</sup> Pakistan's political and civil institutions lack these attributes, and hence open the way for military involvement. This is largely steered by the military's concept<sup>195</sup> of extending

help to build society, and perhaps it is the most idealistic view of military behaviour. It may be a somewhat reasonable argument for Ayub Khan's era from 1958–1967. *Military skills do not transfer well to the sphere of politics....society is more complex than an army...*<sup>196</sup> is a fact that Yahya Khan's era proved, when East Pakistan was lost. In both cases, the superimposing factor of legitimacy haunted them. This was followed by Ziaul Haq era, and then by Musharraf. So gradually, from direct rule (patriarchy<sup>197</sup>), the military seem to transition to indirect rule (patrimonial<sup>198</sup>), with an intermediate phase of a hybrid experiment by Chief Executive Musharraf (neo-patrimonial).



Politico-military rule in Pakistan  
(Source: medium.com)

Christopher Clapham however, suggests that neo-patrimonialism<sup>199</sup> best describes the characteristics of third world nations and defines it as a “form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system.” Today we seem to stand at this juncture of our national history. *Since the military has acquired the role of the guardian of the country's sovereignty and overall security, the organization tends to view domestic political crises from the perspective of the external threat.*<sup>200</sup> The power struggle between the civil and military, to control state authority, has negatively impacted

democratic principles of the country upon the basis of which the forefathers established it.<sup>201</sup> Two wrongs (i.e. political leaders could not shoulder



Political elite of Pakistan (Source: raftar.com)

their responsibility, so the military wrong i.e. intervention, is necessary) may not be able to put things right.<sup>202</sup> The occasional, but regularly repeated schism between the elected national leadership and the establishment (past baggage and current situation), is no more a topic of drawing room discussions, and is out there in the open, with people taking and expressing strong positions, sometimes even being critical of the establishment.<sup>203</sup> This state at the moment seems to create an optimum opportunity for manipulation through hybrid war.

## Understanding the Threat

### • Traditional Threat Perception

It is important to comprehend the nature of threat, for an efficient and effective response at any or all tiers. At the highest level of national security, we are traditionally accustomed to a process of painting scenarios, to classify the threat into neat compartments, and it looks something like this (*see figure at page 31*), at the moment.<sup>204</sup> And it was quite justified, because it was premised on traditional understanding of two distinctive states of relationship

among states i.e. war and peace, at least from an ethical standpoint.

The environment in the new millennia (21<sup>st</sup> century) then transformed the concept of *positive peace* into that of a *negative peace*. After three centuries of state monopoly on violence, globalization seems to have brought us back from physical boundaries (USSR, Yugoslavia,



Negative Vs Positive Peace  
(Source: nonviolenceny.org)


colonization etc.) to ideological boundaries (digital imperialism), that too in virtual space. The evolution of war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century first blurred the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (9/11 followed by a GWOT), and then between war and peace (hybrid war). This evidently demands that for an honourable existence of the state, we must change our ideas about war and how *coercion, aggression, conflict and war are to be understood*.<sup>205</sup> Peace is no more the final objective, but there is a perpetual conflict driven by interests, because we have conceived and developed a type of war that is unrestricted, and tends to function below the detection and response thresholds

D Diplomatic	I Informational	M Military	E Economic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Embassies/ Ambassadors</li> <li>▪ Recognition</li> <li>▪ Negotiations</li> <li>▪ Treaties</li> <li>▪ Policies</li> <li>▪ International forums</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Military information</li> <li>▪ Public diplomacy</li> <li>▪ Public affairs</li> <li>▪ Communications resources</li> <li>▪ International forums</li> <li>▪ Spokespersons, timing, media and venues for announcements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Military operations</li> <li>▪ Engagement, Security Coop, Deterrence</li> <li>▪ Show of force</li> <li>▪ Military technology</li> <li>▪ Size, composition of force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trade policies</li> <li>▪ Fiscal and monetary policies</li> <li>▪ Embargoes</li> <li>▪ Tariffs</li> <li>▪ Assistance</li> </ul>

Instruments of National Power (Source: thelightningpress.com)

of the adversary. So primacy for an aggressor is intellectual superiority, aimed at undetected synchronization of MPESII potential, and for the weak defender it is the detection of such a concealed aggression under the cloak of competing national interests. Violent conflict will then follow after detection. In such an environment of conflict management, there is a cardinal difference in elements of MPESII, needing focus and priority.

This seems to be the motive for articulating the first and only (after 75 years of existence) citizen-centric *Comprehensive National Security* policy for Pakistan, that claims the need for shifting national security focus from geopolitics to geo-economics.<sup>206</sup> With this in context, *the most likely hybrid war scenario for Pakistan is external aggression (scenario 1.1), aimed at coercion of all elements of national power (MPESII), to create internal destabilization (scenario 2.1), aided by a low level of sub-conventional warfare (scenario 2.2), and non-kinetic neutralization of deterrent credibility (scenario 4.1 and 4.2), to ensure pliancy at the minimum level, and implosion leading*




Probable threat scenarios for Pakistan

(Source: Author)

to disintegration, at the maximum level. The worst case scenario predicts that regional and extra-regional forces can all collude, for materializing such a comprehensive threat to ultimately remove the “threat” to world peace. We presently dwell in such a precarious situation, as we are politically polarized, economically weak, civil-military relations are fragile, CPEC is in limbo, our energy needs are precariously deficient (load shedding), we are socially divided, infrastructurally weak, and last but not the least, we are completely vulnerable to information manipulation and perception management, because of competence and social issues.

So the nature of hybrid threat to Pakistan can be summarized; **“Degrading the political economy of Pakistan, with primacy of severing civil-military relations, for creating a dilemma of nationalism in a socially fragmented environment,**

**aided by information manipulation and perception management, to strain the weak infrastructural base (sociopolitical as well as physical), thus leading to an eventual breaking point, and then ensuring terminus with an externally stimulated controlled implosion, that completes with a negotiated nuclear disarmament, to remove an element of instability in the international arena”.** With this in hindsight, the recommended mix of MPESII for threat analysis, is visually portrayed by the following chart:-




A possible mixture of the elements of national power (Source: Author)

## Recommended Responses in Different Domains (MPESII)

- **Conceptual Clarity**


The foremost question that constrains a balanced analysis, is the question: *Is hybrid war a new phenomenon, or the same old war wrapped in a narrative of 21<sup>st</sup> century technological phraseology?* If we relate modern hybrid war to Sun Tzu's old wisdom (winning without fighting), then the analysis gets enmeshed in a retrospective context of *situating the appreciation* (to prove that hybrid war is an old phenomenon), that further complicates the complexity of modern war. This backward gaze tends to bring in the element of *far-sightedness, as a matter of institutional prudence* i.e. to imagine hybridity in every conflict since antiquity. Clausewitz would have advised the same had he lived in this day and age, as his most famous dictum, 'War is the extension of politics by other means', seems to be an erroneous translation of his famous precept in German language, of which John Keegan in his History of Warfare<sup>207</sup>, has provided the correct translation—'War is an extension of political intercourse with the intermixing of other means.'<sup>208</sup> But is it so?



Hybrid war: A cumulative strategy (Source: Author)

The confusion further grows because, despite all variations in conduct, the purpose of war remains unchanged

i.e. *make the adversary fulfill our will.* However, analyzing hybrid war as a new phenomenon changes the perspective of analysis entirely, by posing a question; what is new? For the first time in human history, the new hybrid war takes away the monopoly of violence as the ultimate arbiter in conflict, and puts it squarely as merely one of the elements on the entire spectrum of conflict (visually depicted on the title page). The notion of victory has become a social science instead of empirical physical science, thereby lessening violence by creating a war of spirits. Human intellect has considerably lessened the need-based struggle for food, space and power, but has amplified the elements of self-justification under the elusive precept of security in today's state-based international order. Incompetence,



Bifurcating centre of gravity for hybrid warfare (Source: Author)

instead of power, has become the basis of weakness and ruin. Our arsenals now tend to show more of our fears and weakness, instead of courage and strength. Logic has conquered the basic human instinct of violence. *Si vis pacem para bellum* (If you want peace, prepare for war)<sup>209</sup> can be replaced by *si vis pacem para pacem*<sup>210</sup> (If you want peace, prepare for peace) or more aptly; *achieve targets peacefully.*



So there is a lot of *new*, if only we try to find it, instead of getting enmeshed in the idea of fighting the old war in a new way. *Utopianism*<sup>211</sup>, *pacifism*<sup>212</sup> and *unethical war*<sup>213</sup>, emerge as the persuasive counter-arguments to such a new perspective of hybrid war, but so are the justifications of *realism*<sup>214</sup>, *balance of power*<sup>215</sup> and *ethical violence (just war)*<sup>216</sup>. Only by thinking of it as a new phenomenon, we will change ourselves, otherwise the logic holds that we are already doing the best that can be done with existing resources. Hybrid war presents an endless menu of combinations and means to engage in the type of conflict that suits our capacity and resources. However, the aspect of cardinal significance is to define hybrid war in our own contextual framework, so that our policy succinctly lays down the parameters for developing offensive as well as defensive capabilities for safeguarding our national interests. In terms of determining the center of gravity of hybrid war, it seems better to break it down in terms of critical functions. Besides the *critical requirement* of intellectual superiority that leads to the *critical capability* of synchronization of all elements of national power, the *critical vulnerability* of hybrid war seems to be detection (as a defensive measure). Because, after detection, the hybrid threat ceases to perform the intended purpose by remaining below detection and response thresholds, and hence becomes an obvious function of conflict, that can be responded to.

The need for conceptual clarity depends on how we understand and define the concept of hybrid

warfare for Pakistan. *All war is hybrid, but there is also a specific hybrid way of conducting war.*<sup>217</sup> From the apparent choices between US and the West, Indian and Russian concepts of hybrid warfare, it is suggested to adopt the Russian concept (of *new generation war*) as elucidated by Ofer Fridman<sup>218</sup>, based on works of Sergey Chekinov and Sergey Bogdanov, for two reasons. First, because it tends to differentiate between the concept of non-military conflict (*Gibridnaya Voyna*) and a military conflict (*New Generation War*). Second, it assigns clear responsibilities as to who will plan and execute the non-military confrontation (civil government) and military confrontation (military leadership). In either case, both will complement each other by combining capabilities, but it needs expression of clear intent by policy, in terms of methodology and responsibility. This model seems more feasible in Pakistan due to an omnipresent and competent military, that is supportive of a fragile third world government, through public confidence. It has inherent flexibility to allow employment of all elements of national power in the peculiar environment of Pakistan. Policy makers at national level need to strike an equilibrium through application of double hermeneutics<sup>219</sup>, between either defining hybrid war too strictly (e.g. ethnic conflict is only due to external support), or too softly (e.g. ethnic conflict is only a function of internal imperatives), so as to ensure that resultant policy retains necessary balance to be effective and efficient, and address external interference as well as ensure positive steps to alleviate internal frictions.


• **The Cycle of Hybrid War**

During the last seven decades of so called *rules-based order*, the western powers have perfected a template of hybrid war<sup>220</sup> that seems cyclic in nature, with minor or additional conduct variations as per the dictates of a specific target. The figure below (drawn by the author to explain elements indicated by Dr Ashfaq H. Khan in the introduction of the book), indicates the probable conduct modalities of a typical hybrid war model, planned and conducted by the west successfully in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya , Russia etc.<sup>221</sup> The actual manifestation of hybrid war can differ for Pakistan, from regional as well as international perspectives, and can have more emphasis on implosion leading to disintegration, rather than external measures, because any external stimuli tends to gel the nation together. As a

far-fetched pessimistic perspective, this may also seem to be the motive of our ever present political and security concept; *Pakistan is passing through the most crucial times of its history*, since last half a century. We must take cognizance of where we are heading as a nation.


• **Whole-of-Nation Approach**

This is possibly the most commonly trumpeted concept for countering hybrid war, but rarely with an accompanying strategy to operationalize it. *It is easier said than*



*Ingredients of whole of nation approach*  
(Source: Author)

*done*. The irony of this concept lies in easy comprehension vis-à-vis difficult implementation. Inter-connectedness



*Pictorial representation of the cycle of hybrid warfare (Reference: Book – Living Under Hybrid War)*

presents an opportunity, but can also become a vulnerability if it is not correctly visualized or implemented. Taking an entire nation on board to fight a hybrid war is a tall order, that demands a combination of three important elements of *education, awareness and nationalism*. Education inculcates responsibility, awareness ensures readiness and nationalism energizes the will to safeguard vital interests. This will surely come after we gel as a nation, in the literal sense that a modern nation-state enunciates. Only understanding the situation or problem is not enough, we need to fight back. There is no articulating headquarters for planning, coordinating or directing hybrid war, or its response. Factually, no one is trained for it, and we also do not possess the requisite capabilities to do it. There is a need to have a separate hybrid war headquarters (not like



NCOCC—dealing with national calamity  
(Source: radio.gov.pk)

NACTA), under a specialized coordinator, that answers directly to the prime minister. A good start point can be ensuring the

implementation of national action plan (NAP), for which clear timelines were laid down.<sup>222</sup>

### • Ideological Domain

Laurie Brand<sup>223</sup> argues that *official stories* (based on institution of a founding story, the conception of national identity, and the parameters of national unity— *resembling the*

*concept of national narrative*), deserve careful contemplation, and can become a powerful strategy to reinforce the right to rule, justify policies, or combat opponents. We need to have a well-defined positive national narrative that must bring people up from the level of assumptions (religion and culture), to the proactive reality (unity). We must include academia's perspective and recommendations for developing the national narrative on scientific grounds. There is also a dire need to have a proactive counter-narrative strategy response to our adversaries, by challenging fake news, making the public aware of their manipulation, and highlighting the rising influence of Hindutva and RSS in Indian policies. We need to influence, and not merely inform the public, so it is also important that we make our national narrative a part of education curriculum. We must become diplomatically active to spread our narrative. Our diplomatic missions must ensure that Pakistan's ideology is highlighted and projected at all appropriate places, especially among the Pakistani diaspora.

### • Political Domain

We need to answer political grievances through a political response, without letting it spiral into the domain of violence, as is happening in different parts of Pakistan. We need devolution of power to the lowest levels, so that there is no exploitation, no nepotism, no corruption and it becomes the rightful nursery for a generation of really well versed politicians in the art

of politics. In today's era of intrusive social media and preponderance of soft power, the virtue of a positive political image remains key for national progress and prosperity. Pakistan remains the cradle of one of the oldest civilizations in the world, and must be projected as such in our political domain as well. Our multiculturalism and diversity must be treated as an asset for unity. Media has become a very powerful tool in the hands of exploiters and seem to have swept away the element of decent arguments for airing differences. Our media persons have become too



Hybrid war is international in character and effects  
(Source: e-ir.info)

vocal and intrusive in media talks, to create the impression of influencing opinions, as opposed to highlighting them, and are also prone to political manipulation. Politicians must not yield this crucial space to the ones with the loudest voices. Media must become a responsible *watch-man*, but without becoming the reason for polarization in our society, by taking sides. Similarly, social media must also be harnessed, with positive slack for freedom of speech. Media should be guided and not controlled.

Another significant issue is the military's perceived involvement in domestic politics. People respect the military for restoring political

balance as a neutral party, but it seem to be regarded presently as one of the political players. This situation is easily exploitable through hybrid war on two accounts. Firstly, it exacerbates the existing polarization that also includes other institutions like the police, judiciary and bureaucracy. Secondly, it meddles with the primary tasks of the military, that need attention to remain competent and ever ready, especially in an era of hybrid war. *If someone contemplates that we can manage both simultaneously, then he is playing into the hands of a shrewd hybrid war planner.* The issue of our diplomacy also suffers because of political interference and manipulations, resulting in a weak external reach, due to political interference and manipulation, resulting in weak external reach, because of lack of professionalism and situational finesse. Our diplomatic missions must ensure that all our activities are calibrated for projecting a positive image of Pakistan. Pakistan makes substantial contributions to world peace, that needs to be highlighted more widely. The ways and motives surrounding hybrid war must be thoroughly analyzed, but we must not overreact to it, as every issue is not worth a response at national level.


- **Socio-Cultural Domain**

Political differences must not descend into fights at socio-cultural levels. All cultures must be respected, because these can be different, but never superior or inferior. The rich-poor gap must be bridged through social mobility and equal opportunity. Minimum

wages must be realistically assessed to minimize exploitation of the poor. Elite capture must be reduced so as to ensure equal development throughout Pakistan. Most of our population speaks Punjabi language, but it is not nationally recognized, and so is the case with other provincial languages. Local languages must be made part of curriculum, at least as an optional subject. Justice and meritocracy be ensured, as there seems to be no place for quotas in 21<sup>st</sup> century era of information revolution. Civil society must be propped up, incorporated and mobilized at the national level, to add an additional layer of defense against hybrid war.<sup>224</sup>



Cultural diversity of Pakistan  
(Source: pinterest.com)



Celebrating 7000 years of cultural heritage of Pakistan  
(Source: medium.com)

- **Informational Domain**

Regulate, but do not try to control the information domain. Commission more English channels so that our voice is heard and better understood around the world. Inculcate the tradition of self-censorship under the concept of nationalism. Decrease the incidence of manipulating public's confirmation bias from religious, ethnic, sectarian and sub-national perspectives. The Kashmir issue must be highlighted with actual and realistic arguments, instead of emotional rhetoric, so that the public can play its rightful

role. Balochistan issue hardly gets any coverage on national media, this must be increased. Little is done for minorities in the information domain, though Pakistan is probably the only nation that has a sparkling white portion of national flag to represent minorities. Academia's role in the information domain needs enhancement. False weaponized narrative must be highlighted and countered proactively, because silence tends to authenticate the unchallenged ones.

- **Cyber Domain**

If it were measured as a country, then cyber-attacks and cyber-crimes (which are predicted to inflict damages totaling \$6 trillion USD globally in 2021) would be the world's third-largest economy, after the U.S. and China.<sup>225</sup> Cyber security is a complex issue, and needs a national *cyber security vision* for the mid to

long term. We have already raised a cyber security division. There is a need to have a cyber czar<sup>226</sup> (special assistant to prime minister) at the national level, to unite the efforts. The cyber security efforts need to be




*The challenges of cyberwarfare*  
(Source: wiley.com)

funded appropriately for the needed effects. Cyber security should be made part of bilateral and multilateral relationships. Besides others, cyber CBMs (confidence building measures) are needed to be discussed with India. Being a potentially hazard-prone field, we must have an information and cyber warfare plan for public morale. Foreign hardware makes us vulnerable, so a policy of indigenous production can bring in needed cyber security.

- **AI Domain**

The conceptual framework of hybrid attacks banks on synergy, asymmetry, ambiguity and innovative disruption. To defend against unpredictable and hidden attacks, the best option for



*New frontiers of artificial intelligence*  
(Source: gearrice.com)

a developing country like Pakistan is to develop a strong defensive Artificial Intelligence (AI) capability for early detection systems, firewalls, countering social media bots, general distribution of disinformation and false narratives. We must ensure the use of AI remains human, that too without human rights violations. The complexities and seriousness of this threat must be highlighted to the citizens. A treaty on the lines of NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) should be framed to decide DOs and DONTs of AI in war.<sup>227</sup> This would



*Importance of artificial intelligence for Pakistan*  
(Source: en.wikipedia.org)

ensure avoiding automated launch of nuclear weapons, and leave such WMDs in human control, for attack decisions, so as to ensure minimum human casualties in such hybrid warfare attacks. The most

important decision is to invest and support development of AI capabilities in Pakistan. The president's initiative on AI education<sup>228</sup> in this regard is a welcome step, and should be enlarged and diversified. The world is amidst the fourth wave of AI. We must be alive to improving this aspect of national defense as a nuclear power, and heed advice of *experts who believe that the military use of AI has the capacity of re-ordering the balance of power in the world.*<sup>229</sup>

- **Psychological Domain**

It is important to thoroughly understand the psychological divide, before countering it. The

most important aspect for human flourishing is PERMA (positivity, engagement, relationship, meaning and accomplishment) and can serve as a guiding principle for countering effects of hybrid warfare in the psychological domain. The response needs strategic focus to build our capabilities and capacity. Our concentration must on the fault-lines as identified in the preceding discussion, which must not be dealt with forcefully through kinetic measures, as this tends to increase cleavages and harden faulty perspectives. Patience remains a virtue in this endeavor. It is a specialized field and must be handled by competent personnel of the field, under policy guidelines.

• **Economic Domain**

The primary obligation is to realize the extent and severity of the danger. *One issue that cannot be ignored is whether the poverty debate and research on it was more an academic exercise and that did not sufficiently capture the attention of*


*policy makers or play a significant role in determining policies.*<sup>230</sup> We must decrease the reliance on foreign loans and restructuring programs. After thirty years (1960-1990) of relatively high economic growth of nearly 6% per annum, Pakistan's economic growth under IMF tutelage for next 34 years (1988-2022), declined to just over 4% per annum.<sup>231</sup> There are several reasons beside IMF, but the irony lies in the fact that we were getting money (loans), and yet declining in economic growth. It can be ensured by a ban on import of all luxury items. Our first focus must be on food security, and we must get Chinese expertise to enhance per acre yield of all crops. Importance should be accorded to trade policy, and liaison must be ensured through specialized professionals in embassies around the world. Development of



CPEC: The game changer  
(Source: cpecinfo.com)

CPEC must be ensured at a quicker pace as the project has the potential to replace IMF.<sup>232</sup> As an immediate short term measure, *Karachi must be*

*restored as a peaceful metropolitan, to play its full role in the economy of Pakistan.*<sup>233</sup> Considering the importance of economy in national security and prosperity, management of the economy should be entrusted to a specialized cadre in the central superior services (CSS). Instead of usual postings and transfers of other CSS groups in economic institutions, a dedicated and specialized group may be raised, and designated as *Economic Management Group (EMG)*.<sup>234</sup>



Pakistan's due foreign loan payments  
(Source: thenews.com.pk)

01. Pakistan Administrative Services
02. Police Services of Pakistan
03. Custom and Excise
04. Postal group
05. Income tax group
06. Information group
07. Foreign Services of Pakistan
08. Commerce and Trade
09. Military lands and Contonments
10. Office Management group
11. Pakistan Audit and Accounts Services
12. Railways Commercial & transportation Group.


Adding new Occupation Group To CSP: 13. Economic Management Group (EMG)

*Need to raise a new cadre of economic management group in CSS*  
(Source: facebook.com)

• **Military Domain**

We possess a strong professional military that must concentrate on its primary job of defending Pakistan. It must remain a non-controversial and motivated national force, that has strong public support, and is in harmony with the proud nation it represents. With changing modes of warfare, the emphasis in the Army must shift from

armour, infantry and other heavy elements, to lighter and more agile elements like air-defense and aviation. Similarly at joint services levels, PAF and PN must get preference as the arms of the future. Our war plans must be re-considered from the perspective of effects we envisage on the outcome of any future conflict, which has entered into a new domain of hybrid warfare. With the Indian concept of non-contact warfare vis-à-vis prevailing concept of hybrid warfare, the possibility of a violent and bloody war (massive clash of tanks and infantry) seems remote. Should we continue investing in such capability development, or develop new ones? Our Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) capabilities must be enhanced considerably, and be suitably dovetailed with offensive formations. Defensive cyber warfare capabilities must get needed focus to ensure continuing capabilities in all future conflicts, because unlike



The transition in art of military warfare

(Source: defenseindustrydaily.com)



Ukraine, we do not have the support of Elon Musk and Bill Gates, to ward off the electronic offensive of India and her allies.

- **Infrastructural Domain**

We have to address our infrastructural issues pragmatically. Our power distribution and grids must be strengthened against sabotage and frequent failures. Same is the case with the natural gas distribution system. Critical choke points in cities generally, and on GT Road and the motorway especially, need better planning. In case of hybrid war we should realize how easy it is to block our major cities and Islamabad capital territory. It is ironic that in this modern age, we still have inaccessible areas. Balochistan, FATA (now incorporated in the federation) and south Punjab need better communication infrastructure. We must balance economic necessities with security imperatives, to ensure progress in Balochistan, even if communication arteries do not yield commensurate economic dividends. We are talking of over 40% of the land area of Pakistan (inhibited by less people than Karachi), where less than 5% land is arable, and which depends on agriculture and livestock for 47% of its economy.<sup>235</sup> CPEC offers great opportunities to Pakistan in developing Balochistan (trade, minerals and energy), mitigating power shortages, opening the world of opportunities to us through Gwadar, and even has the potential to replace the need of IMF loans and structural adjustment programs (as per Dr. Ashfaq H. Khan, dean NIPS and principal school of social sciences and

humanities at NUST<sup>236</sup>). That we are unable to operationalize our national potential in this spirit, due to a well-planned hybrid war on Pakistan's internal as well as external fronts. We must give it the priority it deserves, by clearing hurdles it presently faces. Our big cities deserve better governance and administration, especially Karachi, the city that accounts for about 25% of the GDP<sup>237</sup>, 50% of the total collections of the Federal Board of Revenue<sup>238</sup>, 30% of value addition large-scale manufacturing<sup>239</sup> and 95% of the Sindh's economy.<sup>240</sup> It will not be out of place to raise the slogan "Save Karachi; Save Pakistan".



*Importance of Karachi for Pakistan's economy*  
(Source: facebook.com)

- **Lawfare Domain**

International lawfare is a relatively new domain that should be studied and adopted in today's modern era of intrusive social media and globalization. With a diminishing role of kinetic measures in conflict, lawfare must be made an important part of our defense against international and regional hybrid war, and it must be reflected as such in all organizational paradigms. As part of international obligations, we must bring our process of legislation in consonance with international laws, to remove the dichotomy of friction with domestic laws. Lawfare demands competence for offensive

as well as defensive responses. We should have a special assistant to PM on international law, separate from the existing law ministry. Important aspects of international law must be included in academic curricula, to raise awareness about it. We need more expertise in international law, because legitimacy is now the prime global concern for actions as well as reactions.

- **Nationalism Domain**

*Pakistaniat* says it all, and seems to be the only choice we have in terms of dictates of a modern nation-state. For a modern progressive state, a central narrative seems essential, but it must be built on diversity of its constituents, to develop internal bondages. Our story of inception, belonging and unity, has to be based on a mixture of culture, tradition and beliefs. Our politics and governance, at the very root, are embedded in familial and local petty issues. Such politics is common everywhere in the world, but our specific problem arises when one cannot let go of narrow perspectives when it comes to the collective good, as someone may have to sacrifice more than the others, in favour of the larger national interest. Our efforts in this regard have not borne fruit because of the vast gulf of provincial, religious, ethnic and subnational prejudices. Nationalism can overcome these human shortcomings, but it has to be aroused from inside, and cannot be imposed from the outside. It should be brought in conformity with public sentiments. Religion may play a significant role, as a source of unity alone. Our minorities must get equal rights as *Pakistanis*,

as enshrined in the constitution of Pakistan.

- **Civil–Military Relations**

Civil-military relations are an ideal barometer of the quality of democracy and institutional harmony.<sup>241</sup> The quality of democracy and governance is determined not only by the form of government, but the degree of governance.<sup>242</sup> The perceived encroachment of the establishment (the military) upon decision-making regarding key national matters, the



*Civil-military relations* (Source: insider.pk)

weaknesses of the civilian side which prompt such encroachment, and the short and long-term effects of these encroachments on the state, may be resolved through a strategic dialogue between both, and must be based on roles defined in the constitution.<sup>243</sup>

## The Way Forward

The recommendations proffered on the nature and manifestations of hybrid war, by MCDC (multi-national capability development center, Norway) for NATO and EU members<sup>244</sup>, are a good guide for transforming the way of viewing war by Pakistan, in its modern hybrid shape :-

- Hybrid warfare is designed to exploit national vulnerabilities in a coordinated manner across

the entire MPESII spectrum, that extends far beyond the military realm, and therefore as a minimum, Pakistan government should conduct a self-assessment of critical functions and vulnerabilities across all sectors, and maintain it regularly. Crucially, this analysis must consider how these available means can be formed into synchronized defence and attack packages, tailored for the specific vulnerabilities and opportunities.

- Hybrid warfare is synchronized and systematic—the response should be too. Pakistan government should establish and embed a process to lead and coordinate the whole-of-nation approach of self-assessment and threat analysis. Strategic thinking culture can help to relay the threat to everyone concerned, so as to help them furnish response options and strategies. This process should direct comprehensive cross-government efforts to understand, detect and respond to hybrid threats.
- Hybrid threats are an international issue—the response should be too (international cooperation). Pakistan government should coordinate a coherent approach with allies to understand, detect and respond to hybrid warfare for their collective interests. Multinational frameworks—preferably using existing institutions and—processes, should be developed to

facilitate cooperation and broader collaboration.

- Regardless of future implications of hybrid warfare, Pakistan has not completely embraced it as a distinctly different form of warfare. Most defense professionals and academics view hybrid warfare as simply the simultaneous melding of various forms of warfare. In the future, hybrid threats will continue to evolve in complexity, as more lethal and precision weaponry become readily available to information-age guerrillas, supported by the proceeds of global criminal activities. Perhaps a better and more inclusive explanation of hybrid warfare and a hybrid threat, is the presence and employment of hybrid mind-set.
- A hybrid mind-set<sup>245</sup>, or hybrid way of thinking, focuses on the interaction of four mental characteristics, to develop innovative approaches to create desired operational environments, i.e., *understanding strategic context, a holistic approach to operations, internalization of propensity and potential opportunities and embracing complexity at the edge of chaos*. The idea of a hybrid mind-set could be the first step towards a theory of the hybrid phenomenon, that explains the essence of a hybrid threat and hybrid warfare.
- Future warfare eventually devolves into a battle of minds,


and therefore a hybrid way of thinking will help our operational planners to *out-think* and *out-adapt* future hybrid threats, through innovative arrangements of appropriate actions in time and space.

### Conclusion

A traditionalist, unbounded state-centric approach<sup>246</sup> embedded in *realism*<sup>247</sup>, as expounded by Buzan's concept of *security*<sup>248</sup>, along with *regional security complex theory*<sup>249</sup>, and superimposed by the construct of *macro-securitization*<sup>250</sup>, underlines the prevailing chaotic international system. Hybrid warfare seems to sink the world into a perpetual state of simmering conflict. In case of developing nations like Pakistan, Ayooob's concept of *subaltern realism*<sup>251</sup> further complicates the security

equation, as it contrasts differences in how security is perceived by developed nations, and developing nations, where it is marred by issues like state's legitimacy, control and political authority. *If there is a single way to describe the future of warfare, it is as a deepening series of strategic dilemmas: between preparing for the low end of the spectrum of conflict, and the high ones.*<sup>252</sup> Identifying types of conflicts as counter terrorism, grey zone fights, asymmetric conflict and high end conflicts, a RAND study in 2020 asserts that *the future of warfare defies any historical analogy.*<sup>253</sup>

Such a broad spectrum of conflict, incessantly simmering below detection and response thresholds, posing an overwhelming and impossible threat, tends to generate option-less scenarios. It



The complexity of hybrid warfare

(Source: dailykos.com)

triggers a sense of hopelessness due to the enormity of the response, vis-à-vis resources and capability, resembling an information overload that confuses or crashes the system. The customary response is that *we are already doing what can be done with existing resources*. But if what needs to be done, has been done, then why are we still facing existential threats? *We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.*<sup>254</sup> We need to innovate. Think new structures, organizations, processes and policies. Hybrid warfare is synchronized, systematic and international, the response should be too.<sup>255</sup> Hybrid warfare has disrupted the conventional paradigm of the relationship between national power and security, to revive a realist's perspective of *total war*<sup>256</sup> in perpetuity. What the proponents

of the hybrid war thesis are saying, actually resonates with what in strategic studies, has traditionally been conceptualized through the concept of war: *using all means available-including large-scale violence by military forces-in order to achieve desired outcomes.*<sup>257</sup> Warfare has evolved in consonance with social and technological innovations over a period of time. The swiftness of technological processes necessitates the need of anticipatory planning and investing in dual use technologies. Future war demands the creation and calibration of a Pakistan-specific *national strategic thinking culture*, that ensures a whole-of-nation-approach to national security. The future may well be an era of *war in the context of everything else*, as opposed to *war as a central pursuit of states.*<sup>258</sup> If it sounds convincing, it surely can be true!!!

## Endnotes

- 1 Alan DuPont, *Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia's Defense*, Australian security in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Lecture, Parliament House, Canberra, November 13, 2002. As quoted by Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare* (Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 11.
- 2 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 6.
- 3 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77. Also see; Sun Tzu, *On The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (New York: Routledge, 2013), 33.
- 4 Kenneth Macksey, *The Guinness History of Land Warfare* (London: Guinness Superlatives Ltd, 1973), i. The author states, "War, whatever conscience advocates, it is a fundamental of life representing the ultimate expression of man's interminable struggle for food and resources, in addition to his desire for security, power and self-justification."
- 5 Antonio Guterres, Secretary General UNO, "The war is evil. There is no way a war can be acceptable in the 21st century", *Deutsche Welle (DW)*, April 28, 2022, accessed at <https://www.dw.com/en/guterres-there-is-no-way-a-war-can-be-acceptable-in-the-21st-century/av-61618889>. Jon Henley and Julian Borger, "UN Secretary General Describes War in Ukraine as 'absurdity' in 21st Century", *The Guardian*, April 28, 2022, accessed at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/28/un-secretary-general-describes-war-in-ukraine-as-absurdity-in-21st-century>. Also see; <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1117132>.
- 6 Dereth Croxton, "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty", *International History Review* 21, no 3 (September 1999): 569–591, doi:10.1080/07075332.1999.9640869
- 7 This is the simplest connotation of progress that classifies the conflict in three major categories as symmetric (same type of forces of almost equal size), dissymmetric (large vs the small or well-equipped vs insufficiently equipped forces), and asymmetric conflicts (different types of forces and using different type of tactics e.g. terrorism, guerilla, insurgency etc.).
- 8 Robert J. Bunker, "Generation, Waves and Epochs: Modes of Warfare and the RPMA", *Airpower Journal* 10, no.1 (1996):18-28, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/bunker.pdf>.
- 9 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 32.

- 10 William S Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, *Marine Corps Gazette* xix, no. 10 (October 1989): 22–26. For the Russian concept of generations of warfare see, Slipchenko’s Seven Generations of Warfare in Vladimir Slipchenko, *Voiny Novogo Pokolenia – Distantzionnye i Bezkontaktnye* (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004), 32–34.
- 11 Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Classic Infantry Battles in Classic Greece* (London: University of California Press, 1989), 9.
- 12 H. G. Wells, *The War That Will End Wars* (London: F & C Palmer, 1914), 1.
- 13 Mutually assured destruction (MAD) principle of deterrence is founded on the notion that a nuclear attack by one superpower would be met with an overwhelming nuclear counterattack, such that both the attacker and the defender would be annihilated. It is mainly based on the argument of acquiring and ensuring the second strike capability, for responding to the surprising first strike by the adversary. See, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/mutual-assured-destruction>, accessed on February 23, 2023.
- 14 Francis Sempa, *Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 13. Cold war was a proxy conflict based on the ideological and geopolitical struggle for the global influence between superpowers like USA and USSR, since after the Second World War form 1950s. Cold war ended in 1991, with the disintegration of USSR into 15 independent states. Putin and some other Russian thinkers (Dugin, Panarin, Chekidov, Bognadov etc.) are of the opinion that the disintegration of USSR was a consequence of *US/Western hybrid war* that went on for over forty years.
- 15 Ignace Feuerlicht, “A New Look at the Iron Curtain”, *American Speech* 30, no 3. (October 1955): 186–189, doi: 10.2307/453937, JSTOR 453937. Throughout the *Cold War* the term “*iron curtain*” would become a common euphemism for boundaries, physical or ideological, between the socialist (USSR) and capitalist (USA/West) states. Its popularity as a *Cold War symbol* is attributed to its use in a speech that Winston Churchill gave on 5 March 1946, in Fulton, Missouri.
- 16 President Dwight Eisenhower, introducing the domino theory in a press conference on April 7, 1954, had said that, “if Vietnam fell to Communism, the rest of Southeast Asia would soon follow”. Grounded in the concept of *domino theory*, the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, besides many other such proxy interventions, in the name of spreading/conserving the *democracy* or the *socialism* bear testimony to the fact that all these conflicts were based on ideology.
- 17 Every conceivable source on the national inventory of both superpowers was used to downgrade and defeat the other. Even Hollywood was used as

- a propaganda resource e.g. in RAMBO III, the popular violent / eccentric character (played by Sylvester Stallone, as a Vietnam veteran) fought along with Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
- 18 Russian thinkers (including Dugin, Panarin, Chekinov, Bogdanov, Putin) strongly believed that the disintegration of USSR was an outcome of incessant US/West led hybrid war that went on for over four decades. Also see, Ofer Fridman, *Russian “Hybrid War”: Resurgence and Politicization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 29.
  - 19 You Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking”. *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no 3. (1 December, 1999): 344–364.
  - 20 Stephen Graham, “Dreams of Omniscience: Urbanization & the US Revolution in Military Affairs”, accessed on February 23, 2023, <https://www.gsa.ac.uk/life/gsa-events/events/s/stephen-graham/>.
  - 21 The terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001, claimed nearly 3,000 lives in USA and impacted many more globally. On 20 September, US President George W Bush declared a ‘War on Terror’ and stated that defeating terrorism was now the world’s fight. The US had experienced terrorist attacks previously, but none had been on the same scale or significance. 9/11 shook the world and shaped the generation to come. “What Were the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks?”, Imperial War Museum, accessed on 19 January 17, 2023, [https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-were-the-911-terrorist-attacks#:~:text=On%20the%20morning%20of%202011,%2C%20just%20outside%20Washington%2C%20DC](https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-were-the-911-terrorist-attacks#:~:text=On%20the%20morning%20of%202011,%2C%20just%20outside%20Washington%2C%20DC.). Timeline of the attack are illustrated by Nick Routley, “9/11 Timeline: Three Hours That Changed Everything”, September 8, 2021, accessed on January 24, 2023 at <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/9-11-timeline-three-hours-that-changed-everything/>.
  - 22 James F. Childress, “The War Metaphor in Public Policy: Some Moral Reflections”, in *The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility* ed. Carl J. Ficarrota (US: Purdue University Press, 2001), 181–197. The “war on terror” uses war as a metaphor to describe a variety of actions which fall outside the traditional definition of war taken to eliminate international terrorism. Philosopher James Childress describes the use of war as a metaphor as a dilemma: “In debating social policy through the language of war, we often forget the moral reality of war”. Major terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups: 1) Embassy bombings 1998, 2) September 11 attacks 2001, 3) Bali bombings 2002, 4) Madrid bombings 2004, 5) London bombings 2005, 6) Mumbai attacks 2008. This map file was derived from: BlankMap-World6.svg Battlefields in The Global War on Terror - edit03.png. Accessed on January 24, 2023 and available at [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War\\_on\\_terror#/media/File:Battlefields\\_in\\_The\\_Global\\_War\\_on\\_Terror.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_terror#/media/File:Battlefields_in_The_Global_War_on_Terror.svg).



- 23 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence. Positive peace refers to the absence of indirect and structural violence, and is the concept that most peace and conflict researchers adopt.
- 24 Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 3. Hybrid warfare is a theory of military strategy, first proposed by Frank Hoffman, which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, criminal disorder, lawfare and foreign electoral intervention etc.
- 25 Leonid Savin, "The Nature of Hybrid Warfare", in *Living under Hybrid War*, ed. Ashfaque H. Khan and Farah Naz (Islamabad: NUST Press, 2022), 23-44.
- 26 Melissa Dalton, Kathleen H. Hicks, Lindsey R. Sheppard, Michael Matlaga, Joseph Federici, "By Other Means Part II: Adapting to Compete in the Gray Zone" at <https://www.csis.org/programs/gray-zone-project>, August 13, 2019. Retrieved on January 24, 2023. The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines the grey-zone as "the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare. Use of the term grey-zone is widespread in national security circles, but there is no universal agreement on the definition of grey-zone, or even whether it is a useful term, with views about the term ranging from "faddish" or "vague", to "useful" or "brilliant". See, Thomas Dobbs, Garth Fallon and Sarah Fouhy, "Grey Zone", The Forge Report (9 September 2020), Australian Defense College. Retrieved January 24, 2023.
- 27 A proverb attributed to John Lyly's Euphues, in *Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit*, a Didactic Romance written by John Lyly. It was entered in the Stationers' Register London on 2 December 1578 and published that same year.
- 28 John Locke, (1632 - 1704), was an English philosopher whose works lie at the foundation of modern philosophical empiricism and political liberalism. He believed in good human nature and professed limited government interference in public life of its citizens.
- 29 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, (1712 - 1778), "Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, part two", *The Basic Political Writings*, Hackett, p. 64. 'You are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.' Jean Jacques Rousseau (1754), *On the Origin of the Inequality of Mankind, The Second Part*, accessed on January 24, 2023 at <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/rousseau/inequality/ch02.htm>.

- 30 Hobbes postulates what life would be like without government, a condition which he calls the state of nature. In that state, each person would have a right, or license, to everything in the world. This, Hobbes argues, would lead to a “war of all against all” (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). According to Hobbes, the sovereign must control civil, military, judicial and ecclesiastical powers, even the words. Noel Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Science of Politics and His Theory of Science” in *Aspects of Hobbes* ed. Noel Malcolm, (Online ed.: Oxford University Press, 2003): 147–155. doi:10.1093/019924714 5.001.0001. ISBN 9780199247141.
- 31 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).
- 32 N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes, eds., *International Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (Online Edition: Elsevier, November 22, 2001) at <https://www.elsevier.com/books/T/A/9780080430768> , accessed on February 13, 2023. The key concepts of sociological postmodernism are subject, identity, text, and symbol. On these grounds, postmodernity is characterized as a form of social order in which the electronic media play a prominent role, symbolic codes are pervasive, and social identities are fragmented.
- 33 Aleksandr Dugin, ‘Teoreticheskiye osnovy setevykh voyn’ [The theoretical grounds of network wars], *Informatsionnye voyny*, 1, 5 (2008), pp. 2–9; Dugin, ‘Setetsentricheskiye voyny’ [Net-centric wars], *Informatsionnye voyny*, 1, 5 (2008), pp. 10–16.
- 34 Fridman, *Russian ‘Hybrid War’*, 71.
- 35 Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, *Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), Retrieved on January 24, 2023, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR2942.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.html). A key element of operations within the grey-zone is that they remain below the threshold of an attack which could have a legitimate conventional military response (*jus ad bellum*).
- 36 Leo Strauss, “Niccolo Machiavelli” in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 296-317.
- 37 Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, *Understanding Hybrid Warfare: A Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) Project on Countering Hybrid Warfare*, (MCDC, 2017), [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/647776/dar\\_mcdc\\_hybrid\\_warfare.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647776/dar_mcdc_hybrid_warfare.pdf).

- 38 Charles F. Adams, *Murder by the Bay: Historic Homicide in and about the City of San Francisco* (USA: Quill Driver Books, 2007), 162. ISBN 978-1-884995-46-0. Perfect crimes are crimes that are undetected, unattributed to an identifiable perpetrator, or otherwise unsolved or unsolvable as a kind of technical achievement on the part of the perpetrator. A perfect crime goes unsolved not because of incompetence in the investigation, but because of the cleverness and skill of the criminal.
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- 56 Hoffman, *Conflict in in 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 2007.
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- 63 Diego Ruiz Palmer, *Back to the Future? Russia's Hybrid Warfare, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Cold War Comparisons*, ISSN 2076-0957, Research Paper no. 120 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015), 2, [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194718/rp\\_120.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194718/rp_120.pdf).
- 64 It is not surprising that NATO was the first organization to expand Hoffman's tactical–operational understanding of hybrid warfare into a strategy. Since NATO is not a purely military organization and involves a significant political component, Hoffman's military conceptualization of hybridity did not suit the way it thinks about conflicts. Fridman, *Russian "Hybrid War"*, 95.
- 65 These seven principles are, 1) the effects of hybrid force are environment specific, 2) ideology specific, 3) existential threat for using unconventional means for long-term survival, 4) asymmetry, 5) mixed tactics / arsenal, 6) defensive in essence with offensive tactics, and 7) attrition based, in both physical and cognitive domains.
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- 68 'What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to use all the tools they have..... to stir up problems they can then begin to exploit through their military tool', (General Philip M. Breedlove, former Supreme

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
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Published by

Army Institute of Military History

252 Aziz Bhatti Road, Rawalpindi 46000, Pakistan (+92-51-5202244)

e-mail: editor@aimh.gov.pk