ARMY INSTITUTE OF MILITARY HISTORY

WARS FOUGHT BY PAKISTAN ARMY, AND ITS ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING

MILITARY HISTORY PRIMER-2020

Second Edition (2021)

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PREFACE

We are living in the information age, thus disinformation is easily spread. A wide range of fake bloggers and account holders of different applications on social media, spread propaganda to further their interests and narratives. This post-truth environment, and activities on social media, may even shame Goebbels' propaganda skills. Added to this is the hostility of certain opinion makers against the Pakistan Army in the electronic and print media. Sane minds are craving for authentic information with confirmed veracity, to counter the deluge of half-baked truth in a pack of fallacies.

Unfortunately, when Pakistan Studies curriculum of all provinces was examined for content on wars fought by the Pakistan Army, it came to the fore that the information given is inadequate, lacks objectivity and hardly does justice to our worthy officers and men. Most importantly, the account of these events is neither uniform, nor in detail, whereby a young mind can comprehend the complete context. It is worth its while to mention that the same youth, while joining Pakistan Military Academy, remain oblivious to the truth, and continue to carry the same impression in their minds.

Army Institute of Military History (AIMH) has made an effort to create an all-encompassing account of wars fought by the Pakistan Army and its role in national development and international peace keeping, ensuring that accounts of wars, their background and results achieved as a consequence, are based on facts. No effort has been made to contrive the truth to impress the young generation. War accounts have been thoroughly researched, through articulate and authentic material by authors of national and international repute, including India. To this end, references and bibliography have been documented according to international practices of research methodology, to elucidate facts and clear the myths and fog woven around certain events of different wars, especially 1971 War.

Shortcomings during wars, wherever applicable, have not been obscured. The environment and circumstances are explained, to properly understand why certain decisions were taken, right or wrong. Pakistan Army's huge efforts towards national development and international peacekeeping have been highlighted, to impress upon the contribution of the Army towards the development of Pakistan, and global peace.

The first edition of the primer was found very useful and served its objective to clear the fog in the young minds. It is felt that there are certain questions which are wandering, to find an appropriate answer. Our youth is still striving to know why was it important to support the Afghan people in their effort to resist the Soviet invasion in 1979. People generally opine that the war in our neighbourhood left deep scars on the body politic of Pakistan, and adversely impacted our society and its social values. These and more questions were required to be answered appropriately. A very well researched and comprehensive article on *Pakistan's Support to Afghanistan during Russian Invasion* has been added in this edition, to clear some dust on this very important event of our national history, and the role played by our institutions to defend Pakistan's interests.

An effort has also been made to further improve maps in this edition for better understanding.

These well researched accounts will equip young officers with the knowledge to appreciate the sacrifices rendered by their predecessors for the defence of Pakistan, and to withstand scathing propaganda and narratives unleashed by our enemies. This will also help satiate officers' desire to learn military history, to further hone their tactical and leadership skills.

Agha Masood Akram
Major General, retired
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The Pakistan Army at Partition and Liberation Wars in Kashmir and Gilgit- Baltistan

Introduction

The hasty partition of the Indian Subcontinent in August 1947, only two months after the announcement of 'Partition Plan', brought not only an abrupt surge in mutual mistrust but also gave birth to many new complex problems. The Indian leadership as well as some of British hierarchy had expected that the newly formed state of Pakistan would crumble under the weight of a host of unsolvable problems, and would soon rejoin India. With such optimism, the Indian leadership engineered all sorts of complications in the smooth execution of Partition Plan.

At the time of Partition, there were roughly 562 princely states. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 clearly enunciated that the suzerainty of His Majesty over the states would lapse on the day of Partition and that states will be free to join either of the dominions, or opt for independence. However, Lord Mountbatten and Nehru never wanted these states to opt for independence. The principles set for accession to any one of the dominions were based on geographical proximity and the aspirations of the people involved[1]. By 14 August 1947, almost all of these states had indicated, either to accede to one dominion or the other, except for Junagarh, Hyderabad (Hindu majority states) and the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Muslim majority state). India, in utter disregard of the principles of accession, occupied the states of Junagarh and Hyderabad forcefully on the pretext of Hindu majority population. India, however, did not accept the same principle with regards to Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan Army at Partition

The British Indian Army was divided between India and Pakistan on the ratio of 64% and 36% respectively. Pakistan was, however, forced to accept 1/3 of the share of forces and stores later. Even before Partition, the units earmarked for Pakistan were in some cases nearly 200 years old, with the most recent ones raised to fight in World War

[1] *Dr. Cheema. P.I, Pakistan Defence Policy, p.34*

II. They were all battle-hardened, well-disciplined and professionally sound outfits. The erstwhile GHQ Northern Command India, at Rawalpindi, was converted into GHQ Pakistan. General Messervy, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, was appointed as Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Pakistan Army, while General Douglas Gracey was appointed deputy C-in-C. Field Marshal, General Auchinleck became the supreme commander of armies of both the newly formed dominions.

There was massive dislocation of humans, cattle, and material on both sides of the newly formed dominions. There were special trains run to meet the transportation needs of both the dominions. The trains carrying personnel, families and stores through Indian Punjab and Sikh princely states to Pakistan, were frequently attacked by fanatic Hindus and Sikhs. Almost 53 trains were attacked and thousands of passengers were massacred by armed bands of Hindus and Sikhs, in connivance with Indian railway authorities.

A caravan of refugees (Source: livemint.com)

Due to attacks on refugee trains and overall riots in Indian Punjab, the Punjab Boundary Force was created under Major General T.W. Rees on 1st August,1947 to escort refugees across the borders. 14 (Parachute) Brigade, one of the five brigades of Punjab Boundary Force, allocated to Pakistan Army, was responsible for escorting Muslim refugees from India to Pakistan

A refugee train (Source: thestar.com)

Maj Gen TW Rees (Source: stringfixer.com)

and vice versa. 3/1 Punjab Regiment, 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment and 3/16 Punjab Regiment participated in the Punjab Boundary Force and refugees duties. Reportedly seven million Muslims migrated and were escorted to Pakistan and five million Hindus and Sikhs were transported from Pakistan to India, initially by the units of Punjab Boundary Force, and later, after disbandment of the Force, by Pakistan Army on its own. Despite limited strength and meagre resources, the Pakistan Army remained committed not only in safe transportation of refugees, but also in the arduous task of establishing, managing, and guarding the refugees. Most of the time soldiers shared their meagre rations in order to feed the starving refugees. Soldiers would often be required to perform guard duties round the clock without any break.

Still in its infancy, Pakistan Army was dragged into two major wars in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, when India decided to land her troops at Srinagar Airport on 27 October,1947 in response to Maharaja Hari Singh's call for military assistance from India. A brief account of both wars is illustrated in succeeding paragraphs.

Map of Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan Region (Source: cs.m.wikipedia.org)

In the complex of conflicts between India and Pakistan, that were the legacy of partition, the Jammu and Kashmir issue has survived as the main cause as well as the symbol of mutual animosity and intransigence[2]. Much before Partition, a number of Indian leaders started visiting the Maharaja of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, to persuade him to accede to India. Mountbatten, besides convincing other states to accede to India, also visited Kashmir to coax the Maharaja to join India. While the process of persuasion continued, troubles sparked off in Poonch area, where the Maharaja had accelerated the process of systematic persecution of the Muslim population[3]. The tempo of anti-Muslim campaign had increased gradually, with the infiltration of members of Rashtriya Sevak Samaj (RSS), Akali Sikh, and Indian National Army. However, this campaign ran into trouble in Poonch and Mirpur areas – the home of some sixty thousand demobilized Muslim soldiers of the British Indian Army who had fought for the British during the Second World War[4].

These demobilized soldiers organized strong resistance against the Dogra forces. The resistance intensified with an increase in atrocities by Dogra soldiers. Muslim troops in the state forces left Maharaja's service and joined hands with 'Jathas' (groups of freedom fighters) and Azad forces (World War II veterans and local volunteers). Towards the end of August and the start of September 1947, many representatives of Azad forces travelled to NWFP (now KPK) to purchase weapons from the tribal factories. Stories of Dogra brutalities moved many tribal leaders and other locals who had many of their relatives living in Kashmir. Aroused by what they considered to be the persecution of their brethren, the tribal Muslims of NWFP proclaimed 'Jehad' and some 2000 tribesmen, mostly Mahsuds and Afridis, set off on 19 October 1947 towards Kashmir via Abbottabad-Mansehra-Garhi Habibullah[5]. Later, many more tribes from NWFP joined the jehad in Kashmir.

On 22 October 1947, tribesmen imbued with a spirit to support their brethren in distress, crossed the border and advanced towards Srinagar with lightning speed. Within

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[2] *Dr. Cheema. P.I, Pakistan Defence Policy, p 38*
[3] *Dr. Cheema. P.I, Pakistan Defence Policy, p 39*
[4] *Lamb. Alastair, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, 1947-1948, p.121*
[5] *Dr. Cheema. P.I, Pakistan Defence Policy, p* 40

a few days, tribesmen reached and captured areas including Baramula, reaching Srinagar Airfield, right at the doorstep of Srinagar, the summer capital of the State. Panicked by the speed and scared by the ferocity of the tribal laskhars, the Maharaja ran for his life to Jammu, the winter capital of the State. He approached the Indian government for military help to save his rule through a letter. On the basis of that letter Mountbatten, the Governor General of dominion of India, agreed to authorize Indian troops deployment in Kashmir. However, plans for such an airlift had begun much earlier. Indeed, Sardar Patel had written to the defence Minister, Baldev Singh, on 7th October to be prepared to send arms and ammunition to Kashmir by air[6].

In the meantime, tribesmen from frontier regions had begun their march towards Kashmir on 23 October 1947 to help the beleaguered Muslim brethren in the valley, as they had their businesses and relatives in Kashmir. They were probably about two thousand strong, to start with. They would move by lorries from one place to another, fight the Dogra soldiers, push them back and then attack the next position, wherever they met Dogra opposition[7]. On 26 October, despite the 'Standstill Agreement' (an agreement between the Maharaja and Pakistan Government in which Maharaja would neither join any dominion, nor declare independence, for the time being) with Pakistan, the Maharaja decided to join India. Thereafter Indian troops, within a few hours of signing of 'Instrument of Accession', landed at Srinagar Airport. 27 October, till today, is observed as "Black Day" all over Kashmir.

Quaid-i-Azam had ordered General Gracey, the acting Commander-in-Chief (While General Messervy was on leave), to send Pakistan Army into Kashmir in response to India's military intervention. Gracey is said to have demurred, citing the need to get the supreme commander's permission

Indian Troops landing in Kashmir (Source: wandemag.com)

[6] *Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, p.49*
[7] Khan, Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir, p.24

and most probably referring to the stand down instructions of Auchinleck that would have meant the loss of Pakistan's entire corps of senior British military commanders. Further, the Pakistan Army was in no position to launch and sustain a military operation against India at that time. Auchinleck flew to Lahore to meet Quaid-i-Azam and explain the reality behind the stand down order[8]. The only troops (One squadron of 11th Cavalry) that had been employed during this period, was to defend about sixty miles of Pakistani border between Chenab and Bhimber, against RSS and Sikh intruders who used to harass the locals[9]. Thus, the initial fight for liberation of Kashmir was to be fought by the Azad forces and tribal lashkars, without any support from Pakistan Army. Although Pakistan Army was not officially fighting the Indian troops in Kashmir, many officers and men from the Army still fought alongside their Kashmiri brethren in civil dress - while being on leave or absenting themselves from their duty stations.

Ill-equipped, ill-clad, and without any worthwhile logistics, Azad forces and tribal lashkars descended upon Dogra forces with such ferocity that Dogra forces either did not put up any resistance at all, or abandoned their garrisons without putting up a serious fight. In a month or so, the freedom fighters had either liberated or besieged major towns and cities that included Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch, Jhangar, Naushahra, Rajauri, and Bhimber. But this was only before the arrival of the Indian Army. With the landing of Indian troops at Srinagar, fighting in the State entered a new phase. Freedom fighters found themselves pitched against the military might of the Indian Army. The tribesmen and Azad forces were now fully exposed to the Indian Air Force, which completely dominated the airspace in the absence of Pakistan Air Force. Naushahra, Jhangar, and Rajauri were lost to the Indian Army. The Indians, however, could not break the siege of Poonch and link up with the besieged troops, due to the sheer determination of Azad Forces and tribesmen.

Indian Summer Offensive

Since early 1948, the Indian Army commanders were making incessant announcements of an offensive to eject Azad forces and tribesmen from entire Kashmir.

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[8] *Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, p.51*
[9] *Historical Section, GHQ, The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48, p.86*

The main Indian objective was Muzaffarabad, which they intended to capture by a main push down Jhelum valley, combined with an offensive through Poonch, Bagh and Kohala[10]. With these serious developments, General Gracey, now the C-in-C Pakistan Army, had to modify his previous stance of not despatching Pakistan Army to Kashmir. He now considered it advisable to take precautionary measures to keep the Indian forces away from Pakistan's borders[11]. In early May, the Pakistan Government decided to move the Army into Kashmir but with orders to avoid a direct confrontation with the Indian Army, unless absolutely necessary.

Out of four divisions which had come as Pakistan's share, only 7 Infantry Division, located at Rawalpindi, was in any organised shape to be inducted in Kashmir[12]. One brigade of this division was ordered to provide necessary backing to Azad forces. However, as operations in Kashmir gathered momentum, more and more troops were brought into Kashmir and by the end of 1948, just before ceasefire, most of the Pakistan Army was involved in the Kashmir War.

The main battles during the Indian Summer Offensive, commencing on 17/18 May, 1948, were fought in Jhelum and Neelum valleys, with overall thrust towards Muzaffarabad. India had a massive force of three infantry divisions, tanks, artillery and complete air support for its much trumpeted summer offensive. Some of the fiercest battles of the Kashmir War were fought between May and December 1948. The battle for Pir Sahaba / Danna ridge, Point 7229 and battle for Chunj Feature in Neelum valley, are examples of gallantry of Pakistan Army when it defended its area against an overwhelmingly stronger enemy. (*Refer to map)*.

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[10] *Historical Section, GHQ, The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48, p.132 and 133.*
[11] *Historical Section, GHQ, The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48, p.100*
[12] *Ibid*



Map: Tithwal Sector of Jammu & Kashmir (1948 war) (Source: Book - The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48)

Despite valiant resistance by Pakistan Army, Indians managed to capture few of the areas liberated by Azad forces and tribal lashkars due to overwhelming superiority of numbers in men and material. Understrength, under equipped, and virtually with very meagre logistic back up, Pakistan Army, Azad forces and Lashkars defended the liberated areas of Kashmir with sheer determination and devotion. Captain Sarwar Shaheed and Naik Saif were awarded highest military awards of Nishan-e-Haider and Hilal-e-Kashmir respectively. The battle of Pandu feature in Jhelum valley is an example of strong will and resolve of Pakistan Army when it captured the lost feature under extreme odds of being numerically far less than the Indians. Scaling a massive 11,000 feet high mountain

feature, with 70 degree or more gradient at places, without any proper expedients, speaks volume of guts and grit. Pandu feature was eventually re-captured by Pakistan Army and it still holds the feature as a symbol of pride and honour.

The Outcome and Ceasefire

Despite being ill equipped and numerically inferior, Pakistan Army successfully contained the Indian offensive thrusts in almost all sectors. Indians despite total superiority in air, could not re-capture Chakothi, Bhimber, Muzaffarabad, and many other intended objectives of their summer offensive. Pakistan Army had planned an offensive operation code named, "LITTLE VENUS" and "VENUS", to be launched in December 1948. C-in-C Pakistan Army was, however, ordered by the Pakistan Government NOT to launch operations as discussion with United Nations were on, for a ceasefire[13]. Ceasefire was announced on January 1, 1949[14]. In fact it was India, who took the matter to Security Council under article 35 of the UN Charter and promised to resolve the issue through plebiscite. UN Security Council adopted its first Resolution on January 1st, 1949 declaring 'plebiscite' in the entire state as the final solution which unfortunately remains a promise to date. We need to acknowledge the courage and fighting spirit of Kashmiri 'Jathas', tribal lashkar and above all the Pakistan Army, due to whom we hold Azad Kashmir today, otherwise our borders with Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir would be running close to Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat.

[13] *Historical Section, GHQ, The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48, p.268*
[14] *Historical Section, GHQ, The Kashmir Campaign 1947-48, p.270*

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) Liberation War - 1947/48

Map: Gilgit-Baltistan Region (Source: pamirtimes.net)

It was June 1947, when the news of the partition of the Sub-continent reached GB through porters, employed by the state for carrying supplies from Srinagar to Bunji for sustenance of the state army i.e. 6 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (Combination of Hindu and Muslims). Corps of Gilgit Scouts (All Muslims) was another force, located at Gilgit for law and order duties.

The British, with the decision to divide the Sub-continent, handed the state of J&K and Gilgit Agency back to the Dogra ruler in July 1947. The people of GB were well aware of the sufferings and misery if they came under Dogra rule after the British departure. The entire population of GB was Muslim, hence had sympathies with their Muslim brethren and wished to either remain independent or join Pakistan.

The Agency was handed over to the J & K state in July 1947 and Brigadier Ghansara Singh, the new Governor arrived on 30 July at Gilgit[15]. With the arrival of Ghansara Singh, certain rumours were set about, especially regarding the move of state forces from Bunji to Gilgit and relieving Gilgit Scouts of either their role, or disbanding them altogether. This was not well received by the Viceroy Commissioned Officers (VCOs), who enjoyed absolute power and respect after British officers. These VCOs - being relatives of Mirs and Rajas, enjoyed a privileged place in the Agency. Following VCOs, who planned and later led the GB Liberation War, were present in Gilgit Scouts Headquarters in the first week August[16] :-

- Subedar Major M. Babur Khan (Nagar)
- Subedar Safiullah Beg (Hunza)
- Jamadar Fida Ali (Hunza)
- Jamadar Sultan Firoz Sufi (Nagar)
- Jamadar Shah Sultan (Nagar)
- Jamadar Shah Khan (Hunza)

These VCOs met Ghansara Singh and General Scott (Chief of Staff of the Kashmir State Forces) to enquire about the status of future of Gilgit Scouts and status of VCOs. General Scott bluntly refused to grant superior status to VCOs over Junior Commissioned Officers of the state force[17]. Bitter and annoyed, when these VCOs learnt about relief of Gilgit Scouts and the planned persecution of Muslims by Dogra forces after Partition, they decided to organise a freedom movement to liberate Gilgit from Dogra rule. They started the movement secretly and kept getting support for the movement from people of GB. They even wrote a letter to the Govt of Pakistan for help before the final showdown.

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[15] *Baloch, Sikandar Khan, In the wonderland of Asia, Gilgit & Baltistan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, p.138*

[16] *Baloch, Sikandar Khan, In the wonderland of Asia, Gilgit & Baltistan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, p.142 and 143*

[17] *Baloch, Sikandar Khan, In the wonderland of Asia, Gilgit & Baltistan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, p.144*

Maj William Brown
(Source: NLI Centre)

Major William Alexander Brown, the British Commandant of Gilgit Scouts, had by then learnt about the freedom movement and decided to side with the VCOs and Muslim population, as he had intimate knowledge of the people of GB and their aspirations. He knew that the people of GB would never tolerate any tyrant after the British departure[18]. Meanwhile, the VCOs had planned a coup by arresting Ghansara Singh and ultimately declaring independence of Gilgit. Major Brown and his second-in-command Captain Mathieson were taken into confidence for execution of the plan. Ghansara Singh was ultimately arrested, and on 10 November 1947, Gilgit was liberated[19]. An interim govt had been put in place with Shah Raees as the first President.

Major Brown and the VCOs knew that the aftermath of liberating Gilgit would be very costly. They must strike and capture maximum territory to keep the state forces or Indian Army as far as possible. With whatever strength of Gilgit Scouts and the Muslim elements of 6 J & K Light Infantry, they decided to distribute the force into three columns as under[20] :-

- **The Ibex Column**. This force consisted of almost 250 personnel under overall command of Major Ehsan Ali ex 6 J & K Infantry. The mission assigned to this force was '*to move through Indus Valley at maximum speed and capture Skardu, Kargil and Leh* (Ref map below - Yellow route)

- **The Tiger Force**. One of the wings of Gilgit Scouts was named as Tiger Force under command Captain Hassan Khan of 6 J & K Infantry. Its

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[18] *William, A. Brown, The Gilgit Rebellion 1947*
[19] *Baloch, Sikandar Khan, In the wonderland of Asia, Gilgit & Baltistan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, p.152*

[20] *Baloch, Sikandar Khan, In the wonderland of Asia, Gilgit & Baltistan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, p.174*

mission was '*to operate on main Gilgit-Srinagar Road and capture Traghbal Top and Bandipura'* (Ref map below – Green route)

- **<u>The Eskimo Force</u>**. Another wing of Gilgit Scouts commanded by Lieutenant Muhammad Shah Khan was kept in reserve to reinforce either of the two columns, or to be committed against the enemy at a critical time. The force was later named as *Eskimo Force* and committed at Kargil, Dras and Zoji La (Ref map below – Black route)

(Source: google map)

The three columns set out for their objectives under the most trying conditions. It must be remembered that these operations were to be carried out over and through most stupendous mountains which rise between 11,000 to 20,000 feet, and remain snow covered for most of the year. Officers and men of Gilgit Scouts did not have any warm clothing, weapons, ammunition, rations, and not even proper shoes. They had to wrap rags to protect their feet in the freezing cold. Communication was virtually not possible, due to non-availability of any wireless sets and intervening mountains.

This poorly equipped and hardly trained non-professional force, did wonders during the coming months. They travelled through rugged and snow covered mountains at lightning speed, and fell on their enemies like demons. Skardu, being a fortified garrison, was attacked thrice and was ultimately captured. During their march to respective objectives, each force/column had to fight not only the enemy but the cruel weather as well, beside hunger and thirst. More soldiers perished not due to enemy actions but due to extreme weather. Many successful and most amazing actions and ambushes took place during the course of their march to Kargil, Dras and Leh, when the enemy suffered heavy losses in men and material and was forced to flee. A few incidents worth mentioning are - *Ambush at Thorego, Parkuta (now Mehdiabad) action and Ambush at Kharmang.*



Map: Advance of freedom fighters (Gilgit Scouts) (Source: google map)

Besides all these resilient acti ons, the capture and later defence of Zoji La is a feat in itself. A handful of ill-trained, ill equipped but highly motivated soldiers proved indomitable until they were actually starved for ammunition, and were subjected to face the direct hits of Indian tanks before withdrawing to fall-back positions. Unfortunately, due to a complete absence of any military support from Pakistan as Pakistan Army was heavily committed in Kashmir, many areas captured by Gilgit Scouts with absolute determination and resolve, were re-taken by the Indian Army. Gilgit Scouts had reached

within striking distance of Leh, but found themselves lacking in troops, ammunition and rations, besides facing a large and regular Indian Army. The valiant sons of GB had captured Kargil, Dras and many other important villages but had to retreat due to reasons already mentioned. There have been acts of incredible gallantry when these brave soldiers stayed behind enemy lines for more than 11 months even after the ceasefire and remained alive under the most trying conditions. We owe our earnest gratitude to these heroes who liberated almost 72,000 square kilometres of area in GB region which is now the most picturesque and breath-taking part of our country. Our brethren in GB themselves threw off the Dogra yoke, and joined Pakistan of their free will.

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1965 India – Pakistan War

Background

India, which had never accepted creation of Pakistan, conspired to deny annexation of Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan soon after the partition in 1947. She rather chose to use military option to grab hold of the state and as per a planned move, Indian Army invaded Jammu and Kashmir and occupied its maximum territory. There was a deep Indian desire to capture the remaining regions of Azad Kashmir as well. Indian occupation and declaration of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of Indian Union, refusing to hold plebiscite as per UN resolution on 27th November 1963, was the main cause of 1965 India-Pakistan War.

The 1965 War, which started on 6th September 1965 when India attacked Pakistan, was the second major conflict between the two countries over the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Though the war did not resolve this dispute, it did 'defreeze' the Kashmir issue, which was gradually going into obscurity.

"Greatly outnumbered and embroiled in Kashmir raids, Pakistan Army faced India's challenge courageously and played an effective part in the defence of Pakistan."[1] The war concluded with a ceasefire on 23rd September 1965 and peace between the two countries was negotiated under Soviet auspices in Tashkent on 10th January 1966.

Rann of Kutch Skirmish

Indian leadership had been under tremendous pressure after the upsurge in Muslims' sentiment since the theft of the Holy Relic (*Moi-e-Muqaddas* of our Holy *Prophet*^{PBUH}) from Hazrat Bal mosque in Srinagar. The incident had resulted in widespread protests by the Muslims, especially in Kashmir. Ensuing political unrest due to protest by Holy Relic Action Committee (HRAC) and others had brought Indian Held Kashmir to a standstill. The situation was assessed to be in favour of Pakistan.

During the early part of 1965, the Rann of Kutch got world's attention when a dispute over the boundary arose between Pakistan and India, which led to serious

[1] My Version: India – Pakistan War 1965, by General (Retired) Muhammad Musa, Hilal-e-Juraat.

skirmish between the two neighbours. The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, and occupied unmanned border posts along the un-demarcated boundary. In a sharp but short conflict, the Indian forces were evicted by the Pakistan Army troops. Indian Army suffered humiliation at Kanjarkot when her brigade[2] was defeated by Pakistani troops.



Rann of Kutch Dispute[3]

Consequently, on British intervention, a ceasefire was declared and an agreement was signed on 30th June 1965. Subsequently, the forces were withdrawn and the matter was laid before a tribunal appointed by the International Court of Justice for arbitration. The award by the arbitration tribunal vindicated Pakistan's position.[4] After their humiliating defeat at Rann of Kutch, Indian leadership embarked upon a plan to occupy Azad Kashmir.

[2] Indian 31 Brigade
[3] Indo-Pak Clash in Rann of Kutch 1965, Major Saeed Ahmed.
[4] Pakistan Army Website, www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk

Operation GIBRALTAR

In the wake of successful operations against the Indians in Rann of Kutch, the Government of Pakistan decided to launch a guerrilla operation, 'Operation GIBRALTAR', in the Indian Held Kashmir.

The decision to launch the operation was aimed at, firstly: to encourage an uprising by the local population of the Kashmir Valley against the Indian occupation; and secondly: to bring the Kashmir issue into prominence, which was getting into oblivion at that time.

General Officer Commanding 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik was given the task to prepare the troops for this operation, which comprised Azad Kashmir Regulars, civilian volunteers and selected Pakistani troops. About 3,000 troops were to take part in the infiltration operation, which were organized in six groups: namely TARIQ Group, QASIM Group, KHALID Group, SALAH-UD-DIN Group, GHAZANVI Group and BABAR Group.[5]



Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik
(Source: AIMH)

On 7th August 1965, Operation GIBRALTAR commenced in Kashmir. The infiltration force, grouped in seven columns, entered occupied Kashmir through various entry points:

- Three columns entered the Kashmir Valley through the Northern passes, from Gultari, Minimarg and Kel sectors.
- Remaining four columns entered through strongly held Indian defensive positions along the ceasefire line. The main points of entry for infiltration were located in Kotli and Hajipir sectors.

All the columns reached their bases successfully. Major bases for further operations were selected in Gulmarg and Rajauri areas, respectively.

The infiltration forces successfully launched clandestine operations subsequently, and struck at enemy's rear installations, isolated posts, convoys, bridges, police stations,

[5] Pakistan Army archives

and civil administration headquarters. These operations were able to create confusion and demoralization effects, as well as disrupted enemy logistics. Initially, the Indians were taken by complete surprise. However, soon they were able to react to the infiltrators' operations.

Indians had four infantry divisions under 15 Corps in Indian Held Kashmir against Pakistan's 12 Division:[6]

- 3 Infantry Division – Ladakh Valley and Northern Kashmir
- 19 Division – Tithwal Valley
- 25 Division – Rajauri
- 10 Division – Chhamb Akhnur Valley
- Additionally, eight battalions of Jammu and Kashmir Militia were deployed as second line forces.

India launched her offensive on 15th August 1965 in reaction to Operation GIBRALTAR:

- Indian Army attacked Pakistani posts located north of Kargil in Tithwal sectors and Bedori Bulge between Uri and Punch in order to block routes of the infiltrators.
- During the period between 15th – 31st August, Indian operations developed as under:
    - Occupied 10 square miles territory in the area north of Kargil.
    - Captured 2 square miles in Tithwal sector.
    - Captured Haji Pir Pass, taking an area of 170 square miles.

Realizing that Indian reaction to 'Operation GIBRALTAR' could result in aborting the operation to a disadvantage, Pakistan Army decided to launch a counter action. Decision was taken to launch an attack on axis Bhimber – Chhamb – Akhnur with the aim of capturing Akhnur. Its plan was originally conceived and drawn up in June

[6] Pakistan Army archives

1965, for the reason that this operation could be launched from Azad Kashmir without violating the international border between India and Pakistan.

OPERATION GRAND SLAM

The offensive by Pakistan's 12 Division commenced on 1st September 1965, under a heavy pre-dawn concentrated fire by artillery. The attacking troops found no major resistance as they broke through Indian 10 Infantry Division forward defences. By the evening on same day, Chhamb was captured and Indian troops withdrew behind the Munnawar – Tawi River line.

On 2nd September, 7 Division took over the operations from 12 Division. The operations progressed well and after fierce battles, Palanwala was taken on 3rd September and Jurian, another important Indian town, was captured by 5th September. On night 5th/6th September, area up to Kandial and Chak Karpal was cleared. However, on 6th September and onwards, activities in this sector were confined to artillery fire and small but swift actions between the opposing forces.

The GRAND SLAM had progressed well as it had seriously threatened Akhnur and resulted in liberating 340 square miles of Indian Held Kashmir, as against 182 square miles lost to the enemy.

Akhnur had strategic importance, as it was an important link for any movement towards the North. With Akhnur threatened, Indian occupation forces in Kashmir would have faced a serious threat of being cut off from the rest of India. Unable to react in Kashmir, India decided to launch a surprise attack on Pakistan across the international border.



MAP 30

Regrouping of Indian Forces. Operations between 8 and 10 September 1965.

Scale

Operation GRAND SLAM[7]

(Source: History of Indo-Pak War – 1965 by Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed retd)

[7] A Military History of Indo-Pak War 1965, Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed

General War across International Border[8]

India attacked Pakistan across the international border on 6th September 1965

Indian decision to wage a general war across the international borders was aimed to reduce pressure on Akhnur by drawing Pakistan's forces away in to a general war. On 6th September 1965 at 3:00 a.m., Indian army crossed the international border simultaneously at Sialkot, Jassar, Wagah and Kasur without any formal declaration of war. Indian operations developed as under: Indian major offensive was launched by an armoured division and two infantry divisions, under Headquarters 1 Corps, from the direction of Jammu – Samba to capture Wazirabad.

- A subsidiary attack was launched by one infantry division supported by armour along Grand Trunk road towards Lahore.
- An infantry division advanced along Kasur – Burki towards Lahore.

Pakistan Army had expected that the main and decisive battle with India would be fought in the Western theatre. Pakistan Army, much smaller in size, with fewer resources and having less depth, was to make a determined effort for early gains in order to carry the war into the enemy territory. Pakistan Army, therefore, had planned following:

- Formations dedicated for defence to occupy the defensive positions, neutralize the enemy attack and seize as much enemy territory as possible.
- Formations kept in reserve were to be employed in a manner to carry the war into enemy territory vital to her, giving no time to the enemy to react. Pakistan Army had planned to employ its main striking force constituting 1 Armoured Division along with 11 Division, to carry out the offensive operation through Khem Karan and seize as much Indian territory in East Punjab as possible.

[8] Pakistan Army archives

Comparison of ground forces

Theatre / Sector	Pakistani Forces	Indian Forces
Jammu and Kashmir	12 Division	3, 19 and 25 Division
Chhamb Sector	7 Division	10 Division
Sialkot Sector	15 Division	26 Division
Lahore Sector	10 Division	7 and 15 Division
Kasur Sector	11 Division	4 Mountain Division
Sulaimanke Sector	105 Independent Infantry Brigade	67 Brigade
Sindh Sector	Desert Force (51 Brigade and Rangers)	11 Division
Reserve Formations	1 Armoured Division, 6 Armoured Division (a light division), and 8 Division	1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Infantry Division, 50 Brigade, and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade
East Pakistan	14 Division	9, 20, 23 Divisions and 32 (Independent) Brigade. Also five divisions facing China

Deployment of troops at the time of commencement of hostilities

On 6th-7th September, Indian forces kept engaging Pakistani forces all along the border, however, major thrust of Indian offensive developed as under:

- Two infantry divisions attacked towards Lahore.
- One division, supported by an independent armoured brigade, attacked towards Kasur.
- A brigade group attacked Jassar in Sialkot sector with a view to capturing the Jassar bridge (over Ravi river) intact.

By evening 6th September, it appeared that Indian major offensive was along Lahore axis, while attacks at Jassar and Kasur were of a diversionary nature. However, location of the Indian Army reserves, which included their 1 Armoured Division, remained unclear. It was suspected to have moved to Jammu-Samba area from Eastern Punjab.

Pakistan Army contained the Indian offensive all along the border. In Jassar, Indians made some gains, however, they could only advance up to the BRB Canal in Lahore sector. In Kasur sector, Pakistani forces stabilised the position along Rohi Nullah, while in Sulaimanke sector, Pakistan Army's independent infantry brigade[9] assumed an offensive posture from the very beginning and captured few Indian border posts in Fazilka area.

[9] 105 Independent Infantry Brigade

On 7th September, in response to enemy's renewed effort, Jassar bridge was partially destroyed in order to prevent the enemy from using it. No further attempts were made by the enemy to cross river Ravi in this sector. In Lahore sector, enemy's effort to cross BRB were effectively foiled.

Lahore and Kasur Sectors

During the period from 8th to 11th September, in Lahore sector, counter attack by 10 Division faced heavy enemy opposition and the troops held positions behind BRB Canal.

In Kasur sector, Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division was launched on 8th September to trap enemy's forces[10] in Amritsar-Beas area. Their offensive, along Kasur – Khem Karan – Valtoha – Patti – Amritsar axis led by an armoured brigade,[11] after a fierce tank battle near Khem Karan broke through Indian defences, reaching 9 miles deep inside the enemy territory up to Valtoha. On 9th September, enemy quickly brought in heavy reinforcements, an infantry division and an independent armoured brigade, which brought halt to the advance of 1 Armoured Division.

At this time, seeing the situation in Sialkot sector, a heavy brigade was left behind to look after the Khem Karan bridge-head, and 1 Armoured Division was moved to Sialkot sector on 11th September to reinforce the Armoured Division there. The enemy launched strong counter attacks to rollback our foothold in Khem Karan, however, these attempts were repulsed effectively. A complete Indian battalion[12] was taken prisoner, along with its commanding officer, when the battalion tried to infiltrate through our defences in Kasur sector.

During the period from 16th to 23rd September, nothing significant happened except for a major reverse in Lahore sector, where an infantry battalion suffered heavy casualties during a counter attack. In Lahore-Kasur sectors on the whole, we lost an area of 140 square miles and gained 37 square miles of the enemy territory.

[10] Three infantry / mountain divisions and one independent armoured brigade, which were operating against Lahore.
[11] 4 Armoured Brigade
[12] 4 Sikh

Sialkot Sector

In the early hours of 8th September, the enemy launched a major offensive in Sialkot sector along Suchetgar – Sialkot and Charwa – Chobara – Chawinda axes. The Sialkot – Suchetgarh thrust was halted after some loss of ground, however, the enemy put in its main offensive effort along line Charwa – Chobara – Phillaura, using her 1 Corps[13]. In this sector, some of the most memorable and bloody tank battles of the war were fought. By 11th September, the Indian forces had made some tactical gains along the both axes, i.e. Charwa – Chawinda and Suchetgarh – Sialkot. Utilising bulk of armour, the enemy enlarged his gains in areas of Charwa and Mahrajka villages, extending it further to Chobara and Bajra Garhi. The situation in Sialkot sector was becoming unfavourable as 6 Armoured Division, a light armoured formation, had suffered considerable tank losses and Pasrur was being threatened. Hence, by 11th September evening, decision was taken to pull out 1 Armoured Division and move it to Sialkot sector, leaving behind its one heavy armoured brigade group for Kasur sector.

Indian strategic objective was quite evident by this time, as enemy had employed strategic reserves[14] in Sialkot sector to achieve a quick victory by racing up to Grand Trunk Road between Gujranwala and Wazirabad. The Indians had already planned an invasion, Operation NEPAL, to launch an offensive from Samba area in Pakistan's territory between Sialkot and Lahore with the aim to reach the Grand Trunk Road between Wazirabad and Gujranwala in order to cut the major highway and thus seek victory against Pakistan.

Tank Battle around Chawinda
(Source: Army Records)

The enemy's gains had enlarged considerably, extending up to a line defined by Alhar railway station, the town of Chawinda and the right bank of Deg Nadi (covering an area 8-10 miles deep and 8-15 miles wide). Fierce battles raged around Chawinda and Badiana, as the enemy desperately tried to break through towards the Marala Ravi Link Canal and to by-pass

[13] 1 Corps consisted of 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Infantry Division and 26 Infantry Division
[14] Indian 1 Corps

Chawinda in order to capture Pasrur. However, the enemy's two major attempts were frustrated by Pakistani forces.

The Indian last major attempt to capture Chawinda on night 17th/18th and 18th September met heavy resistance from Pakistani side. An Indian infantry formation attacked in waves and with great vehemence, but the defenders of Chawinda scythed them down and Indian forces suffered heavy casualties. Meanwhile, a counter offensive in Sialkot sector to reduce the enemy gains[15] could not materialize because of the ceasefire that came into effect on 23rd September.

Sulaimanke Sector

On night 21st/22nd September, Pakistani forces[16] launched a spirited offensive in the Sulaimanke sector. The Indians had taken up strong defences but Pakistani offensive dislodged them and captured approximately 40 square miles of enemy territory in Fazilka area.

Rajasthan Sector

Elements of an Indian infantry division[17] had attacked in this sector and captured Godra on 8th September. Pakistani forces reacted promptly and by 10th September an infantry brigade[18] and the Desert Force (a mixed force of Rangers and Hurs, approximately 2,500 men strong) had launched the offensive. Munabao was captured by the infantry brigade on night 8th/9th September and by 18th September Pakistani troops had taken Sundra and were one mile South of Pochhina and Miajlar. Kishangarh Fort was captured by *Hur Mujahids*, the followers of *Pir Pagaro*, who formed part of the Desert Force. The Desert Force operating in Rahim Yar Khan Sub-Sector had captured area up to line Shahgarh – Longanewala – Sarkari Tara by 23rd September. Pakistani forces

Kishangarh Fort captured by Hur Mujahids
(Source: pakarmy.pk.tripod.com)

[15] The total Indian gains in this sector were 100 square miles.
[16] 105 Independent Brigade
[17] 11 Infantry Division
[18] 51 Brigade

had captured 1,200 square miles of Indian territory in comparison to the enemy's total gain of 24 square miles in Rajasthan sector.

Role of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN)

M.M. Alam shot down five Indian planes in 20 seconds
(Source: pinterest.com)

Alongside the Pakistan Army, PAF and PN played their part in a befitting manner. It was for the first time that the air forces of both the countries faced each other. PAF pilots displayed remarkable skills and despite its smaller size inflicted heavy losses to Indian air force. On 7th September, a PAF pilot, Squadron Leader M. M. Alam, flying F-86 Sabre aircraft shot down five Indian Hunter aircraft in a single sortie, an unbeaten world record. Pakistan Army's Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Musa commended PAF saying, "…the PAF responded to the Army's calls admirably for close support, and provided it very effectively…". PAF Sabres contributed decisively during the battle of Chawinda as many of the enemy tanks were destroyed and put out of action by Pakistan Army and PAF during the battle.

On 7th September, Pakistan Navy Task Group comprising Pakistan Naval Ships Babur, Khaibar, Dacca, Badr, Jahangir, Tippu Sultan, Shahjahan and Alamgir, and Pakistan Naval Submarine Ghazi, under the guidance of Commodore S. M. Anwar,[19] attacked the Indian naval radar station that was set up on the coast of Dwarka in India, which is approximately 320 km to the southeast of Karachi Port. The operation was successful and it boosted the morale of our soldiers and the nation as a whole.

National Support and Morale

(Source: Pak Post Archives)

Armed forces can successfully carry on the wars when they have support from their nation. The Pakistani nation, with towering morale, showed unflinching fervour during the war and supported their armed forces in whatever capacity they could. Pakistanis from all segments of society provided material and moral support, individually and collectively, including voluntary civil defence services, money, blood donations,

[19] Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947 – 1972, Compiled by PN History Section

transportation, etc. Such was the state of national morale that following Indian attack towards Lahore on 6th September, thousands of youth rushed to Wagah border with the desire to defend the motherland against Indian aggression. At times, underage children and anaemic women turned up to donate their blood. *Hilal-i-Isteqlal* was awarded to the city of Lahore, by the President of Pakistan, and to the cities of Sialkot and Sargodha by the Governor of West Pakistan for the unprecedented act of valour, courage and patriotism displayed by the citizens during the war.

Artists, writers, poets, singers and the like also waged "fine arts war". Jameeluddin Aali's inimitable verse "I sing for you, my country's handsome warriors (اے وطن کے سجیلے جوانو میرے نغمے تمہارے لئے ہیں)" and Punjabi song "God be with you, my beloved warrior (میریا ڈھول سپاھیا تینوں رب دیاں رکھاں)" sung by Madam Noor Jahan are just a few examples.

Madam Noor Jahan
(Source: artsandculture.com)

Many officers and soldiers were given honours and awards for showing acts of bravery, the highest was the *Nishan-e-Haider* given to Major Aziz Bhatti, *Shaheed*. As a Company Commander in Burki area of Lahore sector, Major Aziz Bhatti organised the defence of BRB canal, facing constant enemy small arms, tanks and artillery fire for five days and nights until he was hit by an enemy tank shell and embraced martyrdom on 10 September 1965.

Maj Aziz Bhatti
(Source: Army Archives)

Ceasefire

The United Nations Security Council was able to prevail upon the belligerents to agree to a ceasefire, which came into effect on night 23rd September. However, low intensity fighting continued in Kashmir and Rajisthan sectors even after the ceasefire where the Indians made repeated attempts to either recover lost territory or gain more ground in Kashmir to improve their bargaining position in the post ceasefire talks.

Negotiations in Tashkent concluded in January 1966, with both sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing their armies from the disputed territory. On 10th January, a declaration of formal cessation of hostilities was signed by the presidents of Pakistan and India. From Pakistan's side General Ayub Khan and from India's side Lal Bahadur Shastri attended the talks.



(Source: AIMH)

Outcome

On 6th September 1965, the general war initiated by India across the international borders in West Pakistan at the places of her choosing was effectively contained by the Pakistani forces all along the border. The battles were also taken into the Indian territories forcing India to abandon her strategic aim and seek negotiated settlement with Pakistan.

A captured Indian tank
(Source: quora.com)

It is generally believed that apparently, India attacked Pakistan across the international border in response to Pakistan's Operation GIBRALTAR and Operation GRAND SLAM. It is beyond doubt that India had started to plan Operation NEPAL to seek a victory in Pakistan's territory between Sialkot and Lahore. Aim of Indian's Operation NEPAL was to initiate offensive from Samba area to reach the Grand Trunk Road between Wazirabad and Gujranwala in order to cut the major highway. In doing this, India wanted to relieve pressure on Akhnur by drawing away Pakistan's forces and destroy its armour formations. ***While Pakistan's operations were directed within the disputed territory of Kashmir, India had been planning a general war, an invasion in fact, with Pakistan across the settled international borders, contrary to her claim***. Indian Prime Minister Shastri's declaration in the Lok Sahba in April 1965 ***threatening Pakistan with invasion after Indian defeat in Rann of Kutch, that India would choose her time and place for taking revenge, is a clear proof of Indian designs***.

Pakistan had desired to confine the war only to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir in order to seek favourable results there. However, feeling the pressure due to successful development of Operation GRAND SLAM, India chose to start general war violating the international border. Indian plan was to draw Pakistani forces away from Jammu and Kashmir in to a general war and trap the bulk of Pakistan Army between Gujranwala and Lahore. ***The Indian plan was totally frustrated and not that the situation was stabilized all along the Kashmir and West Pakistan border by the Pakistani forces, they also inflicted heavy casualties on the Indian side***.

In 'Untold Story', Indian Lieutenant-General B.M. Kaul wrote, ". . . ***All I will say here is that we failed to defeat Pakistan — a smaller power than us — which we should have done; also, that we survived certain situations through the grace of God*** . . ."[20] The question is ***why India signed ceasefire agreement with Pakistan after fighting for twenty-two days, if she was about to knock out Pakistan***.

India's aggression against Pakistan's international borders without a formal declaration of war cost her, apart from heavy personnel, material and economic losses, 1,617 square miles of her significant territory as compared to 446 square miles of Pakistan's open and undefended territory. Pakistan Army captured 20 officers, 19 junior commissioned officers, and 569 other ranks of Indian Army.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister, termed Tashkent Summit as a big success for Pakistan stating, "... ***We went to Tashkent with pride because we had thwarted the enemy's plans, taken a larger area of its territory and held a larger number of POWs. It was India, which had pressed for a ceasefire then***".[21]

India was not able to attain surprise anywhere when her army attacked Pakistan on 6th September. Pakistani side had foreseen the war and "Pakistan's armed forces were prepared to, and did, take on the invaders in the air and along all the fronts on the ground when the aggression was launched," wrote the then Pakistan Army's Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Musa in his book 'My Version'.

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[20] Untold Story, B.M. Kaul—p. 474

[21] ZA Bhutto's remarks published in Dawn on 11 September 1971, as quoted in My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, by General (Retd) Muhammad Musa, H.J., 1st 1983

While writing about 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, most of the foreign historians and journalists have opined that the result of the war was broadly inconclusive in terms of loss of men, material and territory. However, the fact is that Pakistan Army's gains and performance were better than the Indian side considering that Indian Army enjoyed superiority in numbers.

THE AUSTRALIAN

BIGGEST TANK BATTLE SINCE WORLD WAR II

PAKISTANI VICTORY

Huge losses on both sides

RIVER THEIR LAST ENEMY

Australia will give

A foreign newspaper headline
(Source: quora.com)

It was acknowledged by the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa, who wrote in his book, "***the great disparity, in men and material, between the opposing forces was made up by our Services with their superior professional skill, better equipment and spirit of defiance. In other words, it was quality versus quantity***."[22]

The Indians did not open a front in East Pakistan, neither did Pakistan initiate any military action there, as the mission assigned to the formation[23] there was to defend East Pakistan, which was just about their total capability.

1965 Indo-Pakistan War was a clear-cut Pakistan's victory because:

- ***Pakistan was able to stalemate an overwhelming large Indian military strength.***
- ***Pakistan Army was able to fulfil its aim of war, in line with the Government of Pakistan's policy, to defend Pakistan.***
- ***Pakistan was able to bring Kashmir issue to the world's attention.***
- ***Pakistan military denied India to fulfil her war objectives, causing her great losses.***

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[22] My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, by General (Retd) Muhammad Musa, H.J., 1st 1983
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Indo-Pak War 1971

Pakistan was created for the Muslims of Sub Continent in 1947. Muslims stood united under the dynamic leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Such was the spirit of Muslims that it took only 41 years from the creation of Muslim League at Dacca and only 7 years from the passing of Pakistan Resolution in 1940 at Lahore, to gain independence of Pakistan. On creation, Pakistan had two wings; East Bengal became East Pakistan and Muslim majority areas of western Punjab, Sind, Balochistan and North-West Frontier, became West Pakistan. However, the nation born on 14th August 1947 amidst billowing smoke, corpses of innocent people and dust trails of the largest human migration, lost its identity somewhere along the route that they followed. Ironically, Quaid-e-Azam had precisely warned us about this when he advised the nation to give up provincialism, while addressing an East Pakistani audience in Dacca, on 21st March 1948[1].

Pakistan had been unfairly described by many Western and Indian writers as a geographical nonsensity and a country disfigured at birth. Indian Congress Muslim leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad predicted that "Pakistan in its present shape would not last more than a quarter of a century". His prediction unfortunately, came true, but not because of the unique shape of the country, not even because of the differences in language and culture of the two wings but because of the follies of its people and because of the selfishness, insincerity and short sightedness of its leaders. And most important of all,



Map: Erstwhile East Pakistan (Source: britannica.com)

[1] Nawaz, Shuja. Cross Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008. p-77

because of the ignominious role played by India, leading upto and during the East Pakistan Crisis.[2]

The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 as a result of a long drawn political mess, military action against insurgents and mainly Indian aggression in East Pakistan, was perhaps the greatest tragedy of the century for Muslims of the Sub-Continent. It is an irony of fate that the same Bengali people who were in the lead of the Pakistan Movement only 24 years after Independence, fought bitterly to destroy the very country which was created as their cherished goal[3]. Why did it happen? The answer is not simple. It was the cumulative result of continuous mismanagement on the part of our leadership ever since Independence in general, and leaders of that time in particular. The tragedy, though a military defeat ultimately, was basically a politico-strategic failure at various tiers of policymaking, and its implementation.

Who is to be blamed for this national tragedy? No one person, event or happening can be blamed for the dismemberment of Pakistan. It was a combination of mistakes made by several people at different stages of its history, which resulted in separation of the Eastern Wing. Internal disharmony provided a golden opportunity to India to achieve her nefarious aims. The integrity of a nation does not depend on the strength and size of the military forces alone. Economic strength and political stability are as important, if not more, for the security of a country.

After the state came into existence, the unity of the two wings came under strain as a result of several factors; some of which were inherent in demography, colonial legacy and resource endowment, while others arose from narrow and short-sighted politics. Since independence, the country and nation passed through a number of trying situations. None of those was probably serious enough to force the Pakistani masses to forge unity, which was typical of the immediate pre-partition era. After Partition, the vested interests of leadership of the country followed the notorious British technique of "Divide and Rule" to stay in the corridors of power. Unfortunately, within 18 years of

[2] Matinuddin, Kamal Lieutenant General. Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crsis 1968-1971. Lahore: Wajidalis Private Limited, 1994.
[3] Matinuddin, Kamal Lieutenant General. Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crsis 1968-1971. Lahore: Wajidalis Private Limited, 1994.

independence, Pakistan was twice forced into wars due to hegemonic designs of India, firstly in 1948 Kashmir Liberation War, and then in 1965, though both wars remained limited within the geographical limits of West Pakistan and Kashmir[4].

Reasons and Perceptions. There could be many reasons and perceptions of East Pakistan tragedy but why did we reach that point of no return within 24 years of independence? Major reasons and misconceptions were only few. The most trumpeted one was "denial of justified share led to Bengalis' resentment against the people of West Pakistan". Once analysed closely, it becomes apparent that political maturity, acceptability and above all the spirit to accommodate each other could have averted the crisis.

The Language Issue. The language row was another reason. It started in February 1948 when a Hindu assembly member, Mr. Dhirendra Nath Dutta[5], moved a resolution in the East Pakistan Constituent Assembly that Bengali, along with Urdu, should be used in the assembly proceedings. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan opposed the motion saying that Urdu was the cultural heritage of the Muslims of India and hence should be the only national language. The decision was reiterated by Quaid-e-Azam in the constituent Assembly on 25th February 1948, that since Pakistan is a Muslim state, Urdu would be its state language. Later in Dacca on 19th March 1948, while addressing the students of Dacca University, he again said "Urdu and Urdu alone will be the lingua franca of Pakistan"[6]This was taken with some reservations by Bengalis.

Our leadership failed to appreciate the importance of Bengali language and its larger effects on the cohesion of Pakistan. Damage was done quite early as concluded by Basant Chatterjee, an Indian intellectual, "The Bengali language had been used as a political weapon in the struggle against Pakistan"[7]. The Language Riots of 1952 reverted

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[4] Most of the details or historical facts have been taken from following books: (a) Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p:112-122. (b) Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p:73-77. (c) Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Private Limited, 1988), p:101-126. These details have also been covered in "Primer on 1971 East Pakistan Tragedy" compiled by Command & Staff College Quetta, Pakistan.

[5] Qutubuddin Aziz, Blood and Tears, United Press of Pakistan Ltd, 1974, p:48

[6] Matinuddin, Kamal Lieutenant General. Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crsis 1968-1971. Lahore: Wajidalis Private Limited, 1994. *p47*

[7] Basant Chatterjee, Inside Bangladesh Today: an eye-witness account, New Delhi: S. Chand, 1973.

the politics to provincial levels and increased the trust deficit between both wings. It is unfortunate that the government failed to fully comprehend the consequences of such a divide. Although Bangla was declared as a national language in 1956, but it was too late.

The Disparity Perception. There was a common perception, and true to some extent as well, that Bengalis were not adequately represented in Civil Services and the Armed Forces of Pakistan. The Government did try to address this, however perceptions prevailed over reality. Perceived economic deprivation of East Pakistan was another major factor. East Pakistan, erstwhile East Bengal, was the poorest part of the province of Bengal before Partition in 1947. It was mainly an agricultural area whose 100% produce used to be exported to Hindu dominated industries of West Bengal. It had the lowest percentage of urbanization[8], industrialization, literacy, electrical power capacity and per capita income at the time of Independence. After independence, the Government did make a lot of effort for the economic uplift of East Pakistan, but more could have been done and at a faster pace. The number of East Pakistanis in the Army rose by about 100% during 1947 to 1958, and went up by 500 percent by April 1968[9], and this indeed reflects the government's efforts.

Role of Leadership. Bengali leaders failed to accommodate others and played with peoples' sentiments instead. Later, during the nine months long insurgency and war against India in 1971, the negative role of foreign media also contributed in conveying a bleak picture of the environment through exaggerated pro-Indian reporting of the situation in East Pakistan. The authorities' decision to expel foreign journalists from Dacca[10] resulted in a visible, hardened and hostile standpoint against Pakistan, as the foreign press became increasingly gullible in accepting, without effort at verifying, the fabricated horror stories of Dacca[11].

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[8] Matinuddin, Kamal Lieutenant General. Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crsis 1968-1971. Lahore: Wajidalis Private Limited, 1994. p97.

[9] Hassan Askari Rizvi, the military and politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997, 2013, Sang-e-Meel publications, page 153.

[10] Nawaz, Shuja. Cross Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008. P:268

[11] Sisson, Richard, Rose, Leo E. War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990. P:217

The Violent Political Mess. The political mess which followed the December 1970 elections further politicised the troubles of East Pakistanis. Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman got a thumping majority, though through massive ballot stuffing & rigging. The head of West Pakistan's majority party tried to stall the convening of the national assembly, an act that added fuel to the fire and widened the political divide. He demanded that Awami League and Pakistan People's Party should share the responsibility of government being the *majority* parties[12]. Mujib, unable to get his share in power, took an extreme position. The political situation worsened and president Yahya Khan postponed the assembly session on 1st March 1971; a decision seriously resented by Bengalis. Fully backed by India, Awami League called for civil disobedience and rebels took over the administration. Consequently, there were wide spread and horrifying massacre of non-Bengalis and Urdu speaking Biharis in East Pakistan[13]. Mukti Bahini, the armed wing of Awami League even planned mass immigration to India with maximum civilians, to internationalise the issue[14]. Colonel (retd) MAG Osmany, head of Mukti Bahini, had met responsible Indian officials along with some Awami League leaders and had been assured full support by them in every possible way[15].

On 1 March 1971 Awami League militants looted and burned many shops and houses and raided the Narayanganj Rifle Club for arms. Almost all the students of Dacca University, except committed militants, had gone to their homes. Iqbal Hall and Jagannath Hall were used as centres from which armed gangs dispersed to collect arms, vehicles and money. On 2 March 1971 two firearms shops were looted and the arms taken to an arsenal which was being started in Jagannath Hall. Practice firing in the University ground was heard all day. On the previous night there had been looting and arson; encouraged by the fact that the troops were confined to barracks on the orders of the governer, mobs armed with firearms, staves and iron bars raided business premises in Jinnah Avenue and Baitul Mukkarram[16]. The Shalimar Hotel and the Gulistan Cinema were attacked and set on fire. Police officers reported that they could no longer trust their

[12] G W Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, C Hurst & Co (Publishers), London. 1974, 146
[13] Yasmin Saikia, Women, War and the Making of Bengladesh : Remembering 1971, Oxford University Press, New York, Pakistan, New Delhi, 2011, p-1
[14] Fazal, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership, 48-49
[15] Karrar Ali, Witness to Carnage, 166
[16] Bose, Sarmila, Dead Rockoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, C.Hurst & Co., London, 2011 p-25

rank and file to deal with the mobs, and asked for the assistance of the military. This was granted, and a curfew was imposed. An Army unit was attacked at Sadarghat and in the firing, six rioters were killed. There was extensive defiance of the curfew and in spite of the efforts of the military, arson and looting continued throughout the night. On 3rd March 1971 mob violence spread to other parts of Dacca, particularly Islampur, Patnakhali Bazar, and Nawabpur. Shops, properties, business premises and private houses belonging to non-supporters of Awami League were looted and set on fire. In the disturbance, five people were killed and 62 wounded. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced the launching of a campaign of complete civil disobedience, and ordered the closing of schools and colleges, so that all students, (except hard-core militants), who had not yet left for home, proceeded to do so.

Violent intimidation continued against all who were not active supporters of the Awami League. Radio and TV stations of Dacca were compelled to play the new national anthem of Bangladesh. More raiding of arms shops and looting took place. On 5th March 1971, Telephone and Telegraph employees ceased to work and ordinary communications between East Pakistan and the outside world, and between Dacca and other parts of East Pakistan, came to an end. Few militant students tried to set fire to the British Council premises, but troops arrived in time to drive them off. On 6 March 1971, there was a jail-break of 341 prisoners from the Central Prison. During the escape, seven prisoners were killed when the warders fired; a sergeant and six warders were wounded too. The escaped prisoners, joined by Awami Leaguers and activist students, paraded through the streets of Dacca shouting anti-Pakistan slogans. The Government Science Laboratory in Dacca was seized and all available explosive chemicals were taken. Raid on the Polytechnic Institute was foiled when troops arrived to disperse the mob[17]. In one example of Mukti's atrocities, an eye witness Noor Jahan (wife of Abdur Rashid) narrates her sad tale. Her husband was shot dead in the attack on their house. Men were shot dead while women were made prisoners and taken to another village. She said that more than two hundred and fifty Pathans – men, women and children were killed. The sadistic Awami League terrorists would slice flesh from the Pathan victims' bodies, rubbing the wound with dust continuously till the victim lost consciousness or life. The abducted women were raped

[17] William LF. Rushbrook, The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey Ltd, London 1972, p-53-54

every night and those who resisted were killed, their bodies were torn into pieces, while 'Joi Bangla' was carved on their foreheads[18].

Operation Search Light. To restore the ever-deteriorating law and order situation, the military, a peacetime force of only one infantry division of four brigades at that time[19] (approximately 15000 personnel), launched OPERATION SEARCH LIGHT on night 25/26 March 1971. Almost all Bengali troops and civil administration present in East Pakistan revolted and started attacking & killing Pakistani military and non-Bengali civilians including their families. They also provided intelligence and physical help to Indian Army and RAW. In Naogaon and Santahar from 26th March to 22nd April 1971, around fifteen thousand non-Bengali people were mercilessly annihilated by Mukti Bahinis[20]. Though the military, within a month, reasonably restored the law and order situation, but it further alienated the masses in East Pakistan, and conditions worsened beyond control.

Role of India. After Yahya Khan's military crackdown in East Pakistan, India saw in the crisis, the chance of the century[21] to cut Pakistan into two. Indian Border Security Force (BSF) troops generally deployed on border, were the first ones to physically jump into action in support of Mukti Bahini. Shri K.F. Rustamji, Director General Indian BSF, lost no time in positioning hand-picked officers with their special commando forces at the most strategic points of India-East Pakistan border. By 29 March 1971, Brigadier B.C. Pande of BSF was directed by Rustamji to proceed to Tripura who did so by placing 104 Commando Battalion at Agartala. Subsequently, more troops were sent on emergent basis for helping miscreants against Pakistan Army. Colonel Rampal Singh (103 Commando Battalion), Colonel Megh Singh (18 Commando Battalion) and Brigadier M.S. Chatterjee (along with commando staff from Hazaribagh) were posted at Cooch Behar, Bongaon and Balurghat respectively, by first week of April 1971[22]. This was the

[18] Qutubuddin Aziz, Blood and Tear, United Press of Pakistan Ltd 1974, p.98-99.
[19] Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership*, National Book Foundation, 1973, p-67.
[20] Government of Pakistan, White Papers, 1971, p.25.
[21] SiddiqSalik, *Witness to Surrender*, Karachi: Oxford University Press 1978, p-247
[22] BC Chakravorthy & S.N Prasad, Govt of India, Ministry of Defence, History Division, New Delhi, 1992, Official History of 1971 India Pakistan War, Appendix, page 803, accessed through bharatrakshak.com on 20 May 2020 (not accessible from Pakistan).

time when India continuously denied any involvement in Pakistani internal matters to the whole world, a blatant lie indeed.

Taking advantage of a staged hijacking of Indian plane "Ganga" and its subsequent blowing up at Lahore airport, (an Indian-planned false flag operation[23]), she banned Pakistani flights over Indian air space. This forced Pakistan to take a much longer route to Dacca via Sri Lanka and caused added problems for shifting of forces / civilians and logistics support. Sri Lanka's generous help to Pakistan by hosting airplanes and ships during these hours of crisis was of immense value. *The Times* reported on *1st* December 1971, that if not all, at least a major portion of Mukti Bahini (Bengali insurgents & rebels) consisted of Indian soldiers. Former Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, in an interview to Oriana Fallaci, admitted that thousands of Indian regular soldiers disguised as Mukti Bahini were despatched to East Pakistan from April to December 1971, and about five thousand of them died[24].

Indian spy agency *Research and Analysis Wing* (RAW), raised in 1968 with the sole purpose of breaking Pakistan into two, played a much deeper and sinister role in these crises. Its' operatives helped Awami League leaders to proclaim independence of Bangladesh in a house in Calcutta. The Indians first secretly, (the fact they never accepted at that time[25]), and later openly, began building up a rebel force called the Mukti Bahini[26]. While talking about deep Indian involvement in East Pakistan crises, the role of Indian organized, trained[27] and equipped insurgents' organization "Mukti Bahini" stands out. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his lieutenants did not leave any stone unturned to widen the existing gulf between the two wings, resulting in added bitterness of Bengali soldiers against the military hierarchy, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and all the West Pakistanis.

International Environment. The international environment at that time did not favour Pakistan. Pakistan was an ally of the US since 1954. It was part of SEATO and CENTO

[23] Junaid Ahmad and Ibnul Hasan Rizvi, Ganga to Pulwama: India's False Flag Operations, AJA Publishers Karachi, 2019, p-28
[24] Chowdhury, Abdul Mumin, Behind the Myth of Three Million, Al-Hilal Publishers, London,1996, p-17
[25] Garry J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: India's secret War in East Pakistan, Random House India, 2013, p-258.
[26] Lt Gen (R) JFR Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: birth of a nation, Monohar Publications, 1997, p-91
[27] Ambassador Lt Col ® Sharif ul Haq Dalim, Bangladesh: Untold Facts, Jumhoori Publications Lahore, 2015, p-128.

and had been given written and unwritten assurances that the US would support Pakistan in case of aggression from any country, including India. Pakistan felt over assured that the US would intervene and prevent its disintegration, however the US followed a coldly calculated policy with regards to helping Pakistan, and the much awaited "US Navy Seventh Fleet" never reached East Pakistan.

USSR almost openly supported India in the months before and during the war. Soviet Union's support to India was formalized through the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed between India and USSR on 9th August 1971. During the conflict, the Soviet Union provided military equipment to India and played a major role at the UN Security Council by vetoing resolutions directed against India. China was in support of Pakistan in 1971 crisis[28]. The support however, remained restricted to moral, material and political domains. The UK openly supported India and on 23rd June 1971, stopped all economic aid to Pakistan[29]. It also allowed setting up of a High Commission by Bangladesh Government in exile in London, from September 1971 onwards[30]. Pakistan could traditionally bank on support from Muslim countries. Although Islamic states were virtually unanimous in their support to Pakistan; the degree of substantive military and financial assistance extended to Pakistan by them was minimal.

Indian Aggression. Before analyzing the open war between India and Pakistan on Eastern Front (East Pakistan), It is important to understand the geography of East Pakistan. It is a low-lying, mainly riverine area with a coastline of 580 kms on the northern littoral of the Bay of Bengal. Replete with mangrove forests and tropical rain forests, the overall land is mostly flat, with a few hilly areas in the east and southeast. The delta plain of the Ganges (Padma), Brahmaputra (Jamuna), and Meghna Rivers and their tributaries occupy 79 percent of the area. Four uplifted blocks (including the Madhupur and Barind Tracts in the centre and northwest) occupy 9 percent, and steep hill ranges up to approximately 1,000 meters (3,300 ft) high occupy 12% in the southeast (the Chittagong Hill Tracts) and in the northeast. It has a tropical monsoon climate characterized by heavy seasonal rainfall, high temperature, and high humidity. Natural

[28] Maj Gen Lachman Singh, Victory in Bangladesh, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dhun, 1981, p-203
[29] Aziz, Kursheed Kamal. World Powers and the 1971 Breakup of Pakistan, Islamabad: Vanguard, 2003. p-162
[30] Ibid – page 165

disasters such as floods and cyclones accompanied by storm surges, periodically affect the country[31]. The international border line with India is snaky, twisting and runs through plains, forests and numerous water channels, thus making it very difficult to defend it effectively.

India started an open but undeclared war by crossing the international border on 21st November 1971 (Eid-ul-Fitr day), ~~a~~ with complete numerical superiority in air, sea and land forces, and attacked East Pakistan from all four sides. Pakistan Army was very thin on ground due to lesser numbers and was widely spread on intricate and winding border lines of East Pakistan, defending BOPs (border outposts) with minimum personnel. They were ordered by Army Headquarters to defend every inch of East Pakistan's land, which was really an uphill task given the numbers of soldiers available. This gave India, fully supported and guided by Muktis, opportunities of bypassing Pakistan Army positions quite easily. Indian Forces always avoided direct confrontation with our troops, wherever possible, and tried to bypass them. However, Pakistani troops defended the borders quite effectively with full force and spirit and caused considerable casualties on enemy. It goes to the credit of our troops, that no major Pakistani position could be overwhelmed by Indian Army, and they were only occupied once vacated by Pakistani troops. Indeed, several isolated positions continued to be held by Pakistan Army, well after 16th December 1971.

Our Armed Forces, having gone through nine months long insurgency without heavy weapons, were faced with an enemy much superior in strength and weapons; almost four times larger. They fought heroically with unparalleled courage, determination and resolve for the unity of Pakistan. Alongside Pakistan Army, both Pakistan Airforce and Pakistan Navy, fought very well despite their meager resources. International community at the UN Security Council discussed the situation for a few days through multiple resolutions but could not reach any consensus due to continuous vetoes by USSR and diplomatic mishandling of the situation by Pakistan at UNO. Timely approval of the resolutions tabled by the Security Council could have saved Pakistan from a lot of bloodshed, the humiliation of surrender and the agony of prison camps. The

[31] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Bangladesh

Security Council's inaction and inept handling of the situation by Pakistan at UN resulted in the conversion of a possible ceasefire, into a surrender. The government was left with no other option but to order Pakistani Forces in East Pakistan to accept the Indian offer of surrender to stop further bloodshed of innocent civilians.

Due to formal Indian aggression launched against East Pakistan on 21st Nov 1971, and her continued atrocities against West Pakistani population in East Pakistan through Mukti Bahini, Pakistan was forced to open Western Front on 3rd Dec 1971. Pakistan Air Force spearheaded the attack by successfully raiding nine Indian air bases (Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Halwara, Sirsa, Ambala, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, Utterlai). Three Pakistani divisions launched offensives against India resulting in reasonable gains. Pakistan wrested the initiative and launched "PUNCH OPERATION" in Kashmir Valley to capture sensitive areas and to offset the Indian forces. In a simultaneous operation, Pakistan successfully captured Chhamb and Qaiser-e-Hind in Hussainiwala Sector (Kasur), which was a matter of pride for us. Fighting determined and tenacious battles, Pakistani forces successfully defended Sulemanki Headworks against repeated Indian attacks. In desert sector of Rahimyar Khan, our forces daringly crossed the border and created a dilemma for Indian Army. Although the senior leadership of Army performed questionably, yet there were innumerable heroes among the officers and men, in both the wings.

Among the senior ones, Major General Eftikhar Janjua, (Shaheed, Hilal-e-Jurat & Bar) in the West, Brigadiers Tajammal Hussain Malik & Saadullah Khan (Hilal-e-Jurat) in the East stood out prominently. Major Muhammad Akram (Shaheed)

Maj Muhammad Akram, NH
(Source: owlapps.net)

Maj Gen Eftikhar Janjua,HJ & Bar
(Source: pinterest.com)



Brig Saadullah Khan, HJ
(Source: thefridaytimes.com)

Brig (Later Maj Gen) Tajammal Hussain Malik
(Source: pinterest.com)

was awarded Nishan-e Haider for his outstanding and courageous performance during battle of Hilli, East Pakistan.

The Real Genocide. Lot of bloodshed happened, firstly during March 1971 and then immediately after fall of Dacca in December 1971. OPERATION SEARCH LIGHT in March 1971 followed a severe wave of killings when hundreds of thousands of Urdu speaking Biharis, loyal Bengalis and other innocent people who stood by the unity of Pakistan, were mercilessly killed. Fall of Dacca also witnessed a cruel wave of massacre of all non-Bengalis, particularly Urdu speaking Biharis and West Pakistanis at the hands of Mukti Bahini and other Indian agents. Their children were torn apart, women raped, properties looted, homes burnt, and remnants were put into filthy camps under most inhumane and unhygienic conditions, living there till today. In the first six months of 1972, Dacca jail which had a capacity of 1966 persons was packed with 14000 so called collaborators, many of them Bengalis. "The worst barbarities of which the Nazis in Hitler's Germany used to be accused were repeated and exceeded"[32]. 'Over 50,000 men, women and children were thrown in prison. Mukti Bahini would frequently take some prisoners from the jail and shoot them without trial. Many prominent Bengali personalities vanished overnight'[33].

The massacre pictures of East Pakistan 1971 shown on internet are actually of Biharis, who were targeted by both Mukti Bahini and other Indian agents, just to malign Pakistani Armed Forces. This was in fact the *real genocide* undertaken by Mukti Bahini, RAW agents, Indian saboteurs and other fanatic elements of society. These gruesome and horrific tales of REAL GENOCIDE have been recorded by famous scholar Qutub din Aziz through his interviews of 173 eye witnesses[34]. On 19 December 1971, just three days after the establishment of Bangladesh, while thousands of Indian Army troops were present in Dacca, uniform-clad Bengali so-called freedom fighters, under Kader Siddique, in full view of thousands of spectators and international media, first badly beat some Bihari's and then killed them by bayoneting them. Kader Siddique himself

[32] Sajjad Hussain, Wastes of Times, 39 and 45
[33] Matiur Rehman, *Bangladesh Today, An Indictment and a Lament*, Published by News and Media Ltd, 33, Stround Green Road, (London, N4 3 EF, 1978) 22, 25 and 26
[34] Qutubuddin Aziz, Blood and Tears, United Press of Pakistan Ltd, 1974, p.98-99

bayoneted three prisoners to death. International media stood by and took pictures and made videos. These pictures were published in the 'Time' magazine on 6 January 1972[35].

Myths and Realities. Sadly, there are a few fabricated myths attached to this tragedy, unchallenged by Pakistan and world at large has settled to believe them. The internet and web pages are full of this venomous propaganda and it is continuously plaguing the minds of all and sundry. These myths are killing of three million Bengalis, dishonouring two hundred thousand women and ninety-three thousand armed forces personnel as prisoners of war. All these have been proved wrong and fictional through research by several renowned writers like William Rushbrook[36], Mr. Afrasiab[37], Abdul Mumin Chowdhury[38], Dr Junaid Ahmad[39], Mr. Ikram Sehgal & Bettina Robotka[40] and Sarmila Bose[41](a Bengali-Hindu professor). Renowned researcher, Yasmin Saikia illustrates that West Pakistani soldiers were not monstrous and barbaric as they have been depicted, but soldiers who, in the middle of civil war, for which they were not prepared, found it difficult to uphold humanitarian values[42]. Killing of three million Bengalis is a fictitious story based upon misreporting of a Soviet Newspaper "Pravda"[43] which became a rhetoric of Bengali leadership later; a usual propaganda quite often seen during such conflicts.

Allegation of killing 3 million is highly exaggerated[44] and the wild figure of three million Bengalis killed during those ten terrible months is multiple times higher than reality[45]. By simple calculations of 265 days i.e. from 26th March to 15th December 1971, it translates into killing of 11,320 personnel and dishonouring 754 women every day, by a force of about 40,000 individuals, spread out in the entire length and breadth of East Pakistan and fiercely engaged in battles with Indian Army and Mukti Bahini. It is

[35] Matiur Rehman, Bangladesh Today, 28, Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, 146 and Fazal, Pakistan's Crisis, 191
[36] William LF. Rushbrook, The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey Ltd, London 1972.
[37] Afrasiab, 1971: Fact and Fiction, Makhdoom Printing press Lahore, 2015.
[38] Chowdhury, Abdul Mumin, Behind the Myth of Three Million, Al-Hilal Publishers, London,1996 .
[39] Junaid Ahmad, Creation of Bangladesh: Myths Exploded, AJA Publishers Karachi, 2016, p-9
[40] Ikram Sehgal & Bettina Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2020, p-222
[41] Bose, Sarmila, Dead Rockoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, C.Hurst & Co., London, 2011, p. 177
[42] Yasmin Saikia, Women, War and the Making of Bengladesh : Remembering 1971, Oxford University Press, New York, Pakistan, New Delhi, 2011
[43] Junaid Ahmad, Creation of Bangladesh: Myths Exploded, AJA Publishers Karachi, 2016, p-258
[44] Ingvar Oja reported in Dagens Nyheter on 1st March, 1973.
[45] Peter Gill. Daily Telegraph, 16 April 1973.

humanly not possible and sounds bizarre. After the formation of Bangladesh, their government announced prize money of 2,000 Takas[46] (Bangladesh currency) for every reported killing case but hardly a fraction of this figure came forward, that too with no veracity of the perpetrators. The figures were even challenged by Colonel Akbar Hussain (a decorated 'Mukti Jodha' and a Bengali cabinet minister under both President General Ziaur Rehman and Prime Minister Khaleda Zia) in the National Assembly of Bangladesh in 1993[47]. Sarmila Bose states in her famous book 'Dead Reckoning' that Bangladeshi eye witnesses and participants of 1971 events told her that women were not harmed by Pakistani Army, except in cross fire[48].

Trumpeting of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers as prisoners of war is also much exaggerated. East Pakistan Garrison was traditionally defended by only one Army division i.e. 13000-15000 personal. According to General AAK Niazi, initially, he had a fighting force of 34,000 only[49]. Owing to worsening law & order situation and Indian threat, two more army divisions along with naval and air force reinforcements were sent to East Pakistan, thus making a total of about 58000 personnel including Navy and Airforce. Total number of prisoners of war repatriated from India by mid May 1974 were 89,981. Out of these 57,944 belonged to the three services of Pakistan Armed Forces. Details of rest of 32,037 were 20,766 from Rangers, FC and Police, 882 were civilians paid out of defence estimates and 10,389 were civilians[50]. There were many civilians, Biharis, West Pakistanis working in East Pakistan and their families, who were not spared by Indian Forces and taken to languish in filthy prisoner of war camps.

Analysis. Irrespective of the fact, who was responsible for this tragedy; the scar is everlasting. Armed Forces of Pakistan who were a symbol of pride for the nation, were pushed into a situation far beyond their control. History is witness that no army could ever fight without the nation behind it, as it is the nations which fight wars, not armies alone. East Pakistan War of 1971, though a national tragedy, still gave birth to stories of courage, valour, patriotism and unmatchable leadership, rarely found in the history.

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[46] Chowdhury, Abdul Mumin, Behind the Myth of Three Million, Al-Hilal Publishers, London, 1996, p, 24
[47] Ibid, p-5
[48] Bose, Sarmila, 'Losing the Victims: Problems of Using Women as Weapons in Recounting the Bangladesh War', Economic and Political Weekly 48 (32) (22-28 Sep. 2007) p-3865
[49] Niazi, A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi:, 1998.
[50] Daily Dawn, Karachi, 1 May 1974

Nowhere in the world, an army 1000 miles away from its home base, without heavy equipment and with a minimum of air and naval support, surrounded by sea on one side and a four times stronger enemy force on three sides having full international and diplomatic support, fought so well for complete nine months against all odds.

Whatever happened has happened and cannot be undone at this stage. It is a misfortune which should not have happened, and people of both Bangladesh and Pakistan, who suffered due to vested interests of leadership across the divide, still regret it. People from both wings were brothers, sharing a common religion and struggled under the same leadership to win independence. Even well after this tragedy resulting in the birth of Bangladesh, they still wish to have cordial and brotherly relations with each other. Pakistan and Bangladesh; two independent and sovereign countries in the world community, sharing the same region, need to have very cordial bilateral relations focusing on mutual cooperation in multiple fields. Both brotherly Muslim countries need to work very closely for regional peace, stability and economic uplift. History is full of examples where one-time foes turned out to be the best of allies in the quest for common interests.

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Pakistan's Support to Afghanistan During Russian Invasion 1979-1989

Introduction

The erstwhile Soviet Union invaded our neighbour Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, to support an Afghan communist government against popular public resistance. The invasion shocked the world and was condemned worldwide. UNSC resolution No 462, though vetoed by USSR, was a sharp rebuff to the Soviet invasion[1]. It resulted in an UN General Assembly emergency meeting[2] and a resolution (passed 104-18 votes in a community of 148 nations) that called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan[3]. OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation - 34 members) also condemned the invasion, while other analysts called it the Soviet Union's moral and political defeat, and the US considered it a serious threat to peace[4]. Sixty six countries, led by US, even boycotted Moscow Olympics in 1980[5]. An overwhelmingly global decision was taken to support the Afghan popular indigenous resistance. Pakistan, as a responsible member of the international community, endorsed it, and played the pivotal role of frontline state in supporting the Afghan resistance. The Soviet Union was ultimately defeated and withdrew her forces from Afghanistan, on 15 Feb, 1989.

Pakistan's Decision to Support Afghan Resistance

This decision was taken after considering the international, regional and domestic environment at the time of the Soviet invasion, and its likely impact on the future of Pakistan. 1980s was an era of international bipolar world order, and Cold War rivalry between two super powers blocs led by US and Soviet Union. The Cold War had begun

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1 UN vote on Afghanistan: a sharp rebuff to Soviets, January 16, 1980, by Louis Wiznitzer, Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.at https://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0116/011646.html.

2 This emergency UNGA meeting was invoked as per UN laws, done only six times till then, on request of 23 countries and its resolution cannot be vetoed by UNSC P5.

3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/15/overwhelming-un-vote-condemns-soviets

4 https://www.sutori.com/story/soviet-invasion-of-involvement-in-afghanistan--DqJjsWpEmbj1hXnLcoKJceGw

5 "The Olympic Boycott, 1980". State.gov. Archives. From U.S. Department of State.

a new Great Game[6], and the Domino Theory[7] increased Afghanistan's importance for the USSR due to Saur Revolution[8] vis-à-vis Islamic Revolution[9] in Iran bordering that could adversely impact Russian Muslim-dominated Central Asia. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had bigger ulterior motives than merely helping a weak and unpopular communist government.

International Compulsions

- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended the contemporary super powers détente. The USSR was condemned worldwide through UN and OIC resolutions, of which Pakistan was an active member. The decision of international community to support the Afghan resistance put Pakistan under legal and moral obligations to support it. This goes against the popular narrative that Pakistan government's Islamic motivation led the nation to participate in Afghan Jihad. Pakistan simply chose to stand firmly with all its allies that included the USA.

- Afghanistan's location has historically made it a buffer between rival superpower blocs, first between Britain-Czarist Russia, and later between US-USSR. The

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6 More precious than peace: The cold war and the struggle for the third world.: By Peter W. Rodman. (New York:Charles Scribner's Son's, 1994. The "Great Game" in the Cold War Era by Walter A. McDougall accessed on June 9, 2021 at https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/08/great-game-cold-war-era/

7 The domino theory was a Cold War policy that suggested a communist government in one nation would quickly lead to communist takeovers in neighboring states, each falling like a perfectly aligned row of dominos. The US National Security Council included the theory in a 1952 report on Indochina, and in April 1954, during the decisive battle between Viet Minh and French forces at Dien Bien Phu, President Dwight D. Eisenhower articulated it as the "falling domino" principle. This was also adopted, in principle, by USSR in later years, albeit in stopping defections and US interferences in communist governments around the world.

8 Saur or Sowr is the Dari (Persian) name of the second month of the Persian calendar, the month in which the uprising took place and was a coup d'état (or self-proclaimed revolution) led by the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against the rule of Afghan President Mohammed Daoud Khan on 27–28 April 1978. The coup was ordered by PDPA member Hafizullah Amin; later at a press conference in New York in June 1978, Amin claimed that the event was not a coup but a revolution by the "will of the people". The coup involved heavy fighting and resulted in a lot of deaths.

9 Amuzegar, Jahangir (1991). Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution. p. 253. The revolution was unusual for the surprise it created throughout the world. It lacked many of the customary causes of revolution (defeat in war, a financial crisis, peasant rebellion, or disgruntled military); occurred in a nation that was experiencing relative prosperity; produced profound change at great speed. Iran voted by national referendum to become an Islamic republic on 1 April 1979 and to formulate and approve a new theocratic-republican constitution whereby Khomeini became supreme leader of the country in December 1979. It specially made USSR skeptical about its impact on Afghanistan and her Muslim dominated central Asian states.

Soviet invasion disturbed the global strategic balance and stability, and brought the USSR physically to Pakistan borders. Geography made Pakistan the frontline state of this International effort. War was imposed on Pakistan, it was not adopted as a matter of choice, that could have been avoided.

- The popular and agreed international modus operandi then adopted to consolidate warring factions in Afghanistan, and seek international and Muslim support, was to declare the Afghan resistance conveniently as Jihad (confrontation) between the good (Mujahedeen) and the bad ('Evil Empire' as declared by US President Ronald Reagan). The US played a significant role in promoting Jihadi culture[10] to reinforce such perceptions of vice vs virtue contest, and was internationally used as a primary tool of conflict management. US President Reagan entertained Mujahedeen leader at White House. Mujahedeen and their Jihad, at that time, had popular social acceptance as well as admiration in the media, as well as films (e.g. Rambo III, besides many other Hollywood films, showed a joint west/mujahedeen struggle against Soviet brutalities). Popularity of jihad in a Muslim country like Pakistan was the natural outcome of that fascination. This was later, often conveniently, misquoted as state policy of Pakistan, to unjustly indict her domestically as well as internationally.

- Other global events of 1979 served as catalysts in intensifying the emotional rhetoric of Jihad in the world in general, and Pakistan in particular. These included the Islamic Revolution in Iran, seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by terrorists, and recognition of Israel by Egypt, before resolving the Palestinian issue. From a certain politically popular perspective, two out of four grand events

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[10] **Reforming Madrasa Education in Pakistan; Post 9/11 Perspectives**, Ms Fatima Sajjad, Volume 3, Issue 1 Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization, spring 2013. The message of jihad was targeted against the Soviets. The Muslims were told through madaris that participation in the Holy War was their sacred duty. There were special text books published by Center for Afghan Studies in the University of Nebraska, Omaha, which was funded by USAID. These books were written in Pashto and Dari by American and Afghan experts. The aim was to promote militant jihad among the Afghan youth. Basic math was taught by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles. University of Nebraska was paid US$ 51 million from 1984 to 1994 for this project. The textbooks designed for promoting militancy in young minds were distributed among the displaced Afghans. Over 13 million copies were distributed in Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madaris where many of their children studied. These books continued to be read by students even after the war ended. The Taliban also found them useful as well for their subsequent utilization.

of 1979 happened in the physical neighbourhood (Iran, Afghanistan), and two in emotional neighbourhood (Palestine and Mecca), crafting opinions of an uncertain future in Pakistan, unless some physical endeavour (Jihad) was undertaken to ward it off.

- Pakistan's decision to support Afghanistan is often projected from a parochial view[11] of achieving strategic depth, contrary to legitimate national concerns[12]. The notion of Pakistan using Afghan territory for its own purposes is a distortion of a concept or of history, and is being used to vilify Pakistan[13].

- Last, but not the least, was the Russian ambition to reach warm waters through Pakistan. Russian strategists have, over the last two hundred years, sought to remedy the lack of warm water ports in the empire, through a steady but relentless drive to the seas. In this respect they seem to have drawn upon the advice and thinking of two of their great strategists, Peter the Great and Prince Gorchakov[14], and the renewed Russian desire to reach the warm waters of the Mediterranean goes back to before the First World War[15]. Moscow tried a different strategy to

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11 Imtiaz, Gul (7 August 2012). "The elusive alliance". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 8 August 2012. Retrieved 7 August 2012. According to Richard Olson, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Pakistan military's doctrine of "strategic depth" is a concept in which Pakistan uses Afghanistan as an instrument of strategic security in ongoing tensions with India by attempting to control Afghanistan as a pawn for its own political purposes.

12 Jean-Luc Racine, Thirty Years after 1979: Is Pakistan Changing Its Strategic Paradigm? The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009 accessed at www.mei.edu. The first Indian nuclear test conducted in 1974 increased this sense of fragility, and pushed the Pakistani Army to redefine its strategic paradigm: in order to counter India's superior conventional forces, Pakistan had to search for "strategic depth" and henceforth increase its influence in Afghanistan, in order to reduce the risk of being squeezed between India and an eventually pro-India regime in Kabul

13 Lt-Gen (R) Asad Durrani (19 October 2011). "Strategic depth — revisited". The Express Tribune. Archived from the original on 21 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.

14 Fifty-one years prior to the birth of the United States Peter the Great died, leaving behind his celebrated will in which he advised his subjects to "... approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey, but in Persia And, in the decadence of Persia, Penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf advance as far as India." (In today's world, "India" ought to be read as "Pakistan"). Accessed at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm#:~:text=Novorossiysk%2C%20Russia%27s%20largest%20warm%20water%20port%20on%20the,Northern%20Sea%20Route%20from%20Southeast%20Asia%20to%20Europe.

15 The honour belongs to foreign minister Sergei Sazonov of Tsarist Russia. He got what he wanted in the Sykes-Picot agreement. Actually, when that secret agreement was first revealed (in a very WikiLeaks way, to the Manchester Guardian) by Vladimir Lenin and Lev Trotsky, over the course of the 1918, the Brest-Litovsk agreement negotiations, after the 1917 communist revolution in Russia, was for some time known as the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement. History was later re-written during the Stalinist era and Russia's role in the agreement was somehow erased. Accessed at

reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea for three decades, but spectacularly failed, courtesy the Afghans and Pakistan[16]. There was a truth in this hypothesis from a Russian perspective, and can even today be validated in the Russian urge to become part of CPEC, as war is not the only way to achieve such a national objective. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in1979 was the logical first step in realisation of this dream, and posed a real threat to Pakistan.

Regional Pressures

- Soviet-Indian collusion played a significant role in the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. The regional scenario of being sandwiched again, between two adversaries (Soviet Union and India), was seen a prelude to the existential threat to the future of Pakistan, and implied an active response to undo it.

- Since inception in 1947, Afghanistan government has not always been completely friendly, due to complexity of border delineation (Durand line), and previously Pakhtunistan issue (claiming area up to Indus River). Soviet presence in Afghanistan, supported then by an anti-Pakistan government in power, was rightly perceived as conversion of a latent threat, to an active capability. Combining it with Soviet ambitions of reaching warm waters through Balochistan, the emerging threat scenario was detrimental to Pakistan's interests in future. It needed active response to neutralize it.

Domestic Imperatives

- Pakhtunistan issue had been politically and actively supported by the Afghanistan government. With additional resources of a superpower at its disposal, it could have been re-ignited and magnified as an international concern, as opposed to a domestic issue, for interference in Pakistan.

- Simmering insurgency in Balochistan, where the Soviet Union is often credited with creation of (Balochistan Liberation Army), would get a fillip through Soviet

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https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/russia-shows-what-it-can-do-in-warm-waters-89563

16 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1261653/cpec-russias-quest-warm-water-ports

intervention and Indian support. It was considered the conduit the facilitated the Soviet Union's ambition reach to warm waters, with India exploiting the sub-national support for it.

- India was actively supporting and instigating Sindhu-Desh issue and interfering domestically by exploiting ethnic and sub-national rivalries, with active participation of RAW.
- Increasing Religious violence in the country was increased by sectarian rivalry, especially in the backdrop of Islamic revolution in Iran and her rivalry with Saudi Arabia.
- Constitutional Islamisation of Pakistan since 1973, and its overt manifestation in 1980s through active government legislation (like Shura and Hudood Ordnances etc.) gave impetus to public perception of Jihad in Afghanistan as a necessary national obligation.
- Pakistan could not afford open confrontation with an adverse superpower, therefore the responsibility as a frontline state had to be through proxy warfare, without overt involvement of the Pakistan government and its military system. This led to speculative interpretations of secret supra-government collusions, contrary to overt policy of neutrality.
- Managing and controlling the massive inflow of international men and material support for the Afghan resistance, demanded a systemic approach for a developing country like Pakistan, and was bound to create unobserved effects in the long run.
- Around 3.2 million Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan. It was initially done in the excitement of replicating Medina's Ansaar-Muhajir brotherhood, due to religious, linguistic and cultural affinities. The long term political considerations and repercussions were eclipsed by jubilant social acceptance at the time.
- Last, but not least, was (erstwhile) FATA's geographical contiguity of the Afghanistan, in addition to linguistic, ethnic and cultural similarities. It was

emotionally charged and geographically suitable, to become the foremost choice to support the Afghan resistance.

Stages of War

It was a war away from impartial media coverage, and can only be briefly explained in some major segments, for understanding.

- **Occupation (December 1979- February 1980)**. Soviet troops swiftly intervened in Afghanistan along two ground routes and one air corridor, quickly taking over major urban centers, military bases and strategic installations within three days. However, Soviet intervention did not create the desired effects of pacifying the country. It rather exacerbated nationalistic sentiment and spread the rebellion[17], which remained dominant and in control of urban outskirts rural surroundings. cities.



Map of Afghanistan showing routes of Soviet intervention

- **Soviet Offensive Operations (March 1980 – April 1985)**. While the Soviets controlled main cities and axes of communications, almost 80% of the country was outside government control[18], where Mujahedeen had dominance. Soviet

[17] Roy, Olivier (1990). Islam and resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. p. 118

[18] Amstutz, J. Bruce (1994). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. DIANE Publishing.

efforts to use the Afghan Army did not succeed, due to organizational and cultural issues and operational inadequacies. So the Russians adopted a three tiered strategy to handle the indigenous Afghan resistance. Broadly the strategy comprised of intimidation, subversion, and military forays.

- **Intimidation**. The Soviets used ground and airborne attacks to destroy villages, livestock and crops in troubled areas, in order to drain the sea of population that supported freedom fighters.
- **Subversion**. The Soviets sent spies to join resistance groups for information and bribery, to increase dissent and weaken the mujahedeen, even using Afghan secret police (KHAD).
- **Military Forays**. The Soviets used to carry out search and destroy operations, using MI 24 helicopters in support, to encircle and occupy villages. The population was then subjected to inhuman interrogations and torture, in order to root out support, and to guerillas limit their options.
- **Conclusion**. The Soviet strategy to handle the insurgency was brutal and ineffective. It created more resistance, making 1985 the bloodiest year, despite increasing Soviet forces to an all-time high.

- **Soviet Departure**
  - **Diplomatic Efforts**. As early as 1985, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry began working with the Soviet Union to provide them an exit from Afghanistan, with initiatives led by FM Sahabzada Yaqub Khan. In 1984-85, FM Yaqub visited China, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, France, US and UK in order to develop a framework for the Geneva Accords, ultimately signed between Pakistan & Afghanistan[19].
  - **Exit Strategy (April 1985- January 1987**). The Soviets shifted the burden of fighting to the Afghan armed forces, and provided necessary

[19] Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press. pp. 248–. ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7. & Amstutz, J. Bruce (1994). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. DIANE Publishing.

support. But the Mujahideen with global support … defeated both Soviets and then supported Afghan forces[20]. Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahedeen (or Peshawar 7), a union of seven Mujahedeen groups fighting the Soviets, was informally agreed since 1981, but was formally shaped in 1985[21].

- **Withdrawal (January 1987-Feburary 1989)**[22]. Gorbachev's rise to Secretary General of the Communist Party in 1985, and his new thinking (Glasnost, Perestroika) went on to ease Cold War tensions. Afghan Mujahedeen with international support, had already generated immense military pressure on the Soviet Union in the last three years[23]. By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced that it would start withdrawing its forces. First half of Soviet contingent was withdrawn from May 15 to August 16, 1988, and second from November 15, 1988 to February 1989, after losing over 13000 casualties. Afghanistan lost over 1.3 million people, the bulk of them civilians, in pursuit of this war[24].

Impact on Pakistan

- **Political Impact**. Beginning with the 1973 Constitution that declared Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, popular political orientation began tilting in favour of building an Islamic identity. 1973 Constitution created institutions like

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20 Sherk, James. ""Winning the Endgame in Afghanistan," by James A. Phillips, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 181, May 18, 1992". Heritage.org. Archived from the original. Johns, Michael (January 19, 2008). "Charlie Wilson's War Was Really America's War". Michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com. "Think tank fosters bloodshed, terrorism," The Daily Cougar, August 25, 2008". thedailycougar.com.

21 Tom Lansford (2003). A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7546-3615-1. Under pressure from the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the main mujahideen parties joined together to form the Islamic Union of Mujahideen of Afghanistan in May 1985. The alliance was led by a general council which included Hekmatyr, Rabbani, and Abd-ur-Rabb-ur-Rasul Sayyaf, the leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan which was established and funded by the Saudis.& Wright, Lawrence (2011). The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (1 ed.). New York: Vintage Books. p. 115. ISBN 978-0-525-56436-2. OCLC 761224415.

22 "Breaking contact without leaving chaos: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan" (PDF). fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. p. 19. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 25, 2010.

23 1986–1992: CIA and British Recruit and Train Militants Worldwide to Help Fight Afghan War". History Commons. Archived from the original on September 12, 2008. Retrieved January 9, 2007

24 LESTER W. GRAU (2004) The Soviet–Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17:1, 129-151, DOI: 10.1080/13518040490440692

the Federal Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic ideology, to channel interpretation of the application of Islam. The PPP government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto organized Islamic Summit Conference in 1974 (after 1973 Arab-Israel war), that had on its agenda issues like the oil embargo, Palestine, Islamic unity and creation of Islamic Solidarity Fund, and thus did create a feeling of Pan-Islamism in society[25]. The Second Amendment to the Constitution declared 'Ahmaddiya' to be non-Muslims[26]. Bhutto faced vigorous political opposition from nine parties coalition of PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), which was united under the banner of Nizam-e-Mustafa[27].In an effort to stem the tide of Islamisation in the streets, Bhutto banned alcohol for Muslims, night clubs and horse racing. The Bhutto government was then removed in Operation Fair Play by Zia ul Haq[28]. The USSR harshly criticized the coup[29]. Zia then committed himself to Nizam-e-Mustafa / Sharia under public pressure, as well as personal preference, and established Shariat courts, Hudood Ordnance and Islamic dispensation of justice[30]. It is in this context that Afghan Jihad came to the fore with considerable global as well as domestic support. Considering it as a one man show in retrospect, is actually taking a parochial view of circumstances, for scapegoating an individual, instead of understanding a social phenomenon that was complex and not easily explainable.

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25 https://historypak.com/lahore-summit-1974/

26 "Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974". The Constitution of Pakistan. pakistani.org.

27 Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; §From Islamic Republic to Islamic State. United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 2005). pp. 395

28 Ibid.

29 Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (2006 ed.). I.B. Tauris. pp. 100–101. Girardet, Edward (1985). Afghanistan: The Soviet War. St. Martin's Press. p. 129.

30 "The basis of Pakistan was Islam. ... Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate culture. It was on the Two-Nation Theory that this part was carved out of the Subcontinent as Pakistan.... Mr. Bhutto's way of flourishing in this Society was by eroding its moral fiber. ... by pitching students against teachers, children against their parents, landlord against tenants, workers against mill owners. [Pakistan has economic difficulties] because Pakistanis have been made to believe that one can earn without working. ... We are going back to Islam not by choice but by the force of circumstances. It is not I or my government that is imposing Islam. It was what 99 percent of people wanted; the street violence against Bhutto reflected the people's desire ..". — General Zia-ul-Haq, by Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; §From Islamic Republic to Islamic State. United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 2005). p. 136. Diamantides, Marinos; Gearey, Adam (2011). Islam, Law and Identity. Routledge. p. 198. Wynbrandt, James (2009). A Brief History of Pakistan. Facts on File. pp. 216–7.

- Zia's effort to practically implement Islamic tenets of Sharia in Pakistan, even before the Soviet intervention, was in consequence to popular public demand since inception[31]. Perceptions differ about the way it was done, but Zia was not alone in wanting implementation of Islamic laws in Pakistan.

- The decision to join the international war effort was politically wholesome, and in consonance with prevalent the international environment. Pakistan did not have a choice to remain aloof from changes occurring around the world, especially in the immediate neighborhood, at the behest of old adversaries.

- The decision to join the Afghan resistance was also politically right, because of its vision to start a covert effort, as opposed to overt aggressive military measures, to safeguard Pakistan's interest with the help of internationally sanctioned and supported resistance, to the communist onslaught.

- Pakistan's political decision won positive international recognition and support, and was endorsed internationally through the UN and OIC resolutions.

- Afghan refugees were given asylum on humanitarian grounds, in consonance with international law. They proved to be a tricky choice between a strategic liability (Pakhtunistan – as 81% refugees in Pakistan were Pakhtuns), as well as a strategic asset to convince them that not Pakistan, but Afghanistan a country of Pashtuns, besides breaking an Indo-Afghan nexus, to ward off a two front dilemma for Pakistan[32].

- **Social Impact**. Accommodating conflict-induced refugees always has two competing ethical perspectives. The first is purely humanitarian (as Pakistan did

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31 Ibid

32 Rhoda Margesson, Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 26, 2007).

in 1980s), and second is political, which Pakistan did not take into full account[33]. In 1979 around 20,000 Afghan had already taken asylum in Pakistan, due to the internal communist coup. From 1978 to Jan 1980, Pakistan supported refugees through her own resources. The figure reached 3.27 million in mid/late1980s, more than 3% of Pakistan's total population. From 1980-2002, Afghan refugees in Pakistan constituted the largest single refugee population in the world[34].

- From the early days of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan's policy towards has been notably liberal and accepting. Whatever the overall impact on Pakistan's economy, the social consequences of refugee presence should not be ignored, even if the level of tolerance of local population has probably been much higher than in most other parts of the world[35].

- Afghan Refugee camps played an important role in the anti-Soviet struggle initially, and later in the rise of Taliban. This is understandable from a social perspective, but politically it created a perception of Pakistan's collusion to raise, maintain and nurture the Taliban. This seems partially true in appearances, because perhaps Pakistan's political thought could not keep pace with changes of international perception about Mujahedeen that was rapidly changing.

- Afghanistan produced 92% of the world's opium crop. It was used to generate resources for the war, and a part of it was smuggled through Pakistan. This led to very unfortunate spill over in Pakistani where besides

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33 Fredre Grare, William Maley, The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, Middle East Institute, MEI-FRS©, 2011. The article is a balanced assessment of problems faced by Pakistan and has been consulted for other opinions as well.

34 For discussion of some of the complexities surrounding these numbers, see Nancy Hatch Dupree, "The Demography of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 366–395; Nancy Hatch Dupree, "Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1988), pp. 845–865; Susanne Schmeidl and William Maley, "The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population: Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions," in Howard Adelman, ed., Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 131–179.

35 Fredre Grare, William Maley, The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. Op cit.

consumption, it was exploited for monetary dividends associated with such narcotics trade[36].

- Being a tribal and independent society, weapons were part of Afghan social culture and outlook, and it was not very different from then existing culture of FATA. However their mingling in our urban society for a long time opened a new Pandora's Box of owning and publically displaying weapons. This was a social phenomenon, facilitated by weakness in our law enforcement, and the onus should lie there. The tendency of attributing it to some sort of formal consent of any particular government to arm the public in this matter is quite far-fetched, and restricts in understanding of why it happened in society.

- **Economic Impact**[37]
  - The perception that Afghans were taking jobs that might otherwise go to Pakistanis, surfaced repeatedly. Pakistanis believed that Afghans were a drain on economy, but conversely Afghan labour migration could prove beneficial to Pakistan in the form of labour and to Afghanistan in the form of remittances[38]. NADRA has stopped providing proof of registration cards to refugees, since 2007
  - It is in fact difficult to make a truly balanced cost-benefit analysis, since a large part of Pakistan's real economy is in the informal sector. Afghan refugees created more demands for goods, and created inflation in some parts of the country, especially Balochistan and then NWFP. However, the economy also surged due to substantial incoming international aid.
  - Pakistan also paid an environment price as a host country. Refugees needed pastures for their flocks, leading to degrading of local ecosystem and massive deforestation.

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36 See Alain Labrousse, Afghanistan: Opium de guerre, opium de paix (Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, 2005); Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009).

37 Frehic Grace, William Maley, The Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, Middle East, Institute, 2011.

38 Ibid.

- Afghan refugees also created extra pressures on an already constrained education system, and Pakistani schools.

Conclusion

In 1979, when Russia invaded Afghanistan, US was enmeshed in Tehran Embassy hostage crisis with an adverse view of Islamic radicalism and adopted wait and see policy, whereas CIA and Pentagon initially considered Afghanistan a lost cause (with or without support of Pakistan) and wastage of resources to unnecessarily antagonize a rival super power in a country that was already slipping under Soviet influence from last twenty years.[39] Hostile (puppet) Afghan Government with aid of a global superpower (USSR) and regional hegemon (India) presented an existential threat to Pakistan. USSR and India were both nuclear powers in 1979 and had earlier played the decisive role in breaking Pakistan in 1971. They were joining hands to be again in a position to exploit ongoing Baluchistan insurgency and Pakhtunistan issue to serve their own ulterior motives. In such a threatening situation Pakistan adopted the most natural course of safeguarding vital national interests, initially alone for almost two years, by a decision to support Afghan Mujahedeen. Initial success created opportunity for USA to exploit it and to make it a Vietnam for USSR. Thus, our allies started pouring in resources to make it a success, but only till it could serve US interests, denying Mujahedeen the ultimate victory of capturing Kabul and laying fertile grounds for a ensuing civil war. Pakistan's support to Afghanistan was based on pragmatic principles driven by national interests, in the backdrop of the prevalent international environment of 'Cold War' at the time. Other reasons cited for undertaking such a massive support to the Afghans, are at best a different perspective and at worst speculation.

Though the undesired outcomes of our support to Afghan war affected Pakistan in many unfortunate ways, it was not foreseeable at the time. No one could have predicted such a sudden US exit, along with international community, let aside later sanctions, and leaving Pakistan in the lurch. Pakistan had to handle the ensuing conflict in Afghanistan alone, and without any international support. Negative socio-political fall out is an

[39] Mohammad Yousaf, Mark Adkin (1992), The Bear Trap (Afghanistan's Untold Story), Leo Cooper Publishers, London, UK.

undeniable fact, but mostly resulted due to constrained capacity issues created by US sanctions and deliberate USSR exploitation. Political and social problems which Pakistan faced afterwards, is a complex interaction of many religious, ethnic, sectarian and sub-national tendencies, exacerbated further by political wrangling in the decade (1990s) following the Afghan imbroglio. Social phenomenon as complex as this, cannot and must not, be grounded in individual motivation alone, as it tends to mask the social realities of a nation, needing actual attention and solutions.

Pakistan Army and the War on Terror (WoT)

The seeds of Pakistan's war on terror were sown in the decade long (1979-1988) Afghan Jihad against the erstwhile USSR. The western world got together to defeat communism and Pakistan became their frontline state. Scores of 'Mujahideen' from all over the world rallied inside Pakistan who were trained and sent to Afghanistan, duly supported by USA and Pakistan. Ironically, with the breakup of erstwhile Soviet Union, Americans abandoned the region, leaving Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with the highly motivated, trained, and battle hardy 'Mujahideen' cum 'Taliban' at their own. The resultant infighting within Afghanistan led to the creation of hardline Taliban government there.

After the dastardly event of 11 September 2001, USA declared global war on terrorism, and launched ferocious attacks on Afghanistan where the leadership of 'Al Qaeda' (a terrorist organisation, considered to be the mastermind of 9/11), was provided safe havens by the then Taliban government. Consequently, Pakistan's long, porous border with Afghanistan afforded the influx of fleeing miscreants into Pakistan's erstwhile FATA region, where they found their sympathisers of Russo – Afghan War (1979 to 1988). These miscreants started carrying out brutal acts of terrorism in Pakistan in the shape of suicide bombings in bazars, places of worship, schools, hospitals, and other public habitations, killing countless innocent people. This endangered the very edifice of the country. Such dire circumstances forced Pakistan to join the US - led global war on terrorism. Hence, for the first time in 2002, Pakistan's Armed Forces moved into erstwhile FATA under the umbrella of operation AL MIZAN, to rid the country of the bane of terrorism.

The ensuing years witnessed an upsurge both in operations by the Armed Forces, and miscreants' activities. Year 2007 saw the creation of 'Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP)' with clear external support from 'Research & Analysis Wing' (RAW, India) and others, which united various factions of miscreants under one banner. Resultantly, their activities spread far and wide across the country targetting big cities such as Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Quetta and Karachi. Miscreants operated from their bases inside the agencies of erstwhile FATA. The biggest threat to internal security of Pakistan came

when TTP took control of Swat valley and challenged the writ of the government, as the valley lies perilously close to Islamabad. TTP committed heinous crimes against the peaceful local population of the vale, in order to subjugate and coerce them to support the miscreants. They turned this beautiful 'Little Switzerland' into the valley of death, and blood of the innocent turned Swat River red. The Armed Forces of Pakistan launched large scale operations to flush out, and crush, fully entrenched terrorists. To save the people of Swat from further suffering, the Army relocated a huge number of 'Internally Displayed Persons' (IDPs) to peaceful camps away from the war torn areas. It was an exemplary relocation and later rehabilitation of IDPs back to their homes akin to 'Ansaar-e-Madina', where the whole nation welcomed their brethren from Swat with open arms. From 2008 to 2009, Armed Forces carried out operations RAH-E-HAQ and RAH-E-RAAST to clear miscreants from Swat district, and established writ of the government in the area, after sacrificing countless lives. Swat operations could be termed a huge turnaround in Pakistan's war against terrorism. At the same time, numerous operations were underway in the adjoining regions of Swat such as Bajaur, Shangla, Malakand, lower Dir and Buner. The miscreants were on the run, but were moving like water; from one agency of FATA to another. They increased their activities deep inside Pakistan causing fear and mayhem through suicide bombings, use of 'improvised explosive devices' (IEDs), indiscriminate firing, target killing and kidnapping etc.

TTP's leadership concentrated in South Waziristan Agency (SWA), was controlling all the activities across the country. Therefore, operation RAH-E-NIJAAT was undertaken in Oct 2009, which successfully uprooted TTP from SWA by Dec 2009. Once again, the peaceful local population had to suffer the ordeal of migration for the period of war in their homeland. In the year 2010, the gallant Armed Forces of Pakistan cleared Bajaur, Kurram and Orakzai agencies of erstwhile FATA. From 2010 to 2013, the Armed Forces consolidated their gains and firmly established the writ of the government in most parts of the troubled region. The process of rehabilitation started with construction of roads, schools, hospitals and dams etc. During the same period, the miscreants kept on retaliating with their terrorist activities in major cities, GHQ, Marriot hotel Islamabad, airports, police establishments, Frontier Corps(FC) and Rangers' set ups, Army, Airforce and Naval bases, besides killing national leaders. The Armed Forces

stepped up their cleansing operations, and eventually the miscreants' back was broken, and most of them were either killed or crossed over to Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, North Waziristan Agency (NWA) was the only area from where the miscreants were operating. Hence on 15 June 2014, operation ZARB-E-AZB was launched in NWA, which was considered to be the stronghold of miscreants who operated from extremely inhospitable terrain. 16th Dec, 2014 could be termed as 'the darkest day' in the war on terror, when the terrorists attacked Army Public School (APS), Peshawar that shook the entire nation to its core. 149 people including 132 students ranging from ages 8 to 18 years were ruthlessly martyred. The brave principal of the school became a shield between the terrorists and her children and they could only touch the students after her martyrdom. All six foreign terrorists were killed by the Army commandos during the rescue operation, and more than 900 students were rescued. It was the most atrocious and deadliest attack which brought the nation together in anguish and mourning – 'the nation was at war'. The government formulated 'National Action plan' (NAP), which was unanimously approved by all stakeholders. Consequently, the scope of operations against miscreants was enhanced. Despite stiff resistance, our valiant Armed Forces intensified operation ZARB-E-AZB, which went on for two years and the terrorists were successfully evicted from NWA. As a result, terrorist activities across the country reduced considerably.

Having rid the erstwhile FATA region of the miscreants, it was time now to cleanse the country of their support bases. Hence, operation RADD-UL-FASAAD was initiated on 22 Feb 2017. Under its umbrella, the supporters, financiers and nurseries of recruits for terrorism were targetted. Countless 'Intelligence Based operations' (IBOs) were successfully conducted by unsung heroes, to save the nation from the perils of terrorism.

Much to the chagrin of miscreants and their benefactors, the Pakistani nation, Armed Forces and 'Law Enforcing Agencies' (LEAs) stood tall against all odds and won this impossible war. Despite being trained for conventional war with known enemy, the Armed Forces of Pakistan turned a new page in the history of warfare by simultaneously facing the conventional threat from the east (India) and winning the war against shadows (unknown enemy) in the west. Arguably, no army in the world has won such a complex

war in modern history within such span of time, involving such intriguing dynamics i.e. tribal, ethnic, economic, societal, sectarian, regional, extra regional and global cross currents. All this had the backing of hostile foreign agencies and powers who wanted to embroil the nation in a never ending war, with the purpose of weakening Pakistan. However, owing to the sense of sacrifice and tenacity of the military and the nation's resilience, we have been able to defeat the faceless enemy. On the other hand, 'International Security Assistance Force' (ISAF) in Afghanistan consisting of over 39 nations at one time, with all their might and wherewithal, failed to succeed in the US led global war on terrorism.

This remarkable victory has come about with huge sacrifices in men and material by the nation in general, and people of erstwhile FATA in particular, who had their homes and complete way of life destroyed. In this ongoing war, over 70 thousand Pakistanis, including (approximately) 8 thousand military, and LEA personnel, embraced shahadat - much more than during any conventional war fought with India. Besides, Pakistan's economy suffered colossal loss in this war. Nonetheless, a lot more needs to be done to sustain this incredible victory. Without addressing the root causes of terrorism i.e. religious extremism sponsored from abroad, economic deprivation, poverty, unemployment, lack of education, social injustice, discrimination etc., there will always be fresh material available to become cannon fodder for centrifugal forces. Mainstreaming of erstwhile FATA and adherence to NAP is the right way forward if we want to establish long lasting peace.

Pakistan Army's Role in National Development and International Peacekeeping

Pakistan Army has not only fought wars, but has always been in the service of the nation since inception, which started with flood duties in 1947, protection of refugee trains and their settlement during partition. The tale of this service by Pakistan Army continues in the cause of the progress of Pakistan.

Every year Pakistan experiences small to medium intensity floods somewhere in the country, thus Army, at times Navy also, is generally called out in aid of civil power. Pakistan Army has remained in the forefront with civilian administration to take the people to safety. However, during high floods of 1973, 1992 and 2010 its role was further enlarged, which started with bringing people to safety, providing food and transport for the homeless, and in working on flood control and sanitation. Army Engineers performed efficiently in reconstructing bridges, repairing roads, building, cleaning, deepening canals and constructing embankments to contain swollen rivers. Pakistan Army's role in combatting regular floods in erstwhile East Pakistan, right upto 1970, is notable.

Flood relief operations (Source: defence.pk)

In October 2005 an unprecedented calamity befell north of Pakistan, a massive earthquake jolted Kashmir and adjoining areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Though Pakistan Army deployed on the Line of Control (LOC), itself suffered enormous losses in men and material, its sense of duty energized and reinvigorated every officer and man, to bring in all resources to help their countrymen. Initially providing them relief, with the help of PAF, in quick and efficient evacuation from a very difficult terrain, to adjust them in large tent cities and later helped them rehabilitate by reconstructing their villages and

Rescue operation after earthquake
(Source: chinadaily.com.cn)

cities to resettle them again. The planning and conduct of this gigantic multi-national effort, by Pakistan Army, is no less than a miracle. It is worth mentioning that Pakistan Army also helped Iran, Turkey and Nepal with all its resources, after massive earthquakes.

Quetta has always had chronic water shortages due to scanty and irregular rainfall. Had it not been for the Army, the city may have gone arid long ago. The Army helped in construction of Wali Tangi and Kach Dams in early 1960s, to enable it to survive as a thriving metropolitan city of an important province[1].

In the beginning of 2020, the world witnessed the spread of pandemic COVID 19, which soon engulfed the whole world. Pakistan was no exception. Since no vaccine for of the disease was available, prevention was the only way to stop the spread. Lockdowns were enforced but they were no solution as they would hurt the economy. Pakistan was caught between the devil and the deep sea. Pakistan Army came out to help and established National Control and Operation Center(NCOC), which became the nerve centre of the collective effort of all concerned departments, to monitor the pattern of spread of this disease, its analysis and collective response. Smart lockdowns were introduced which buttressed the health of both the population and the economy, and thus saved Pakistan from the looming disaster. Pakistan is among the very few countries of the world which effectively controlled the spread of COVID-19.

2020 also witnessed an attack of locusts on standing crops. People of Pakistan again looked towards its Army to efficiently control it, to protect the agrarian economy. Pakistan Army established National Locust Control Centre (NLCC) to monitor the pattern of locust attack and take effective measures to counter it before it damaged the crops. A cohesive effort of the Army with other departments helped save the lifeline of Pakistan, the agriculture sector.

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[1] Nation Building and Pakistan Army by Raymond A. Moore, Jr. Published by Aziz Publishers Lahore, in 1979.

Construction of tunnels
(Source: geologydesk.com)

Pakistanis take lot of pride in Pakistan-China friendship, but to give this friendship a practical manifestation was through construction of 901 kilometer long Karakorum Highway, an engineering marvel, which men in khaki as part of Frontier Works Organization (FWO) helped build with their blood and sweat over several years, such was the difficulty of terrain, virtually each kilometer cost a life. The dream of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will now be realized through this road. FWO, a subsidiary organization of Pakistan Army, since its establishment in 1966, is contributing in a big way to the national economy. More important is its role in construction of 674 Kilometer long highways, 751-meter long Nahakki Tunnel, Gomal Zam Dam[2] and infrastructure in far flung areas of the country, where other commercial organizations fear to tread. It has not only helped in construction of CPEC infrastructure in Balochistan but also worked on construction of new airfields, dams, canals and thermal power stations in other parts of the country. FWO has the distinction to be declared Best Infrastructure Development Company of Pakistan for the year in 2016 during "29th RCCI International Achievement Award 2016" held in Dubai. While at Turkey, FWO was awarded for "Fastest Growing Company of the Year 2017[3]. It also undertook some foreign ventures like construction of Road from Peshawar to Jalalabad and clearance of mines in Kuwait after First Gulf War.

The Army was frequently called upon for de-silting of canals, help provincial governments identify ghost schools to streamline their education system and train police force on modern lines.

In last seven decades whenever need aroused, all ranks of Pakistan Army contributed their several days salary for the cause of country and wellbeing of people of Pakistan.

[2] Dawn dated 31 October 2019
[3] https://www.brecorder.com/news/1000236/interview-with-aftab-ahmad-chaudhry-regulatory-authorities-foremost-to-reform-real-estate

Presenting cash[4] *and cheques in two different eras.* (Source: dawn.com)

Fauji Foundation was established by an act of Parliament in 1954 as a welfare organization, which is run for retired army personnel. It is not only helping them in their rehabilitation after retirement but has also become a leading light in corporate sector. It is managing more than 12 industrial units ranging from power projects to cement plants and fertilizers. As a conglomerate, it is one of the highest taxpayer of the country and at the same time creating equal job opportunities for civilian youth. As far as funding of ex-servicemen is concerned, it greatly eases burden on national exchequer.

National Logistic Cell (NLC) was established in 1978 to augment inadequate Railways to speed up movement of cargos south-north of country, to reduce congestion on Karachi Port. It now has a Cargo Wing and an Engineering Wing. Its Engineering Wing has undertaken big projects like construction of roads, overhead bridges and underpasses in different parts of the country including projects of national import and CPEC infrastructure. Whereas, its cargo fleet moved millions of tons of cargo up and down country to help achieve development targets of the country.

In 1976, Special Communication Organization (SCO) was assigned task to provide telecommunication to the inhabitants of AJK and GB in the most treacherous weather and terrain conditions, in the absence of T&T/PTCL[5]. Hallmark of this military organization is that it connects people of those areas with the rest of the country, whereas other mobile companies cannot operate, and yet it is financially viable.

[4] 1 FF Regiment Archives
[5] sco.gov/pk

Army's contribution in the field of education and higher education is also far reaching. Network of Army Public Schools, and Federal Government Education Institutions administered by Pakistan Army in entire Pakistan is imparting quality education up to secondary level. National University of Science and Technology (NUST) since its establishment in 1993 has become a modern pioneer institution of excellence and is now ranked among the top Universities of the world. Army has also established National University of Technology (NUTECH) and National University of Medical Sciences (NUMS) to help achieve growing technical and medical requirements of the country. PAF, Navy and Rangers/Frontier Corps are also partners in this spread of quality education through their respective schools and cadet colleges. Air and Bahria Universities are providing quality higher education.

Army is one of the largest contributors to United Nations peace keeping missions around the globe, since 1964. The countries include Congo, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, East Timor, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Angola, Sudan, Western Sahara, Tunisia, Rwanda and Central African Republic. Besides earning international goodwill, it earns Pakistan Army, a substantial foreign exchange every year, which helps meet foreign obligations of Pakistan. Pakistan Army has so far contributed more than 200,000 troops in 46 missions in 28 countries. 156 Pakistani Peace Keepers including 24 officers laid down their lives in the cause of international peace[6].

Pakistan Army alongwith PAF and Navy also helps friendly countries like Saudi Arabia, Sudan Iraq, Palestine, Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe in training their Cadets, Officers and Soldiers, which contributes to military diplomacy.

Just like education, Pakistan Army has a vast network of hospitals and medical services spread all over the country. Combined Military Hospitals (CMH) established almost in all major cities of the country from Skardu in the north to Karachi, Khuzdar, Gawadar and Zhob in south. These hospitals are not only extending medical facilities to members of armed forces but civilians as well. In Azad Kashmir CMHs are providing medical services to the entire population. Armed Forces Institute of Cardiology (AFIC)

[6] THE NEWS, dated 24 October 2019.

is the best facility for heart patients in the entire country. Similarly other Armed Forces Institutes like Ophthalmology, Urology, Dentistry, Bone Marrow Transplant, Pathology, Transfusion, Mental Health, Nutrition, Radiology and Imaging, and Rehabilitation Medicine are extending quality specialized medical services to the citizens and also training the youth for their future role as specialists in their respective fields.

Since British Indian Army's war effort, was focused towards East when it was fighting against Japanese invasion in Burma in World War 2, therefore most of the military industries were raised to help that effort, which ultimately became part of India after independence. Pakistan Army Air Force and Navy marched their way in the years to achieve indigenization and are now running Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF), Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT), National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation (NRTC) Naval Dockyard Karachi, modern aircrafts manufacturing facility in PAF Complex Kamra and are meeting defense production needs of the country.

Army helped establish institutions like National Data and Registration Authority (NADRA), and National Accountability Bureau (NAB). NADRA has gained international fame and Pakistan is now helping friendly countries like Sudan and Kenya establish such institutions in their own country. NAB in last few years brought back billions of looted and fleeced money back to National exchequer and helped affected individuals.

Civil armed forces (CAF) of Pakistan work under Ministry of Interior and are providing extra ordinary services in maintenance of law and order and protection of border duties. All these CAFs are officered by Pakistan Army and providing leadership to their respective forces.

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Pakistan